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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR
Throughout this past year, undergraduate students overcame obstacles that upended any sense of
educational normalcy. Many students returned to their college campuses for the first time in a year
and a half, continued to navigate the COVID-19 pandemic, and experience hybrid forms of
learning inside and outside of the classroom. Despite the challenges presented to every student,
undergraduates across the country and the world carried on and made the most of an atypical school
year.
The staff of DUJPEW has been incredibly grateful to read the wonderful submissions that we
received this year and collaborate with our peers in the undergraduate community. This year’s
selection process was as difficult as our past editions thanks to the intellectually engaging
submissions that we received from across the country. Like the submissions that we received, the
nine papers that we present in this edition of DUJPEW cover a variety of topics, including
American presidential elections, Canadian immigration, and juror selection bias. Dartmouth
College Class of 1819 alumnus Rufus Choate once said, “Happy is he who has laid up in his youth,
and held fast in all fortune, a genuine and passionate love of reading.” I and the rest of the staff at
DUJPEW are hopeful that the works in this issue of the journal stimulate the mind and further
intellectual curiosity.
I would like to thank the entire DUJPEW staff for their great work this year. Although we had a
smaller team than in past years, the selection and editing processes went smoothly, and the
enthusiasm that each staff member brought allowed this year’s issue to be as strong as ever. I must
also thank Jacob Meister and Mason Wegener for bringing me into the DUJPEW community
during my freshman year — it has been an honor helping the journal persevere through the
complications presented due to the pandemic. I would also like to express thanks to Noah
Freundlich and Jonathan Briffault, who helped keep the journal alive and were great to work with
last year.
In closing, I would like to thank the nine authors who contributed the fabulous pieces of writing
that make up this year’s publication. Each of these works adds something new and fascinating to
their disciplines, and we are proud to be able to provide a platform to share these pieces to a wide
audience. I hope that all readers of this year’s journal will be able to appreciate the time and effort
that has gone into creating this year’s publication, and that endeavor begins with our nine authors’
commitment to their crafts.
Addison Dick ’22, Editor-in-Chief
Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs

Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

3

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

ARTICLES
5

The Religious Seculars: How Does Yom Kippur Impact Electoral Turnout?
Gall Olle Sigler, Yale University

21

“Pure People” and “Corrupt Elites:” Corruption Talk in the 2020 Election
Milan Loewer, Columbia University

47

Early Childhood Intervention and Income Inequality: An Analysis on the
Intergenerational Mobility of Head Start Participants
Paul Hinton, Carleton College

67

Bias in the Jury Box: The Sociological Determinants of Juror Selection for
Capital Cases in North Carolina
Alessandra Quattrocchi, University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill

101

Studying the Economic Impact of the Demonetization Across Indian Districts
Arnav Joshi, University of Pennsylvania

120

Conservatism, Collaboration, and Capacity: Political Explanations for Canada's
Shift in Immigrant Admissions Logic
Jaidyn Appel, Tufts University

133

Identifying Potential Pork-Barrel Legislation with Machine Learning
Sunil Green, Purdue University

144

Econometric Analysis of the Relationship between Domestic Economic Growth
and Levels of Inflow of Remittances in Developing Countries
Mihail Naskovski, Kalamazoo College

161

Triple (Identity) Threat: Multi-Layered National Identity Appeals in Republican
Political Narratives During the 2016 and 2020 Presidential Elections
Brita Mackey, Colorado College

https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

4

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

The Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics, and World Affairs
Volume. I, Issue. IV, 5-20, July 2022

The Religious Seculars: How Does Yom Kippur Impact Electoral
Turnout?
GALL OLLE SIGLER
Yale University
ABSTRACT: Does Yom Kippur impact electoral turnout in religious and secular Jewish
communities in Israel? By collecting data on electoral behavior in elections to local councils from
1983 to 2018 in Jewish-secular, Jewish-religious and non-Jewish municipalities, this research
attempts to elucidate the relationship between the communal Yom Kippur experience and electoral
turnout. This research finds that that the Yom Kippur experience appears to decrease turnout in
secular municipalities, while no statistically significant impact was observed in religious
municipalities. Research on the psychological significance of novelty and religious events, as well
as ethnographic analysis of Israel, suggests that the Yom Kippur experience undermines the stakes
of both intra- and inter-communal disputes, decreasing the perceived significance of the elections
in the heterogenous secular municipalities. Further research is necessary to explore the politically
potent religious undertones of Israeli secular identity.
Introduction
As election campaigning approaches the ballot date, politicians encourage citizens to
pilgrimage to the polls and exercise their “civic” right to vote. They emphasize that electoral
participation is paramount to the maintenance of accountable government, and that democracy
demands the participation of the citizenry in the political process. Yet despite the rhetoric, citizens
in the developed world seem increasingly less inclined to vote. Mirroring this worrying pattern,
turnouts have substantially decreased in Israel over the years, in both national and municipal
elections. Consistent turnout decline, however, does not fully encompass the puzzle the Israeli
voter poses to researchers; electoral participation in Israel has been the most volatile out of all
OECD countries between 1996 and 2015.1 Furthermore, Israeli attitudes towards secularization
defy trends in the developed world. Judaism remains inseparable from the Israeli experience, and
most Israelis refuse both modern secularism and religious orthodoxy. As the Israeli identity crisis
festers, questions surrounding religion’s role in the public sphere are increasingly salient on party
platforms. Meanwhile, social rifts in Israel have widened due to right-wing populism and the
occupation of Palestine, rendering electoral participation more important than ever.
Considering both the significance of electoral turnout to a vibrant democracy and Judaism
to Israelis, this research aims to contribute to the literature on elections in Israel. Specifically, this
research strives to delineate the impact of Yom Kippur on electoral turnout among religious and
secular communities. Literature on the impact of religious events on electoral turnout is lacking,
and existing scholarship is ambivalent about the impact of Yom Kippur on political participation.
On one hand, research finds that individuals exposed to religious messages are more politically
assertive and willing to participate. On the other hand, other scholars find that religious
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experiences bolster political attitudes that potentially reduce the importance of elections. By
analyzing elections in religious and secular municipalities in Israel from 1983 to 2018, I find that
Yom Kippur diminishes electoral turnout in secular municipalities but has no statistically
significant impact in religious municipalities.
Literature Review
The fact that citizens participate in elections itself is the underlying enigma of election
turnout research. Drawing upon Ordenshook and Riker’s observation that the power of the
individual to impact election results is infinitely small, Macaluso and Wanat deduce that voting
cannot be comprehensively explained from a purely “utilitarian” perspective2. Scholars presented
numerous explanations for why individuals vote despite their votes’ insignificance to electoral
outcomes. Gerber and Cutts explore the possibility that voting is driven by “habit-formation” 3 4.
Other scholars conjectured that voting is valued as a “civic duty” in liberal democracies 5 6.
Relatively recently, scholars began earnestly examining voting as an expressive act 7 8. Striving to
revise the paradigm, scholars such as Franklin et al. criticized the focus on the voter in explaining
turnout patterns, claiming that the elections themselves, and how they are perceived are the main
driver behind turnout9. The focus on the elections rather than the individual buttresses numerous
theories, such as the “stakes-hypothesis”, which posits that individuals decide to vote based on the
perceived significance of the elections.
Yet despite the miscellaneous motivations to vote, turnout changes in every election.
Among the most studied explanations for changes in electoral turnout is economic performance,
yet scholars disagree about the direction of the impact. Rosenstone and Park find that poor
economic performance decreases political participation, while Lau finds evidence that negative
perceptions of economic performance are correlated with higher turnout rates 10 11 12. Hofsetter
finds that higher levels of competition between parties enhances electoral13. Lending validity to
the “stakes-hypothesis,” Pacek finds that the perception of the importance of elections most
accurately captures changes in electoral participation14. Correspondingly, Zimmer claims that
social diversity within a community increases political participation as it increases competition for
resources15. Geys cites research by G. Cohen indicating that homogeneity, rather than
heterogeneity, increases electoral participation, yet finds evidence that provides some support for
Zimmer’s thesis16. Stockemer and Wittington find that election turnout also appears to be impacted
by the proximity of an election to a war17.
Despite contradicting views on the motivation for and differences in turnout, religion
appears to be a consistently accurate predictor of both turnout and political affiliation, as well as a
reliable motivator for electoral participation. Research has found that individuals who frequent
religious institutions exhibit higher election turnouts18. Macaluso and Wanat find that the more
ritualistic a religion is the higher electoral participation among its members19. Scholars designed
numerous explanations for the high turnout displayed by religious individuals. Brady et al.
postulates that attendance in religious services facilitates the development of civic skills that are
indispensable to political participation20. Luedeman suggests that voting in elections may be
perceived as a religious act21. Gerber et al. asserts that political participation is often socially
mandated by fellow parishioners and churches are often explicitly political, increasing voting rates
among church frequenters22. Nonetheless, research on the impact of religion on electoral
participation has almost exclusively focused on associational religiosity. Scholars have largely
disregarded the potential role of religious ideas or personal religiosity in impacting turnout.
Religious “communalism” is prevalent in Israel, especially among “Traditionalists,” who are less
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likely to frequent the synagogue but exhibit comparable levels of religious beliefs to Orthodox
Jews23.
The focus on the “associationally religious” also overlooked singular religious experiences
and their potential impact on political attitudes. The meager research on singular religious
experiences indicates that they may meaningfully influence political attitudes. Clingingsmith et al.
explores the impact of the Hajj on Pakistani participants, finding that Hajjis are more tolerant of
other ethnic and religious groups, and endorse peace, equality and harmony24. Mclendon and Riedl
find that religious “self-reaffirmation” messages ameliorate propensity towards political
participation among participants25. Their findings reaffirm previous inferences by Rosenstone that
“a sense of personal efficacy” is likely to induce political participation26. Most salient to this
research, Cohen-Zada et al. establishes that participation in the “Selichot”, a communal prayer at
the synagogue during Yom Kippur, increases risk-seeking behavior as well as trust in Muslims,
and decreases support for political compromise27. Psychological research elucidates that the
impact of the repetition of religious activities diminishes over time. For example, Sheldon finds
that individuals prefer novelty to repetition, suggesting that a motley of activities are indispensable
to sustaining happiness28. Likewise, theories of decreasing marginal utility were applied to
religious goods by previous scholars, such as Zaleski and Zech29. The literature appears to support
the notion that a religious activity is more impactful the first time it is experienced, and utility to
the individual moulders with repeated experience.
Yom Kippur is an annual religious experience that constitutes “one of the most prominent
days in contemporary Israeli public culture”, transcending the secular-religious divide. Yom
Kippur is arguably the most significant fast in Judaism, as individuals settle their “account with
God” by fasting and expressing remorse for their sins30. Little research is devoted to the
relationship between religious fasting and politics; in their historical analysis of fasting in
Scotland, Stephen concludes that collective fasting was a socially unifying experience31.
Correspondingly, in Israel, religious and secular Jews alike frequent the synagogue annually for
the fast. Despite the prominence of secular Jewish culture in Israel, Keissar-Sugarmen finds that
“a sweeping majority of Jews” in Israel abide by the fast32. While Cohen-Zada et al. earnestly
explores the impact of Selichot, they fail to account for the entirety of the Yom Kippur experience.
Throughout the holiday all business and transportation activities stop; As television programs
cease to air, bicycles fill the streets. None of these social prohibitions are enshrined by law, yet
they are followed with equal vehemence by both secular and religious citizens. At the center of
Yom Kippur is the individual’s relationship to God, family, and the community. Throughout Yom
Kippur, Israelis “contemplate the previous year and try to be better people”33. In the public sphere,
individuals stroll the streets “meeting with people in the neighborhood” and greet passersby with
the ritualistic “See you next Yom Kippur”. At home, individuals resort to spending quality time
with their families; often, they fast but remain at home and do not visit the synagogue. Therefore,
the Cohen-Zada account captures merely one version of Yom Kippur and fails to encompass some
of the amorphous and communal aspects, as well as the personal traditions, of Yom Kippur.
Despite the absence of research directly addressing the relationship between religious
experiences and turnout, the aforementioned research could be manipulated to hypothesize both
an increase and a decrease in political participation following Yom Kippur. Research on electoral
behavior among religious individuals seems to insinuate that after a religious experience, an
individual would be more willing to participate in elections. For religious individuals, Yom Kippur
might constitute a reaffirmation of their association with the synagogue and their Jewish identity,
relationships that foster greater political participation. Among seculars, the rush to the synagogues
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during Yom Kippur might expose individuals to the “organized-religion effect” on political
attitudes, civic skills and sense of duty. Secular individuals, who intuitively are more connected
with Judaism during Yom Kippur, might see value in voting as a religious act. Perhaps the Yom
Kippur experience, which is associated with the community and the family, buttresses a sense of
social responsibility and consequently increases the stakes of the elections. Following Yom Kippur
secular individuals might frequent the synagogue more often. Therefore, there are myriad
hypothetical explanations, rooted in the literature, that support the notion that Yom Kippur may
enhance electoral participation.
Conversely, the research on the impact of religious experiences on political positions lends
itself to the turnout-diminishing effect hypothesis. Research on both the Haj and Yom Kippur
found that attitudes towards out-group members improve following the religious experience.
Considering the Israeli social hodgepodge and its political cleavages, the softening of attitudes
towards out-group members could potentially diminish the stakes of the elections. Among the most
salient issues in every Israeli election is Judaism’s role in the public sphere. Secular-lefitist parties
promise to halt the “Judaization” of the public sphere and tax-benefits to Yeshivas and Orthodox
Jews, while the religious right calls to protect and expand the prevalence of Judaism in Israeli
society. As the debate intensifies towards election day, the perception of the elections’ stakes
purportedly increases. The enhanced tolerance among all synagogue visitors in Yom Kippur, as
well as the attachment of seculars to Jewish institutions during Yom Kippur, might lead both sides
to be more accepting of the other’s view. Furthermore, the focus on self-reflection and improved
perception of the other might placate political assertiveness between adjacent social groups.
Secular and religious Jews, for example, are fluid and ill-defined categories in Israel, in contrast
to the clear demarcation between Jews and Muslims. Cohen-Zada et al. finds that Yom Kippur did
not fundamentally change political positions; rather, it caused participants to gravitate towards the
“strongly opposed camp” and decreased the political assertiveness of the strongly in favor. They
find that all Jews were more likely to reject political compromise, and as a result they were more
ideologically aligned. Lastly, the Yom Kippur experience, which is associated with increased riskacceptance, might undercut the stakes of the elections, as individuals may be more difficult to
mobilize to vote for issues they would otherwise find risky not to vote on.
Methodology
To understand the impact of Yom Kippur on electoral turnout in Israel, I examine Israeli
municipal elections. Beginning in 1950, municipal elections took place concurrently with the
national elections in Israel. Following the 1975 election reforms, municipal elections were
separated from the elections to the Knesset. The reforms stipulated that the elections would be held
every five years in all municipalities simultaneously and residents vote separately for the municipal
council and the mayor34. Ever since, the structure of municipal structure and voting has not
meaningfully changed.
There are numerous reasons why municipal election turnout is an appropriate dependent
variable for the impact of Yom Kippur. Most importantly, the elections take place in relative
proximity to Yom Kippur, between October and November, and thus allow us to isolate the impact
of Yom Kippur on electoral attitudes. According to the 1965 Local Authorities Election Law, the
elections must be held on the first Tuesday of Cheshvan on the Hebrew calendar35. Because the
Hebrew Calendar varies from the Gregorian calendar, the months do not perfectly overlap, and the
date of the election on the Gregorian calendar changes every year. Nevertheless, the relative
distance between Yom Kippur to the municipal elections remains intact. As anticipated, both
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proximity to Yom Kippur and variance within the data were salient: the furthest day from Yom
Kippur was only 41 days, and the closest was 22 days. If elections were to take place months after
Yom Kippur, the attitudinal impact of the Yom Kippur experience will likely diminish, and a
connection between Yom Kippur and changing attitudes throughout the year will be difficult to
isolate. Therefore, the relatively short distance between Yom Kippur and the elections allows us
to credibly gauge the psychological impact of Yom Kippur on electoral attitudes.
Municipal elections are also particularly apt considering the literature on the importance of
stakes to electoral turnout, and its potential connection to religious experiences. In a 2020
assessment of municipal elections in Israel, the Jerusalem Institute for Policy Research found that
despite the de-jure Unitarianism of the Israeli political system, the local authorities hold “central
role” in providing education, welfare, and religious services36. Municipalities, for example,
regulate numerous functions pertaining to religion in the public sphere, most controversially public
transportation during Saturday. Issues concerning housing permits and religious services are
salient cleavages along Arab-Jewish and religious-secular lines respectively. Consequently,
municipal elections, in both religious and secular municipalities, constitute relatively high-stakes
elections.
To evaluate the relationship between turnout in municipal elections and Yom Kippur, I
calculated the turnout in all available municipal elections between 1983 and 2018 in twelve
municipalities within the internationally recognized boundaries of Israel. I analyzed Jewish
religious and Jewish secular municipalities to distinguish the impact of the Yom Kippur experience
on turnout in religious and secular municipalities. The non-Jewish municipalities were employed
as a control group, as they are not expected to be impacted by Yom Kippur. The four secular
municipalities were Tel Aviv, Herzliya, Holon and Rishon Lezion; The four religious
municipalities were Bnei Brak, Beit Shemesh, Dimona and Safed; The four non-Jewish
municipalities were Rahat, Sakhnin, Qalansawe, and Umm al-Fahm. The results in all religious
municipalities were coded together, while results in secular municipalities were coded together.
The Israeli Central Bureau of Statistics (CBS) lacks consistent and reliable data on religiosity in
Israel on a municipal basis. Consequently, this research had to rely on an alternative indicator of
Jewish religiosity. While numerous municipalities publish data on the percentage of youth who
study at a Yeshiva, the indicator would only apply to Orthodox Jews. In 2018, “Free Israel”
published a report on the level of “religious involvement” in municipalities across the country,
ranking them by separation of the synagogue and the state37. Municipalities with large Jewish
religious populations, of varying degrees of adherence, are presumed to score lower on religionstate separation; therefore, the metric better encompasses both the Traditionalists and Orthodox.
The assumption that the level of separation between religion and state institutions reflects upon
demographics complies with platforms of national religious parties, and religious calls for greater
role for religious role over the private sphere. The religious municipalities were picked from the
lowest strata of “religious freedom” and the secular municipalities from the highest strata. The
religious or secular composition of the municipalities was also qualitatively reaffirmed.
Municipalities with significant non-Jewish populations such as Haifa and Jerusalem were excluded
from the analysis to isolate the Jewish religiosity, which is more indicative of participation in Yom
Kippur, than religiosity in general.
Lacking data about the turnout posed an obstacle to this research. Most challenging, the
municipal results record only the total number of votes, and the turnout is not officially published.
To emulate turnout, I recorded the total number of votes as a fraction of the total population of the
municipality. However, data on Israeli demographics indicates that religious and secular
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municipalities have significant variations in age. Considering the high birth-rates in religious
communities, a larger fraction of the religious population than the secular population is likely to
be ineligible to vote. Therefore, we anticipate that the results will underestimate turnout in
religious communities. Likewise, this research would have benefited from more data-points, but
for numerous reasons, only seven elections were apt for our analysis. Considering the significance
of the electoral system in determining voter turnout, data from prior to the 1975 reforms would
weaken the credibility of the analysis. Additionally, the elections 1988 were excluded from the
analysis because they took place in March and were considerably further from Yom Kippur than
the rest of the dataset. For each election I marked the distance between the election date and the
end of Yom Kippur that year in days. Because Yom Kippur and the municipal elections have fixed
Hebrew dates, the distance between the events retains its proximity, but changes slightly every
year. Unexpectedly, three of the coded election years had the same distance between Yom Kippur
and the election date.
To ensure we isolate the impact of Yom Kippur on turnout, this research employed
numerous controlling variables. As outlined in the literature review, economic performance is
believed to be of utmost significance in influencing voter turnout. Therefore, if economic
performance in November is substantially different from the economic performance in September,
it will be difficult to isolate the “Yom Kippur effect” from the effect of the economy. Research on
the relationship between economic performance and turnout claims that economic prosperity as
well as exhaustion with political incompetence influence political participation. As a result, we
employed both GDP and unemployment controls. The purpose of the GDP variable is to control
for the level of economic prosperity, and the unemployment controls for the effectiveness of
governmental economic policies. No available data was found for unemployment rates and GDP
growth by month. Therefore, for every election the annual GDP growth rate and the annual
unemployment rate were coded as GDP and Unemployment respectively; the data was collected
from the World Bank and the CBS. Furthermore, the possibility that another event might be
impacting electoral turnout must be considered. Other Jewish holidays, such as Rosh Hashana,
take place prior to Yom Kippur in September. To examine whether another event might be the
underlying cause for changes in electoral participation, we added another variable, DSS1, coded
as the distance between the elections and September 1st. If Yom Kippur is not connected with an
increase or increase in electoral participation, we would expect the coefficient of the relationship
to be comparable and for the relationship to be statistically significant. However, due to resource
and time limitations this research is lacking in controls. For instance, the literature appears to
suggest a relationship between warfare and electoral turnout. While no election in this research
took place within a year after a war or a major operation began, the geographical separation of the
towns and continuous warfare was not controlled for. Safed, for example, is in the north; between
1982 and 2000 Israel and Lebanon engaged in continuous warfare which claimed the lives of many
Israelis and was bound to impact political attitudes. The political and psychological impacts of the
war in Safed would be unparalleled in Bnei Brak, located in the center of the country. Future
research, therefore, ought to control for both geographical and temporal separation from warfare.
Despite the vast literature indicating that Yom Kippur is likely to impact electoral turnout,
it is ambivalent on whether we ought to expect a decrease or an increase in turnout. We intuit that
the impact of electoral participation will be more pronounced in secular municipalities.
Considering Yom Kippur’s outsized weight to secular Jews, for whom Yom Kippur is the only
holiday observed, this research infers, in line with research on hedonic activities, that its
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psychological impact will be correspondingly larger. Therefore, this research posits two
hypotheses:
1. Yom Kippur will increase electoral turnout in both the religious and secular
municipalities, and the impact will be more salient in the secular municipalities
2. Yom Kippur will decrease electoral turnout in both the religious and secular
municipalities, and the impact will be more salient in the secular municipalities
Figure 1 and Figure 2, as well as Table 1 and Table 2, show the result of the analysis in the
religious and secular municipalities respectively. On the Y-axis appears the turnout in the
municipal election as a fraction and the X-axis records days since Yom Kippur.
Figure 1 and 2: Electoral Turnout by Days Since Yom Kippur in Secular and Religious
Municipalities

Table 1: Secular Municipalities Regression
Estimate

Std. Error

t value

Pr(>|t|)

Intercept

0.0696803

-0.0995121

-0.700

0.49113

DSYK

0.0133373

0.0025878

5.154

3.63E-05 (***)

UNEMPL

0.0042333

0.0022313

1.897

0.07100 (.)

DSS1

0.0020535

0.0009583

2.143

0.04345 (*)

GDP

-0.0569594

0.0144183

-3.951

0.00068 (***)

Table 2: Religious Municipalities Regression
Estimate

Std. Error

t value

Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept)

0.192316

0.178427

1.078

0.293

DSYK

0.003448

0.004427

0.779

0.445

GDP

-0.002174

0.023953

-0.091

0.929

UNEMPL

0.004571

0.003902

1.171

0.255

DSS1

0.001749

0.001775

0.985

0.336
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Table 3: Non-Jewish Municipalities Regression
Estimate

Std. Error

t value

Pr(>|t|)

(Intercept)

0.448607

0.251164

1.786

0.0893 (.)

DSYK

-0.005273

0.006549

-0.805

0.4301

GDP

0.027323

0.036352

0.752

0.4610

UNEMPL

-0.003792

0.006086

-0.623

0.5403

DSS1

0.002608

0.002459

1.061

0.3014

(Signif. codes: 0 ‘***’ 0.001 ‘**’ 0.01 ‘*’ 0.05 ‘.’ 0.1 ‘ ’ 1)

Results
The data indicates that there is a positive correlation between the distance from Yom
Kippur and electoral turnout, in both religious and secular municipalities. The coefficient of the
relationship with the controls for secular municipalities stands at 0.0143383 and in religious
municipalities at 0.005035. Consequently, the findings indicate that Yom Kippur decreases
electoral turnout in secular municipalities 2.85 times more than in religious municipalities. The
relationship between electoral turnout and Yom Kippur was found to be statistically significant in
secular municipalities when controlling for annual unemployment rate, annual GDP growth and
days since September 1st (P < 0.001). Nevertheless, the relationship was not found to be
statistically significant in religious municipalities (P > 0.1). Likewise, no statistically significant
impact was identified in non-Jewish municipalities, as hypothesized. The analysis finds that annual
GDP growth is a statistically significant indicator of electoral turnout in secular municipalities, in
line with previous research, but not in religious municipalities. Interestingly, there does not appear
to be a strong statistically significant relationship between voter turnout and unemployment in
either religious or secular municipalities. Likewise, the relationship between distance from
September 1st and election turnout was found to be statistically significant, indicating that previous
holidays or events in September are of significant to electoral turnout.
Discussion
The findings reaffirm the vast literature indicating that religious individuals are more likely
to vote in municipal elections. The highest coded turnout in the secular municipalities approaches
45% while the lowest turnout stands at 30%. In religious municipalities, however, the highest
turnout coded approaches 60% and the lowest turnout is 40%. Despite our inability to discern the
reason for higher turnout among the Jewish religious population, the findings demonstrate that
Jewish religiosity complies with trends observed among Christian denominations. Yet this
research acknowledges that voting patterns in religious municipalities do not incontrovertibly
reflect the voting patterns of religious individuals. While very unlikely, perhaps the secular
individuals in the religious municipalities vote in significantly higher numbers because of their
minority status. Future research could benefit from stronger indicators of religious demographics,
such as local surveys on membership in the synagogue, frequency of prayer and belief in God,
which would encompass both Orthodox and Traditionalist Jews. Furthermore, the results from
secular municipalities indicate a statistically significant relationship between economic
performance and electoral turnout, reaffirming existing literature. Intriguingly, religious
municipalities appear unfazed by changes in economic performance. Future research could
delineate the separate relationship between economic performance and electoral turnout by
different levels of religiosity, exploring their respective sensitivity to economic changes. Lastly,
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earlier events in September, perhaps but not certainly Rosh Hashana, were found to have a slight,
yet statistically significant, impact on electoral turnout in secular municipalities. Rather than
weakening our analysis, the finding might reaffirm the potency of religious events in impacting
electoral turnout, particularly in secular municipalities. While impossible to ignore, the coefficient
of the relationship between turnout and DSS1 is 6.5 times smaller than the relationship with Yom
Kippur, indicating that any previous event in September does not comprehensively account for the
decline in turnout following Yom Kippur.
The results seem to support our second hypothesis, that Yom Kippur decreases electoral
participation, particularly salient in secular municipalities. For every 10 days following Yom
Kippur, electoral turnout appears to increase by 3.6%. The results suggest that Yom Kippur
impacts electoral participation and reduces the likelihood of individuals to vote in secular
municipalities. While the results are suggestive of causal connection, there are several explanations
for the decrease in voter turnout that do not entail the Yom Kippur experience. The most likely
alternative explanation is that the lower voter turnout following Yom Kippur might indicate the
importance of voter mobilization in motivating turnout, rather than a noticeable attitudinal change.
Voter turnout increases when voters are approached to vote (Bedolla and Michelson, 2003). The
proximity of the elections to Yom Kippur to the municipal elections might decrease the time and
resources that are spent on voter mobilization, and consequently reduce turnout. Evidently,
campaigning ceases throughout Yom Kippur. However, the mobilization hypothesis is unlikely to
be applicable to this research. Most importantly, besides Yom Kippur itself, there exists no legal
or social limitations on campaigning before and after Yom Kippur. Subsequently, it is safe to
assume that campaigning should only cease for the duration of Yom Kippur. The 25-hour period
is unlikely to constitute a significant difference in levels of mobilization, when political campaigns
often last for months. Even if we were to accept that the “mobilization lost” from Yom Kippur
significantly decreases voter turnout, the mobilization thesis fails to explain why the further the
elections are from Yom Kippur, or the 25-hour campaign halt, the more likely an individual is to
turnout. Lastly, the application mobilization hypothesis to this research will rely on the assumption
that secular voter turnout is more contingent on political mobilization than religious voter turnout.
The research on the impact of single religious events on political attitudes provides another
explanation for the lower turnout following Yom Kippur. Clingingsmith et al. Finds that
participation in the Haj fosters greater solidarity among Muslims, as well as increases peaceful
attitudes towards out-group members. Following the Haj, participants are more likely to report
belief in harmony between genders, ethnicities and religions. Similarly, Cohen-Zada et al., finds
that while individuals who visited the synagogue during Selichot are less likely to believe in
political compromise, their view of Muslims does not worsen, and Sephardic participants even
exhibit a slight increase in trust towards Muslims. Therefore, it seems that religious events, and
Yom Kippur in particular, could potentially enhance congruency and trust between religious
groups. Increase in trust of out-group members, such as Orthodox Jews and non-Jews in secular
municipalities, might decrease the perceived importance of the elections, dissuading individuals
from voting.
Secular-religious and Muslim-Jewish divides manifest themselves in numerous political
cleavages that are pertinent to the municipality’s mandate. Claims of “Judaising” in the public
sphere, and particularly in schools, elicit public outcry continuously. In 2018, a research outlining
public school textbook contents and alleging that there is no “Judaizing” in the education system
caused vociferous debate on the role of Judaism in education38. In fact, almost a third of Israeli
parents express worry of the role of Judaism in the public education system39. Likewise, issues
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concerning the institution of public transportation during Saturday, the Shabbat, are subject to
intensive debate, as currently, secular municipalities largely lack public transportation. In the race
for municipal elections in 2018 in Tel Aviv, at the center of the challenger’s agenda, Asaf Zamir,
was the establishment of public transportation during Saturday, who exclaimed that “this city is
secular”40. Demonstrating the significance of religious-secular divide all throughout Israel,
Alternate Prime Minister Lapid’s entrance to politics was marked by his lamentations that religious
individuals are not obliged to serve in the military and calls for criminal sanctions against religious
evaders41. Thus, if Yom Kippur assuages the secular-religious divides, by bringing secular
individuals closer to their Judaism and rejuvenating tolerance of the other, the elections could be
perceived as less important, and subsequently less worthy of turnout.
The data also supports the inference that the impact on secular individuals would be more
salient than the impact on religious individuals. Although a religious individual is more likely to
visit the synagogue for Selichot, fast and engage in earnest rumination, they are seemingly less
influenced (or not at all) by the Yom Kippur effect on turnout. While ostensibly counterintuitive,
there are numerous ways to understand the divergence between secular and religious
municipalities. Most persuasively, the difference might lie in the novelty effect of the religious
experience on secular individuals in comparison to religious individuals. Intuitively, religious
individuals are more likely to engage with the synagogue and fast throughout the year. For secular
Jews, however, Yom Kippur is often the only religious event that they observe. Unsurprisingly,
Yom Kippur is known to be the “busiest day” of the year in synagogues42. One might intuit that
recurring participation in religious events decreases the significance of each event treated
separately. In other words, the psychological impact of Yom Kippur on a religious Jew, who visits
the synagogue on a weekly basis and fasts six times a year, is lower than the impact on a secular
Jew, whose participation in religious activities during Yom Kippur is avant-garde and unfamiliar.
Another explanation might lay in the different rituals undertaken by religious and secular Jews.
Throughout Yom Kippur, secular residents stroll the neighborhood and interact with their
neighbors. Yom Kippur becomes not only a religious experience, but a communal one. Religious
individuals, who are stricter about the prohibition on any “work”, refrain from some activities that
are perceived as communal, such as riding bikes with children. Perhaps, the positive impact of
Yom Kippur on perceptions of out-group members does not occur exclusively within the walls of
the synagogue. Political attitudes are brewing in the streets, where neighbors interact, and in the
households, where parents mull over their values, actions, and relationship to God and their
families. Demarcating the Yom Kippur experience to associational and communal is beyond the
scope of this research. Yet the findings reaffirm the need to earnestly explore Yom Kippur as an
experience of both secular and religious Jews, one that occurs in the synagogue, the street, at home
and within oneself.
The explanation that positive attitudes towards out-group members diminished electoral
turnout could also explain the divergence between secular and religious municipalities. Religious
municipalities in Israel tend to be more homogenous than secular municipalities in Israel. For
instance, according to the Israeli Bureau of Statistics, 99.9% of Bnei Brak’s population is Jewish,
and the vast majority of the city is Orthodox. Conversely, Rishon Lezion is 90% Jewish, and
Orthodox, traditional and secular Jews reside in the. The heterogenous secular municipalities have
noticeably more “out-groups” and “in-groups” than the religious municipalities. Perhaps, the
findings of this research help tie the stakes-hypothesis and the contradicting findings of Geys,
Zimmer and Cohen about the relationship between heterogeneity and electoral turnout. Indeed,
this research finds that religious municipalities, which are less diverse, have a higher base-turnout
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than secular municipalities, ostensibly rebuking the heterogeneity hypothesis. However, the
significant decrease in political participation following Yom Kippur might indicate that socially
homogenous communities are not equally susceptible to turnout volatility as socially
heterogeneous communities, whose changing political attitudes immediately influence the stakes
of elections.
Conclusion
To conclude, this research strived to enrich the literature on political participation in Israel
by examining the impact of Yom Kippur on electoral turnout. Previous literature presented
different ways in which religiosity and religious experiences might modulate electoral turnout. By
evaluating municipal elections in Israel since 1983, this research concludes that Yom Kippur
reduces turnout in secular municipalities, while no significant relationship between Yom Kippur
and turnout was found in religious municipalities. Ultimately, this research aimed to induce more
research on the relationship between singular religious experiences and electoral turnout,
particularly in Israel. As acknowledged, the methodology of the paper is flawed, and the results
are primarily suggestive rather than conclusive. Hopefully, this research sheds light on numerous
shortfalls in current research on religion and politics and presents meaningful amendments to
future research. Future research should earnestly examine the religiosity of secular individuals,
acknowledge the holistic nature of religious experiences, which are not bound by associational
institutions and occur both in the public and private spheres, and invest in understanding the impact
of ideas, interactions, and messages conveyed in religious settings on political attitudes and
participation.
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Appendix
Table 4: Votes and Population by Municipality, Religious Municipalities
MUNICIPALITY

YEAR VOTES

POP.

TURNOUT

DSYK GDP UNEMPL DSS1

BNEI BRAK

2018

80299

198,863

0.4037905493

41

3.5

4

59

BNEI BRAK

2013

69463

172,485

0.402719077

38

4.2

6.2

51

BNEI BRAK

2003

53534

139,634

0.3833880001

22

1.1

13.5

57

BNEI BRAK

1993

46415

124,400

0.3731109325

38

3.4

12.7

51

BNEI BRAK

1983

40119

96150

0.4172542902

38

2.6

4.3

51

DIMONA

2018

18486

34,135

0.5415555881

41

3.5

4

59

DIMONA

2013

15961

33,188

0.480926841

38

4.2

6.2

51

DIMONA

2008

16922

32400

0.5222839506

33

3

7.7

71

DIMONA

2003

16777

33,896

0.494955157

22

1.1

13.5

57

DIMONA

1998

16696

32,800

0.5090243902

41

3.9

10.7

59

DIMONA

1993

14794

29,500

0.5014915254

38

3.8

12.7

51

DIMONA

1983

10698

27,026

0.395841042

38

2.6

4.3

51

BEIT SHEMESH

2018

45,524

118,676

0.3835990428

41

3.5

4

59

BEIT SHEMESH

2013

35,151

94,069

0.373672517

38

4.2

6.2

51

BEIT SHEMESH

2008

26,955

72,700

0.3707702889

33

3

7.7

71

BEIT SHEMESH

2003

20,468

57,046

0.3587981629

22

1.1

13.5

57

BEIT SHEMESH

1998

13,063

29,300

0.4458361775

41

3.9

10.7

59

BEIT SHEMESH

1993

8828

18,400

0.4797826087

38

3.8

12.7

51

BEIT SHEMESH

1983

5663

12,976

0.4364210851

38

2.6

4.3

51

SAFED

2018

16,562

35,715

0.4637267255

41

3.5

4

59

SAFED

2013

14,846

32,901

0.4512324853

38

4.2

6.2

51

SAFED

2008

13,963

29,600

0.471722973

33

3

7.7

71

SAFED

2003

12,853

26,790

0.4797685704

22

1.1

13.5

57

SAFED

1998

11,863

23,800

0.4984453782

41

3.9

10.7

59

SAFED

1993

10,023

20,900

0.479569378

38

3.8

12.7

51

SAFED

1983

7,342

15,583

0.4711544632

38

2.6

4.3

51
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Table 5: Votes and Population by Municipality, Secular Municipalities
MUNICIPALITY

YEAR VOTES POP.

TURNOUT

DSYK GDP

UNEMPL

DSS1

TEL AVIV

2018

203489 451,523

0.4506725017

41

3.5

4

59

TEL AVIV

2013

143656 418,590

0.3431902339

38

4.2

6.2

51

TEL AVIV

2008

142087 403,301

0.3523100612

33

3

7.7

71

TEL AVIV

2003

107724 363,387

0.2964442867

22

1.1

13.5

57

TEL AVIV

1998

146689 354,400

0.4139080135

41

3.9

10.7

59

TEL AVIV

1993

143387 348,245

0.4117417335

38

3.8

12.7

51

HERZELIA

2018

43,944

95,142

0.4618780349

41

3.5

4

59

HERZELIA

2013

27,965

89,813

0.3113691782

38

4.2

6.2

51

HERZELIA

2008

33,602

86,300

0.3893626883

33

3

7.7

71

HERZELIA

2003

33,245

83,644

0.3974582755

22

1.1

13.5

57

HERZELIA

1998

36,820

82,759

0.4449062942

41

3.9

10.7

59

HERZELIA

1993

32,283

82,759

0.3900844621

38

3.8

12.7

51

HERZELIA

1983

27,246

63,155

0.4314147732

38

2.6

4.3

51

HOLON

2018

75,874

194,273

0.3905534995

41

3.5

4

59

HOLON

2013

59,356

186,399

0.3184351847

38

4.2

6.2

51

HOLON

2008

61,329

176,300

0.3478672717

33

3

7.7

71

HOLON

2003

54,097

165,773

0.3263317911

22

1.1

13.5

57

HOLON

1998

66,733

163,082

0.4091990532

41

3.9

10.7

59

HOLON

1993

61,345

163,082

0.3761604592

38

3.8

12.7

51

HOLON

1983

50,575

133,460

0.3789524951

38

2.6

4.3

51

RISHON LEZION 2018

108058 251,719

0.4292802689

41

3.5

4

59

RISHON LEZION 2013

83085

237,639

0.3496269552

38

4.2

6.2

51

RISHON LEZION 2008

85716

226,800

0.3779365079

33

3

7.7

71

RISHON LEZION 2003

75,400

214,616

0.3513251575

22

1.1

13.5

57

RISHON LEZION 1998

71,369

163,245

0.4371895004

41

3.9

10.7

59

RISHON LEZION 1993

50,529

163,245

0.3095286226

38

3.8

12.7

51

RISHON LEZION 1983

38,988

104,387

0.3734947838

38

2.6

4.3

51
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Table 6: Votes and Population by Municipality, non-Jewish Municipalities
MUNICIPALITY YEAR

POP.

VOTES

TURNOUT

DSYK DSS1

GDP

UNEMPL

RAHAT

2018

69,032

28767

0.4167197821

41

59

3.5

4

RAHAT

2013

58,690

23200

0.3952973249

38

51

4.2

6.2

RAHAT

2008

43,863

18726

0.4269201833

33

71

3

7.7

RAHAT

2003

35,760

14679

0.4104865772

22

57

1.1

13.5

RAHAT

1998

27500

11090

0.4032727273

41

59

3.9

10.7

RAHAT

1993

24700

7819

0.3165587045

38

51

3.8

12.7

SAKHNIN

2018

31,057

20071

0.6462633223

41

59

3.5

4

SAKHNIN

2013

28,136

17457

0.6204506682

38

51

4.2

6.2

SAKHNIN

2008

25,582

15140

0.5918223751

33

71

3

7.7

SAKHNIN

2003

23,224

13065

0.5625645884

22

57

1.1

13.5

SAKHNIN

1993

17,800

8755

0.4918539326

41

59

3.9

10.7

SAKHNIN

1983

12,880

5205

0.4041149068

38

51

2.6

4.3

KALANSUA

2018

22,788

10577

0.4641477971

41

59

3.5

4

KALANSUA

2013

20,645

10252

0.4965851296

38

51

4.2

6.2

KALANSUA

2008

18,302

8429

0.4605507595

33

71

3

7.7

KALANSUA

2003

15,919

8066

0.5066901187

22

57

1.1

13.5

KALANSUA

1993

11,200

5330

0.4758928571

41

59

3.9

10.7

KALANSUA

1983

7,800

3213

0.4119230769

38

51

2.6

4.3

UMELFAHEM

2018

55,182

26620

0.4824036824

41

59

3.5

4

UMELFAHEM

2013

50,597

20233

0.3998853687

38

51

4.2

6.2

UMELFAHEM

2008

44,497

20892

0.4695147988

33

71

3

7.7

UMELFAHEM

2003

39,046

16796

0.4301592993

22

57

1.1

13.5

UMELFAHEM

1998

33,200

16494

0.4968072289

41

59

3.9

10.7

UMELFAHEM

1993

28,100

13419

0.477544484

38

51

3.8

12.7

UMELFAHEM

1983

20,100

7637

0.3799502488

38

51

2.6

4.3
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“Pure People” and “Corrupt Elites:” Corruption Talk in the 2020
Election
MILAN LOEWER
Columbia University
ABSTRACT: The word “corruption” has two separate but interrelated meanings. The first kind of
corruption refers specifically to an abuse of public office for private gain; the second is broader
and indicates a disjunction between a political reality and the ideal to which that reality ought to
conform. This paper explores the role of various forms of “corruption talk” in the 2020 presidential
election. The first part of the paper examines the “supply side,” looking at the kinds of “corruption
narratives” that politicians offered in 2020. Using natural language processing, I analyze how Joe
Biden, Donald Trump, and Bernie Sanders spoke about corruption. I show that while Biden tended
to speak about corruption in a manner familiar to political scientists — as an abuse of public office
for private gain – Sanders and Trump used “corruption” in a completely different way, referring
to it as a quality of social groups, corporate interests, “foreign” values, or even the “system” as
such. I then examine the “demand side,” using data from the American National Election Survey
(ANES) to demonstrate how various forms of “corruption talk” may have played a role in voting
outcomes. Finally, I situate the rise of the anti-establishment appeal in the context of the neoliberal
turn and propose that the most powerful tool to fight right-wing populism is a discourse that
acknowledges the “corruption” of the status-quo and appeals to the principle of popular
sovereignty, thereby providing a liberal and inclusive alternative to populism.
Introduction
This election will decide whether we restore the rule of a corrupt political class or whether
we declare that in America we are still governed. We are the people. We govern. We’re the
boss. We’re the people.1
- Donald Trump, Oct 30, 2020, rally in Michigan.
What are you hiding? … Russia’s paying you a lot. China’s paying you a lot on… all your
businesses all around… the world. China’s building a new road to a new golf course you
have overseas… Release your tax return or stop talking about corruption.2
- Joe Biden, Oct 22, 2020, second presidential debate.
There has been practically no civilization without some concept of corruption — the
meaning of corruption, however, has changed drastically from classical and medieval times to
today.3 In their Intellectual History of Political Corruption, Bruce Buchan and Lisa Hill explore
the historical trajectories of two concepts of political corruption, what they call “degenerative”
corruption and “public office” corruption.4 They show that from the times of the early medieval
1
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Christian kingdoms until just a couple of centuries ago, political corruption was primarily
conceptualized as a degeneration or decay of the polity, rather than (exclusively and specifically)
as an abuse of public office for private gain. From Socrates corrupting the morals and reason of
the youth of Athens to Aquinas excoriating “tyranny as the “corruption” of monarchy”5 —
“degenerative” corruption captured any kind of disjunction between real and ideal. In the broadest
sense, corruption has always referred to the relationship between a “real” state of affairs and the
ideal to which that “real” state ought to conform – “co-rruption” is the rupture between the real
and the ideal.
But in contemporary times, centrist politicians and political scientists almost exclusively
talk about corruption as an abuse of public office for private gain. On the other hand, “populist”
and “popular” politicians like Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders invoke the “degenerative”
conception of corruption quite often. Nonetheless, these two concepts of corruption are by no
means mutually exclusive, and as we will see, the liberal public office conception of corruption
arises from the need to formally institutionalize safeguards against “degenerative” corruption. If
“corruption” reflects the relationship between political ideal and political reality, in order to
examine the divergence in the use of “corruption,” we must first examine the underlying logic of
“liberal” and “populist” politics.
I. The People, Democracy, and Corruption
With the exception of a few theocracies and dictatorships, contemporary states derive their
legitimacy from some conception of popular sovereignty: the idea that legitimate kratos (power)
resides in the demos (citizenry). Political corruption in the contemporary context therefore involves
a derogation from the ideals underlying a political system grounded in the power of “the people.”
But what exactly is this entity, “the people”? If popular sovereignty means that (all) the people
rule, “the people” can never be identified as an actual, empirical, unified political agent to which
one can ascribe a particular action or will. This is because identifying the popular sovereign as a
particular entity with particular qualities would mean excising a part of the people from the
people,6 thereby contradicting the principle of popular sovereignty — that (all) the people rule.
For example, by identifying the will of the people with a pro-life stance, those who do not hold a
pro-life stance are thereby excluded from the people. Instead, “who ‘the People’ are remains an
open question, one which democracy in many ways is about. [emphasis mine]”7
Following this logic, the ideal of popular sovereignty is based on two conflicting ideas: 1)
that there is a subject called “the people” which wields popular sovereignty, and 2) that the people
can never be identified as an actual, empirical, unified agent.8 If “the people” cannot be identified,
we can never be certain that “the people” rules: popular sovereignty is an ideal which by its nature
can never be realized. It contains a constitutive “corruption” — a rupture between real and ideal,
which can only be papered over through various fictions.
As Edmund Morgan has convincingly shown, identifying “the people” as the basis of
political legitimacy required the use of “make believe” from the very beginning: “Make believe
that the people have a voice or make believe that the representatives of the people are the people.”9
But populism and liberalism resolve the tension (“co-rruption”) inherent in the idea of popular
sovereignty through two very different kinds of “make believe.”
The liberal interpretation of popular sovereignty transforms the rulers from individual
people into abstract office holders and conceives of the state as fundamentally neutral. Populism,
on the other hand, brushes off one side of the contradiction: that the people is never identified as
an actual, empirical, unified agent. Populism conceives of the People-as-One and of the populist

2
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ruler as the only true embodiment of the people, thereby making democracy mythologically “pure”
again.
a. Popular Sovereignty and Corruption in Liberal Democracy
Following Claude Lefort’s concept of democracy as a “form of society” in which “the locus
of power becomes and empty place,”10 we understand that democracy resolves the “constitutive
corruption” of popular sovereignty through the fiction that no One rules; that the place of the
sovereign is never occupied and the state serves as the terrain of conflict in which the interests of
the people (plural) are debated, collated, and acted on. As long as “the people” is not imagined as
an actual, empirical, unified agent (as One), it is impossible to definitively identify the essence and
will of the popular sovereign: what it is, and what it wants; and, as a corollary, it is impossible to
identify corruption positively with respect to it — as a degeneration of a moral and social order the
validity of which emanates from beyond the social; “the people” is not conceived of as a unified
transcendent entity: the source of social truth, morality, and power.11 Instead, “the people appear
only in the plural.”12
But while it is impossible to identify the people positively as associated with a particular
social and moral order, it is possible to identify it negatively: the popular sovereign is not the
particularistic interests of an individual or faction. In this light, corruption in liberal democracy
came to be understood as the appropriation of sovereign power for private or factional ends.
In order to keep sovereign power out of the hands of private or factional interests, democracy
requires the functional separation of “private person” and “public office.”13 In the words of Max
Weber, “members of the administrative staff should be completely separated from ownership of
the means of production or administration” and citizens and officials “insofar as they obey a person
in authority, do not owe this obedience to him as an individual, but to the impersonal order.”14
The boundaries that separate “public” and “private” are defined into existence and are, to an extent,
arbitrary. But “rules of separation” are necessary in order to maintain the illusion of uncorrupted
popular sovereignty: the illusion that officials act as agents of the people.
This codification of public and private interest means that there is a distinction between a
“substantive” approach to corruption — the belief that regardless of formal rules, the conduct of
an official or the content of legislation advances factional or individual interests — and a “formal”
approach, which is entirely contingent on the formal terms of the official’s authorization.
To illustrate this difference between formal and substantive corruption, consider the following
example, which I take from Peter Bratsis’ analysis of the “Clinton Coffee Scandals” during
Clinton’s campaign for a second term in office:
If the coffee is being consumed by prospective campaign contributors in a public area, say,
the nonresidential areas of the White House, it can be said to constitute political corruption
because the president is allowing his private interests to contaminate the purity of the public
space… If coffee is being consumed and contributions are being sought in space that is
designated for the president’s use as a private individual, no corruption is present. The same
people, the same coffee, the same money changing hands; the only difference is in the room
where it is occurring, which constitutes all the difference between corruption and
noncorruption.15
Clearly, from a substantive standpoint, it is unclear why meeting in the oval office would
constitute more of a subversion of public power for private ends than meeting in the private
residences; but from a formal standpoint, it makes all the difference.
3
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A substantive allegation of corruption involves direct, popular appeals (“the campaign finance
system is corrupt because it has empowered the superrich at the expense of working people”);
whereas allegations of formal corruption (“official X illegally embezzled Y dollars”) unless
combined with a substantive element,16 involve no direct appeal to the idea of democracy as such.
However, because the rules that govern public office are, or ought to be, designed to prevent
substantive corruption, most formally corrupt instances are also substantively corrupt. (In other
words, public office corruption is typically a subset of substantive corruption.)
As we will see, Sanders primarily spoke about corruption within the substantive/popular
framework, whereas Biden primarily spoke about corruption within the formal, public office
framework.
b. Popular Sovereignty and Corruption in the Populist Imagination
Populism reinterprets the principle of popular sovereignty through a conception of the
“People-as-One.” The popular sovereign — the principle of political legitimacy and the basis of
power — is equated with “the people” who are presented as an actual, empirical, unified agent,
identified with the heartland and held up as the moral source of political legitimacy.17 As theorist
Claude Lefort notes, populism is an “image of a society which is one with itself,” an image of an
“organic community.”18
Populists imagine that there is a singular common good, that a concrete and homogeneous
political subject called “the people” can discern and will that common good, and that only the
populist leader is capable of correctly interpreting the will of the “true people.”19 But this “people”
is (and can only ever be) a part of the whole citizenry. The “true people” must be extracted from
the empirical population.20 Donald Trump put it best when he announced that “the only important
thing is the unification of the people – because the other people don’t mean anything.”21
Substantive and formal corruption can often create an opportunity for the emergence of
populism, and populists make both substantive and formal critiques of corruption. But while the
populist and the formal and substantive conceptions of corruption will often coincide, this is not
because populists understand corruption in the same way.
If the “true people” are the only legitimate basis of political power, corruption in the
populist framework doesn’t involve just any kind of appropriation of sovereign power for factional
ends, it involves undermining the “real people,” and the political, social, and moral order that is
imagined to be connected to “the people.” Populist politics is largely defined in terms of the
symbolic opposition between “the people” and the “corrupt elite” which stands between “the
people” and power. Consequently, allegations of “corruption” play an outsized role in populist
discourse.
The conception of corruption that is unique to populism is what I call “symbolic
corruption.” Unlike the liberal substantive critique of corruption, in the symbolic framework,
corruption is no longer understood to mean any privileging of private or factional interests against
the interests of the whole (understood as the entire population); instead, corruption refers to
actions, actors, groups, and institutions which are symbolically identified with the “corrupt elites.”
Through an analysis of campaign speeches by Joe Biden, Donald Trump, and Bernie Sanders, we
will see how the formal/liberal, symbolic/populist, and substantive/popular conceptions of
corruption (respectively) manifested in political discourse during the 2020 election and further
elucidate each framework. We can then look at how this “corruption talk” may have affected voter
choices. Finally, we can examine the underlying (substantive) factors – the crisis of representation,
skyrocketing economic inequalities, and status anxieties caused by globalization and skill-biased
technological change — that have created a latent “demand” for a political discourse built around
4
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the (symbolic) narrative that American democracy has been stolen from “real Americans” and that
the power of the “real people” has been usurped by outside forces.
II. Corruption Talk in 2020 Campaign Discourse
In order to examine candidate discourse around the issue of “corruption,” I use transcripts
from Rev.com, a database that includes campaign rallies, political speeches, town halls, and
presidential debates between January 15th and November 3rd, 2020 (which were harvested using
web scraping software). There are a total of 230 unique transcripts in which Biden, Sanders, or
Trump speak at least once; of these, there are 94 transcripts in which the word “corrupt” or
“corruption” appears at least once. Each transcript is separated into paragraphs averaging around
250 words, which I treat as discrete “documents” for the purposes of natural language processing.
From a preliminary glance at the data, we find that Sanders and Trump invoked
“corruption” far more often than Biden (7 and 9.4 times more often respectively), as we might
expect given the central importance of critiques of the “corruption” of the status quo in the
substantive/popular and symbolic/populist frameworks.
Table 1: Rev.com Database Descriptive Statistics
Transcripts

Biden
Trump
Sanders
Total

142
104
33
23022

Transcripts
containing
“corrupt” or
“corruption
13
69
13
94

% of transcripts
containing
“corrupt” or
“corruption”
9.2%
66.3%
39.4%
40.9%

Words

# of instances of
“corrupt” or
“corruption”

Rate per
100,000 words

120,372
256,100
21,706
398,178

18
362
23
403

14.96
141.35
105.96
101.21

I begin by examining what kinds of words were most important for each speaker within the
collection of “documents” that contained reference to corruption in order to determine the general
kinds of ideas and issues that were most associated with each speaker’s use of “corruption.” For
this purpose, I use the tf-idf statistic which is intended to measure how important a word is to a
document within a collection of documents by dividing the term frequency within a subset of
documents by the inverse of the number of documents in the whole corpus in which the term
appears.23
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Figure 1: TF-IDF by Speaker Among Documents Containing the Word “Corrupt”

As we can see, Sanders and Trump tended to use more morally and normatively inflected
vocabulary, such as “greed” and “family” when talking about corruption, whereas Biden tended to
use more technical and neutral language. Trump appears to connect corruption with politicians,
media, and the “establishment,” Sanders with billionaires and the pharmaceutical industry and
Biden with illegal business practices. Broadly, tf-idf can give us an idea of the general semantic
sphere in which each candidate used the word “corrupt,” corroborating the hypothesis that Trump,
Biden, and Sanders use the word in a symbolic/populist, formal/liberal, and substantive/popular
manner respectively.
But within these respective discourses, they each used “corruption talk” in the context of
specific topics that were characteristic of their particular approach to the issue. In order to analyze
what kinds of topics each candidate talked about and in what proportion, I use the structural topic
model package in R (STM), which utilizes Bayesian estimation to search for “topics” in a large set
of documents, assuming that these “topics” are latent variables which determine the content of the
documents.24 The model assumes that a “topic” is composed of a mixture of words where each
word has a probability of belonging to a topic. It further assumes that a document is composed of
a mixture of topic proportions that determine the word distributions within that document.25 The
sum of topic proportions across all topics for a document is one, and the sum of the word
probabilities for a given topic is one.26
Applying the topic model to only the subset of documents in which corruption is discussed
or mentioned, we can get an idea of how often each candidate talked about an issue or set of issues
in conjunction with corruption.

II. A - Trump’s Corruption Discourse

In order to model Trump’s corruption talk, I specify a topic model containing 8 topics.27
Figure 2 below shows the relative proportion of these topics — if a topic has a proportion of .2,
that means around 20% of Trump’s corruption talk revolves around that topic. The model also
returns the words that are most likely to indicate the presence of each topic28 as well as the topic
proportion of each document. (For example, a given document might be a mixture over topics 5
6
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and 3, containing 70% topic 5 words and 30% topic 3 words.) In the figure below, each topic is
labeled with a title that most closely fits the content of the documents containing the highest
proportion of that topic. For example, the documents containing high proportions of topic 5 are
about the corruption of American values by the left – hence the label “values.”
Figure 2: Trump Expected Topic Proportions

We find that the 5 most prevalent themes in Trump’s corruption discourse, in order, were:
the election (more specifically, dethroning the corrupt elites and giving power to “the people”)
(topic 1), fake news, particularly in conjunction with election coverage (topics 2 and 3), Joe Biden
and Hunter Biden’s alleged public office corruption (topic 4), the corruption of American values
(topic 5), and globalization (topic 6).
Trump often uses the word “corruption” when he is not talking about public office
corruption (or anything that a political scientist schooled in the principal-agent model might
recognize as “corruption”). As we’ve outlined, “populistic” political logic pits a “pure people”
against a “corrupt elite.” In describing this opposition in terms of policy, values, culture, etc.
Trump will often use the word “corrupt” as an adjective to qualify an organization, person, group,
value, or idea associated with the “corrupt elite.”
Topic 1 — election and rule by “the people” vs. “the elites” demonstrates the symbolic
conception of corruption in its most distilled form; it tells us the most about Trump’s use of
“corruption talk” and is a logical place to begin. The following are some excerpts from the
documents most associated with topic 1. In the table below (and in all subsequent tables)
documents are ordered by how highly associated they are with the topic – i.e. the document that is
99% “about” topic 1 is listed first, the document that is 98% “about” topic 1 is listed second, etc.
Among the top-ranked documents, some are omitted because their content is identical or nearly
identical to another document in the selection (candidates will often use specific lines over and
over again during the campaign).
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Topic 1 – Election: Restoring American Democracy to “The People”
Michigan, This election comes down to a very simple choice. Do you want to be ruled by the corrupt
November 2 and selfless [sic] political maniacs? Or do you want to be ruled by the American people?
You’re supposed to be ruled by the American people.29
Michigan, This election will decide whether we restore the rule of a corrupt political class or whether
October 30 we declare that in America we are still governed. We are the people. We govern. We
govern. We’re the boss. We’re the people.
Pennsylvania In 2016 Pennsylvania voted to fire this corrupt political establishment and you elected an
October 31 outsider as President who is finally putting America first… And if I don’t sound like a
typical Washington politician, it’s because I’m not a politician. Right?30
Michigan, If you want your children to be safe, if you want your values to be honored, if you want
November 2 your life to be treated with dignity and respect, then I am asking you to go to the poll
tomorrow and vote, vote, vote… For the last four years, the depraved swamp has tried
everything to stop me and to stop you… Together we will defeat the corrupt
establishment. We will dethrone the failed political class, and we will drain the
Washington swamp. And we will save that American dream. That beautiful, beautiful
American dream.31
Wisconsin, Do you want to be ruled by the corrupt and selfish political class or do you want to be
November 2 governed by the American people? That’s what it’s all about. It’s the American people.
They’ve taken that away.32

These excerpts contain little to no substantive content. Trump’s discourse is full of what
theorist Ernesto Laclau calls “empty signifiers”: signifiers with a vague, highly variable,
unspecifiable or non-existent signified that have different meanings to different people, allowing
the audience to project their own signification onto the speech.33 Words such as “American
people,” “American dream,” “political establishment,” “depraved swamp,” “values,” “dignity,”
etc. have no fixed or concrete meaning – they are all marshaled by Trump to set up a Manichean
opposition between the “pure American people” and the “corrupt elite,” signifying who “we” are
in opposition to who “they” are.
Without directly addressing any particular issues, Trump evokes the idea that America and
American democracy have been stolen from its rightful owners, the “true people.”
Populist political logic divides society into two camps: on the one side the elite and the
consolidated power structure, and on the other the block constituted by the populist leader and the
people.34 Following this logic, Trump claims to be an outside maverick, who “doesn’t sound like
a typical Washington politician” or “play by the rules of the Washington establishment.”35 He is
the voice of the people and claims to represent them directly. Within this “logic,” being “governed
by the American people” is the same thing as being governed by Trump.
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Topics 2 and 3 – Corrupt media and Fake News
Rally - Pennsylvania,
Oct 26
Rally - Pennsylvania,
Oct 26

60 Minutes Interview
Oct 22

CNN is fake corrupt news… they’re corrupt. They have to report the news. They are the
enemy of the people. They really are. They’re the enemy of the people.36
They’re fake and they’re corrupt people. They’re fake. They’re corrupt. I never watched
CNN, but I had to see it this morning… I watched MSDNC… MSDNC. And you watch
these polls and you say, they’re fake polls. They’re fake. These are real polls [gestures
toward crowd]. We’re going to win in Florida. We’re going to win in Pennsylvania…
we’re watching you, governor, very closely in Philadelphia. A lot of bad things happen
there with the counting of the votes. We’re watching you Governor Wolf, very closely.37
I wouldn’t be here if I didn’t have social media, because the media is corrupt… the
media is corrupt… the media is fake, and frankly, if I didn’t have social media, I’d have
no way of getting out my voice.38

Democratic representatives are made accountable to the citizenry through both “direct” and
“mediated” mechanisms. Direct accountability occurs during election time or in the case of recall
votes. Mediated accountability involves the check that civil society and the media exert on
governmental power.
Trump frames civil society and media institutions as part of a group of liberal, coastal elites
that want to trick and mislead the people in order to further their own (rather than “the people’s”)
interests. He therefore claims that the only way to get the truth out and to communicate “directly”
with the people without the corrupt mediation of the mainstream media, is through his various
social media platforms. Trump positions himself simultaneously as the leader, and as one of the
people (“we are the people, we govern”). His identification with the “real people” makes mediated
accountability through the “fake media” — and “corrupted,” “elite” institutions more generally —
not only unnecessary but a subversion of the power of “the people,” and thereby a “corruption” of
popular sovereignty.39
But the idea that his base somehow plays a role in his decision making or in checking his
power, is a complete illusion. In the words of Jan Werner Müller, populists imply “that ‘the people’
can speak with one voice and issue something like an imperative mandate that tells politicians
exactly what they have to do in government… Yet the fact is that the imperative mandate has not
really come from the people at all; its supposedly detailed instructions are based on an
interpretation by populist politicians.”40 When Trump says that only “we” are qualified to watch
vote counting he really means “I” and those who do exactly what I tell them. Within this framing,
there is no role for the institutions of horizontal accountability to exert any sort of restraining
influence on the true representative of the “real people.”41
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Topic 5 - The “Corruption” of American Values
Rally – North The Democratic party is the party of high taxes, high crime, unlimited regulations,
Carolina, open borders, late term abortion, socialism, blatant corruption, and the total
March 2nd obliteration of your second amendment. The Republican party is the party of the
American worker, the American family, the American dream, and the late great
Abraham Lincoln.42
Rally - Every corrupt force in American life that betrayed you and hurt you is supporting Joe
Michigan, Biden. The failed establishment that started the disastrous foreign wars… The career
November 2nd politicians that offshored your industries and decimated your factories and sent your
jobs away… The open border lobbyists that killed our fellow citizens with illegal
drugs and gangs and crime… The far-left Democrats that ruined our public schools,
depleted our inner cities, defunded our police, and demeaned your sacred faith and
values… The anti-American radicals defaming our noble history, heritage, and
heroes… Antifa, and the rioters, looters, Marxists, and left-wing extremists, they all
support Biden.43
Rally – This election will decide whether we preserve our magnificent heritage or whether
Michigan, we allow far left radicals to wipe it all away. Joe Biden has made a corrupt bargain
October 17th in exchange for his party’s nomination. He has handed control of his party over to the
hardcore militant left… [The democratic party is] now the party of socialists,
Marxists and left-wing extremists… America is the most magnificent, most virtuous
nation that has ever existed.44

Beyond the media and the political establishment, much of Trump’s corruption talk
concerned external threats to the values, lifestyles, and livelihoods of the “real people.” Within
this discourse, it is not the principle of popular sovereignty itself that is being corrupted, but rather
the popular sovereign (“the real people”) is threatened with cultural and economic displacement
by the “other people.” In the United States as elsewhere in developed Western nations, the
transition from industrial to post-industrial society and the spread of post-materialist values led to
a restructuring of the cultural axis of political contestation.45 Across the post-industrial regions of
Western Europe and North America “white working-class people sense that they have been
demoted from the center of their country’s consciousness to its fringe.”46 Trump played off of this
feeling, claiming to give voice to groups whose status is increasingly in decline, identifying them
as real Americans whose “noble history, heritage, and heroes” must be protected against the
“corrupt force[s] in American life.” Once again, the use of empty signifiers is extremely important
in Trump’s construction of the dichotomy between “pure people” and “corrupt elite.” Trump extols
the virtue of the “American worker, the American family, and the American dream,” defined in
opposition to some nebulous group (“every corrupt force in American life that betrayed you and
hurt you”); he gestures towards a set of amorphous values connected with some unspecified time
when American was “great.”

10
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Topic 6. Globalization and the Economy
Rally – NV, For years, Washington politicians took money from lobbyists, global corporations and
Feb 21st corrupt special interests to ship our jobs and factories. They stole our wealth. They
shipped it overseas and to other countries. America lost one in four manufacturing jobs
following the twin disasters of NAFTA and China’s entrance into the WTO… Under
my administration, the great betrayal of America is over. America is no longer for
sale.47
Rally – The corruption of politicians like Biden and it is corruption, is exactly why I ran for
Pennsylvania, president. I ran for trade; I hated the trade deals. I said, “Why are you allowing them
Oct 26th to take all of your car companies and moving them to Mexico and Canada?48
Rally – Joe Biden shipped away your jobs, shut down your factories, threw open your borders
Wisconsin, and ravaged our cities while sacrificing American blood and treasure in endless wars.
Oct 17th Joe Biden is and always has been a corrupt politician.49
Rally – Joe Biden is the living embodiment of the corrupt political class that enriched himself
Georgia, [sic] while draining the economic life and soul from our country. For the last 47 years,
Oct 16th Joe Biden, he shipped away your jobs, shut down your factories, threw open your
borders and ravaged our cities while sacrificing American blood and treasure in
endless and ridiculous foreign wars.50

While Trump does not truly identify, much less actually address the underlying causes of
status loss, in this case he does connect the feeling of status loss to real, substantive issues:
immigration, trade globalization, deindustrialization, and economic decline supposedly
orchestrated by a corrupt elite (of which “Joe Biden” is the living embodiment”). This is the closest
Trump comes to making a substantive rather than symbolic critique of corruption.
Trump paints America as the victim of a collusion between the liberal establishment and
foreign countries, who together “drained the economic life and soul from our country.” He also
connects the economic disruption caused by globalization and technological change with migration
— not logically, but affectively. Immigrants, foreign countries, and the domestic elites they
supposedly collude with are convenient scapegoats. This narrative is capable of explaining a
complex and heterogeneous reality through a simple affective logic: “here is what is happening,
this is why, and these are the people who are doing it to you.” They are taking our jobs and our
factories. This is who we are; these are our enemies; only I can defeat them and restore us to our
rightful place. Ultimately, even this more substantive critique of corruption is subordinated to a
symbolic logic.
In these excerpts, Trump also seems to vaguely gesture at formal, public office corruption.
But while Trump may, at times, be implying not only that Biden is on the side of a secretive cabal
aiming to undermine American workers, but also that Biden personally and illegally profited in
doing so, it’s clear that Trump’s allegations of “corruption” here as well as elsewhere do not refer
to an actual act of law breaking or anything resembling formal public office corruption. The
“corrupt special interests” are never identified with any particular person or group in a plausible
way, they gesture instead at the Manichean opposition between the people and the “corrupt
political class” behind the “sacrifice of American blood and treasure” and the “great betrayal of
America.”
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Topic 4 - Public Office Corruption
Rally - While Biden was giving China your jobs, his family raked in millions and millions of
Michigan, dollars from the Chinese communist party. Joe Biden is a corrupt politician who
Nov 1st bought and is paid for… His son’s like a human vacuum cleaner. “Hey Dad, what
country are you going to today?” “China.” “Oh, good, maybe I can take in a couple of
million.” … [Hunter] wants China to pay $10 million a year for recommending
service… I guess he calls it introductory services. He’s introducing his father.51
Rally – North In Ukraine, [they gave Hunter] $183,000 a month, and a $3 million upfront payment
Carolina, for him and his friends, with no experience and no job, and they said, do you know
Sept. 19th energy? No, I don’t… They’re corrupt.52
Rally – Florida, All Biden does is talks [sic] about COVID… He doesn’t call it the China virus. You
Oct 29th know why? Because China has him paid off… They gave his son one and a half billion
to manage. He makes millions of dollars a year, I assume.53
Rally – And what about Omar where she gets caught harvesting?54 I hope your US attorney is
Minnesota, involved. I’ve been reading these reports for two years about how corrupted, crooked
September 30th she is… frankly harvesting is terrible, but it’s the least of the things that she has done…
she tells us how to run our country… she’s been crooked for a long time… AOC also.
You take a look at the corruption, the disgusting corruption. 700% increase refugees
coming from the most dangerous places in the world including Yemen, Syria, and your
favorite country, Somalia, right? Biden will turn Minnesota into a refugee camp…
Overwhelming public resources, overcrowding schools, and inundating your
hospitals.55

Even when Trump did speak about “public office” corruption – which was the case in
somewhere around 15-20% of his invocations of “corruption” – he usually framed (often vague
and unspecified) charges of public office corruption in terms of the broader claim that the elites
are fundamentally morally bankrupt and, ultimately, evil. The last excerpt is particularly telling;
after accusing Ilhan Omar of corruptly tampering with ballots, he expresses outrage that she — an
outsider and enemy of “the people” — “tells us how to run our country” and warns that as a
consequence of her “disgusting corruption” Minnesota can expect a “700% increase in refugees.”
It is also notable that Trump’s accusations of public office corruption against Biden increased as
Biden began to comment on Trump’s various conflicts of interest in the lead up to the election. It
has repeatedly been noted that part of Trump’s strategy is to fling whatever he is accused of back
at his accusers,56 which may explain the relative increase in his accusations of public office
corruption over the course of the campaign, culminating in various accusations against Hunter
Biden.
Notably, in the Hunter-Ukraine case, Trump illegally abused the powers of his office,
threatening to withhold funds from Ukraine in order to further his private interest (getting reelected) — in other words, Trump committed public office corruption. However, within Trump’s
framing, Trump was using all of the powers at his disposal to unmask the moral degeneracy of the
“corrupt elite” – and to some extent, this framing worked. A Pew poll conducted in November of
2019 found that 65% of Republicans who got their news from right-wing outlets believed that
Trump “temporarily withheld US aid to Ukraine because he wanted to advance a US government
position” whereas only 10% believed he did so in order to “help his reelection campaign.”57
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II. B - Biden and Sanders on Corruption
In order to model Biden and Sanders’ corruption talk, I use models with 3 rather than 8
topics, given the far smaller samples; in both cases, all topics had nearly equal topic proportions,
and so I omit the STM topic proportion plots for the sake of tidiness.
As shown in Table 1 (on page 8), Biden spoke about corruption over nine times less frequently
than Trump. When he did speak about corruption, he nearly always used the term to indicate
formal, public office corruption. Occasionally, he mixed more substantive appeals into his
discourse, but these always served the purpose of exciting outrage about issues of public office
corruption. Out of Biden’s eighteen mentions of corruption, all but two fall into one of three broad
topics: 1) Trump’s tax returns and illegal business activity, 2) public office corruption in the Trump
administration, or 3) corrupt disbursement of CARES act funds. (The other two mentions were
unrelated and model reported that they contained equal mixtures of all three topics, when in fact
they corresponded to none of the topics.)

Biden - Topic 1. Public Office Corruption of the Trump Administration
Energy Plan
Speech – July
14th
Discussion –
NC, Sept. 23rd

It seems like every few weeks, when he needs a distraction from the latest charges of
corruption in his staff or the conviction of high-ranking members of his administration
and political apparatus, the White House announces “it’s infrastructure week.”58
This has been the most corrupt administration in modern American history. The Justice
Department has turned into the president’s private law firm…59

Biden - Topic 2. Trump’s Tax Returns and Illegal Business Activity
Presidential
Debate –
Oct. 22nd
Rally –
Michigan, Oct
31st

What are you hiding? … Russia’s paying you a lot. China’s paying you a lot on… all
your businesses all around… the world. China’s building a new road to a new golf
course you have overseas… Release your tax return or stop talking about corruption.60
I released 22 years of my tax returns… He hasn’t released one. He talks about
corruption. What is he hiding? He owes $41 million out there. Who’s he owe it to? …
and this guy talks about corruption.61

Despite the fact that around 70% of Biden’s corruption talk concerned acts of public office
corruption by Trump or his associates (Topics 1 and 2), Biden’s accusations of corruption didn’t
stick with Trump’s base. Corruption for them was identified with an elite that Biden belonged to
and which Trump attacked from the outside as an anti-establishment maverick. Within Trump’s
“logic,” whether something was or was not corrupt was contingent on where it stood in the divide
between people and elite. As long as an affective identification between the leader and the people
is maintained, “corruption” remains trapped in this logic.

Biden - Topic 3. Disbursement of CARES act funds
Sanders Endorses
Biden in Livestream
Meeting,
April 13th
Virtual Town Hall –
June 27th

Donald Trump and his team are trying to gut the whole oversight of the Corporate
Loan Program now. Trump fired the Inspector General … who was put in place
to police corporate corruption and what’s he trying to hide? [sic] Congress should
demand answers.62
Trump’s corrupt recovery is focused on the wealthy, well-connected, not the
millions of mom and pops that are out there facing ruin… 40% of the funds didn’t
go to small businesses at all and the Main Street lending program has lent not a
single dollar.63

In his discussion of the CARES act,64 “corrupt recovery” Biden has a more substantive
appeal. He implies that much of the disbursement of funds occurred in an illegal manner; but, more
13
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

33

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

importantly, he alleges that the wealthy and those with connections to the Trump administration
benefitted disproportionately at the expense of “Main Street” and the American people as a whole.
Regardless, only five of Biden’s eighteen mentions of corruption deal with these more substantive
issues. For Biden, “corruption” (noun) signifies a specific action, event, or pattern of actions and
events; Biden rarely used “corrupt” (as an adjective) to indicate a quality (not directly connected
to formal public office conception) of some organization, entity, group, or society as a whole.
Unlike Biden, Sanders primarily talked about corruption in these more substantive terms,
using the concept to indicate the presence of a rupture between real and ideal. He talked about the
disproportionate influence of certain economic interests and social groups within democracy; he
even went so far as to say that American democracy itself had been corrupted by these interests.
In fact, nearly all of Sanders’ corruption talk is concerned with factional interests (corporations
and the rich) exerting undue influence in political and economic life.

Sanders - Topic 1. Misc. Factional Interests in Economic and
Political life
Democratic Debate – We [need] the courage to take on the one percent, take on the greed and corruption
Iowa, Jan. 15th of the corporate elite and create an economy and… government that works for all
of us, not just the one percent.65
Rally – Missouri, Within a corrupt political system, where billionaires buy elections, our job is to
March 9th reinvigorate democracy so we have one person, one vote, not billionaires buying
elections.66

Nonetheless, Sanders does make vague and general allusions to formal public office
corruption. When Sanders attacks the corruption of the healthcare industry, he may, in part, be
thinking about illegal behavior on the part of the industry, or the public office corruption that
facilitates it. When Sanders denounces Trump’s “corrupted administration,” he is doubtless at least
partly thinking of Trump’s manifold violations of the emoluments clause. When he speaks of
corporate corruption, he is certainly, at least in part, thinking of actual illegal activities and bribery
of elected officials.

Sanders - Topic 2. The Trump Administration
New Conference – [Trump is a] pathological liar… running a corrupt administration. He clearly does
March 11th not understand the Constitution of the United States and thinks that he is a
president who is above the law. He is a racist, a sexist, a homophobe, a xenophobe,
and a religious bigot.67
Rally – California, We will not have a corrupted administration for four more years. We will not have
March 2nd a President who has apparently never read the Constitution of the United States.
We will not have a President who is undermining American democracy… we are
a democracy, not an autocracy.68

Sanders - Topic 3. The Greed of the Healthcare Industry
Rally – South Don’t tell me we can’t take on the greed and corruption of the pharmaceutical
Carolina, Feb. 28th industry… Charging us, in some cases, 10 times more for the same exact drugs sold
abroad… we’re going to pass a Medicare for All single-payer program.69
Democratic Debate Now is the time to take on the greed and corruption of the healthcare industry, of
– Jan 15th the drug companies, and finally provide healthcare to all through a Medicare for
All single payer program.70

But more importantly, Sanders is concerned with precisely the fact that so many of these
“corrupt” behaviors are not illegal, that they have been codified in the laws as a legitimate part of
14
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the system. For Sanders, “corruption” is something that occurs in relation to the constitution, the
principles of American democracy, and the American people. Ultimately, Sanders is concerned
with the corruption of democracy – with the demos whose kratos has been usurped.
However, unlike Trump, Sanders never identifies this demos positively, as possessing a
concrete will, reason, or morality which can only be embodied in his own person. Instead, Sanders
focuses on substantive appeals to the ideal of democracy; the ideal that the people, in the abstract,
have a say in creating “government that works for all of us.” Sanders is quite clear that “the
people,” means all the people. For Sanders, Trump is corrupt, in part, because “he is a racist, a
sexist, a homophobe, a xenophobe, and a religious bigot” – because he excludes a part of the people
from the people. At its core, Sanders’ appeal to the principle of popular sovereignty remains
popular, rather than populist.
III. Did “Corruption Talk” Work?
Now that we’ve seen how each candidate used “corruption talk” and examined the political
logic driving these different usages, the logical next question is, “did these various forms of
corruption talk work?” Perceptions of “corruption” are high among the American public, with over
70% of voters reporting that they believed political corruption was either “very” or “quite”
widespread.71 But did this contribute to a “demand” for “corruption narratives” that played a role
in determining vote choices in the 2020 election? Did “corruption talk” appeal to voters?
Furthermore, were voters concerned with public office corruption in particular? Or was the more
inchoate sense that elites are removed, untrustworthy, and self-serving the factor that ultimately
drove voting outcomes?
In order to answer these questions, I use data from the American National Election Study
(ANES), which is a representative survey of Americans before and after the 2020 presidential
elections. I am interested in the role that perceptions of public office corruption vs. a more
generalized distrust of elites (which could be addressed through either substantive and symbolic
“corruption talk”) have in predicting vote choice for Sanders over Biden in the Democratic
primary, and vote choice for Trump over Biden in the general election.
I take answers to the question “How widespread do you think corruption such as bribe
taking is among politicians”72 as my indicator of perceptions on public office corruption. My
variable on degenerative corruption is composed of the average of responses to three questions: 1)
“Most politicians are trustworthy,” 2) “Most politicians do not care about the people,” 3) “When
it comes to public policy decisions, whom do you tend to trust more: ordinary people or experts?”
Responses to each question range on a 5-point scale: for the first two, the scale runs from “agree
strongly” to “disagree strongly”; for the third, the scale runs from “trust ordinary people much
more” to “trust experts much more.” All of the survey questions included here were administered
in the month after the 2020 election.
My “corrupt elites” variable is the average of each respondent's score across all three
questions.73 I take these questions as good indicators of attitudes toward “degenerative” corruption
because they each express an aspect of distrust toward elites: lack of trust in politicians, the feeling
that politicians are emotionally removed from the people, and the belief that the people ought to
take back control of government from technocratic elites. These questions have a relatively low
level of correlation, with the Pearson r statistic ranging between .2 and .3: in other words, they are
not measures of the same phenomenon; they measure different aspects of a single phenomenon.
Answers to each of these questions were recorded on a five-point scale, which I then normalize to
a one-point scale — regression coefficients thus express the change in vote outcome likelihood
when moving across the entire spectrum of the variable.
15
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I model the primary and general election using the subset of those respondents who
reported voting for Biden or Sanders, and Biden or Trump respectively, excluding incomplete data.
My benchmark specification is an ordinary least squares regression with the public office and
“corrupt elites” variables as the main regressors, controlling for basic demographic variables —
age, income, race, gender, education, rural/urban, and party identification for the Trump/Biden
regression. (Table 2 below displays only the main regressors, for the full regression, see table 4 in
the appendix.
Without adding the corrupt elites variable into our regression, we find that beliefs about
the level of public office corruption are a strong predictor of voting outcomes, with an 18 and 16
percent increase in the likelihood of voting for Trump or Sanders when moving across the entire
range of the variable.
However, given that neither Trump nor Sanders were concerned about public office
corruption, this result may initially appear puzzling. Only when we consider that beliefs about
public office corruption may be a product of a worldview that sees elites as “degeneratively”
corrupt does this striking finding begin to make sense. Those who have an inchoate sense that
elites are unrepresentative, self-interested, nefarious, and culturally removed from people like
them may also be more likely to believe that politicians engage in public office corruption such as
bribery.
Table 2: Voting Outcomes Regression

This hypothesis is confirmed by our regression analysis. When we introduce the corrupt
elites variable, the statistical significance of the public office variable drops out for both the general
and primary election models. Moving across the entire range of the “corrupt elites” variable we
see an extraordinary 36 and 23 percent increase in the likelihood of voting for Trump and Sanders
respectively. General distrust of elites takes on the entire explanatory value of beliefs about public
office corruption: public office corruption now has no role in predicting Trump or Sanders vote in
a best fit linear regression model.
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When Trump talked about corruption, he often referred to various cultural grievances,
while Sanders was primarily concerned with economic inequalities. In order to test whether
distrust of elites is affected by perceptions of economic and cultural issues, I run another
regression, this time treating the corrupt elites variable as my dependent variable, again controlling
for demographic characteristics.
In order to examine the effect of economic factors, I look at three variables: opposition to
free trade, the belief that free trade takes away American jobs, and self-reported class (upper,
middle, working, and lower). In order to measure the effect of cultural resentment, I look at four
variables: the belief that American culture is harmed by immigrants, like/dislike of feminism,
support for “traditional family values,” and the perception that “rural people don’t get enough
respect” — note that rural/urban is one of the control variables (for the full regression, see table 5
in the appendix).
Table 3: “Corrupt Elites” Regression
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I find that cultural resentments play a large role in predicting distrust of elites, but that
opposition to globalization and self-reported social class are slightly less effective at explaining
variation across the corrupt elites variable. Interestingly, beliefs about public office corruption are
highly predictive of beliefs about degenerative corruption, even in the kitchen sink regression, and
explain more of the variation in the dependent variable than either economic or cultural factors.
This does not mean that perceptions of public office corruption “cause” generalized distrust of
elites; if anything, the direction of causality runs the other way: those who believe that “elites are
secretly working to advance their own interests rather than those of regular people,” are more likely
to believe that “acts of bribery and embezzlement are common among politicians.” However,
perceptions of public office corruption are nonetheless a large component of generalized distrust
of elites; indeed, they appear to be a significantly larger component than, for example, the
perception that American culture is harmed by immigrants.
Ultimately, we find that the economic and cultural factors which are associated with a
generalized distrust of elites are precisely the issues that Trump addressed through his discourse
around corruption. (Sanders also addressed economic displacement and the increasing sense of
alienation from elites, but without resorting to racist dog whistles or playing of cultural
resentments.) This connection between candidate discourse, the cultural and economic factors that
lead to increasing distrust of elites, and the regression analysis on vote choice strongly suggest that
the feeling that the system as a whole is fundamentally corrupt was channeled through the symbolic
and substantive narratives that Trump and Sanders constructed through their “corruption talk,” and
that this perception of generalized corruption played a role in vote choice for Sanders/Trump and
against Biden in the 2020 election.
IV. Conclusion
The success of anti-establishment candidates like Trump or Sanders on the national stage
would have been inconceivable only twenty (maybe even ten) years ago. Over the past half
century, faith in the American system of government has plummeted, with trust in the federal
government decreasing from 60 percent in the years prior to the Vietnam War protests and the
Watergate scandal to somewhere around 20 percent today.74
The growing feeling that the system is fundamentally corrupt and that elites are only
looking out for themselves has been driven by two primary factors: skyrocketing economic
inequalities and shifts in the normative order that leave certain portions of the population
(particularly those with the strongest claim to traditional American identity) feeling left out of the
dominant elite value system.
On the one hand, the superrich have made enormous gains in the past fifty years at the
expense of the American middle class, the supposed bulwark of American democracy. Since the
early 1970s, the U.S. economy has nearly doubled in size,75 but this growth accrued almost
exclusively to the top 1%.76 In Thomas Piketty’s terms, the rate of return on capital tends to exceed
the overall growth rate (r > g), and given the absence of redistributive policies, regulation, and
cooperative ownership, those who derive their income from capital have seen their fortunes
skyrocket, while average hourly wages have stagnated or even declined.77
On the other hand, over the past half century, post-materialist values of autonomy, selfexpression, gender equality, multiculturalism, secular values, and LGBTQ rights have increasingly
replaced traditional American values grounded in a protestant work ethic and national
exceptionalism. People who fail to assimilate themselves into the new normative order “feel
socially-marginalized as a result of incongruence between their values and the discourse of
mainstream elites.”78 Many people who voted for Trump believed not only that the existing
18
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political establishment is fundamentally corrupt, but also that American values and the American
people itself has been corrupted through immigration, globalization, and the imposition of a new
normative order by foreign hearted liberal elites.79 These voters were seeking not only objective
material gains but also an increase in subjective social status: recognition and respect. This is what
Trump spoke to through his corruption talk when he excoriated:
“Every corrupt force in American life that betrayed you and hurt you, the career politicians that
offshored your industries and decimated your factories and sent your jobs away… The open border
lobbyists that killed our fellow citizens with illegal drugs and gangs and crime… The far-left
Democrats that ruined our public schools, depleted our inner cities, defunded our police, and
demeaned your sacred faith and values… The anti-American radicals defaming our noble history,
heritage, and heroes.”80

Sanders and Trump both addressed our contemporary democratic discontent through their
corruption talk (which, as we have shown, played a role in their respective appeals). Sanders spoke
primarily to the issue of economic inequalities, while Trump spoke primarily to the feeling of
status loss and cultural change. Both used a discourse that pits “the people” against a “corrupt
elite”; and both spoke to the feeling that power has been taken from the people.
But while Trump’s corruption talk was exclusionary and backward looking, a tool of political elites
to divide and conquer through a symbolic logic that obscures substantive issues and plays off the
cultural resentments of the white working class, Sanders’ corruption talk was inclusionary and
constructive, emphasizing the creation of a just social system and a normative order in which
everyone has a place and is accorded respect and recognition. Trump used a populist appeal to
exclude a part of the people from the people; Sanders used a popular appeal, understanding that
“the people” means “all people,” and that no one can ever claim to definitively speak for (let alone
embody) all of the people.
Meanwhile, Biden generally avoided talking about “corruption” and when he did, his
discourse was largely limited to condemning formal, public office corruption. While Biden was
successful in the 2020 race, as the perception that the status-quo is “corrupt” increases, a discourse
that fails to address “degenerative corruption” will be less and less effective.
In order to be successful, leftist political discourse must be grounded in the promise of
American democracy — the ideal of government by the people, for the people, but avoid
constructing “the people” as a part of the whole. It must identify the substantive corruption in our
political system — the disjunction between the ideal of American democracy and the reality of
American plutocracy — while remaining within a liberal framework. “The people” contains a
beautiful promise: the promise of democracy and liberty. Despite its perils, we must return to the
idea of “the people.”
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Appendix
Table 4: Voting Outcomes Full Regression
Trump Vote in General Election
Predictors

Sanders Vote in Democratic Primary

Estimates

Estimates

Estimates

Estimates

(Intercept)

-0.02
(-0.08 – 0.05)

-0.10 **
(-0.16 – -0.04)

0.73 ***
(0.59 – 0.87)

0.66 ***
(0.52 – 0.80)

Public Office

0.18 ***
(0.13 – 0.22)

0.03
(-0.02 – 0.08)

0.16 **
(0.06 – 0.27)

0.08
(-0.03 – 0.20)

0.36 ***
(0.30 – 0.41)

Corrupt Elites

0.23 ***
(0.10 – 0.35)

Income

-0.04 ***
(-0.04 – -0.03)

-0.04 ***
(-0.04 – -0.03)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.02)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.02)

Education

-0.02 ***
(-0.02 – -0.01)

-0.01 ***
(-0.02 – -0.01)

-0.00
(-0.01 – 0.01)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.01)

Age

0.00 ***
(0.00 – 0.00)

0.00 ***
(0.00 – 0.00)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.01)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.01)

Party ID [Republican]

0.78 ***
(0.75 – 0.80)

0.75 ***
(0.72 – 0.77)

Party ID [Independent]

0.31 ***
(0.28 – 0.33)

0.29 ***
(0.26 – 0.31)

race [Black]

-0.10 ***
(-0.13 – -0.07)

-0.11 ***
(-0.15 – -0.08)

-0.20 ***
(-0.26 – -0.15)

-0.21 ***
(-0.26 – -0.15)

race [Hispanic]

-0.06 ***
(-0.10 – -0.03)

-0.06 ***
(-0.10 – -0.03)

-0.04
(-0.11 – 0.03)

-0.05
(-0.12 – 0.02)

Gender [Female]

-0.00
(-0.02 – 0.02)

0.00
(-0.02 – 0.02)

-0.07 **
(-0.11 – -0.03)

-0.07 **
(-0.11 – -0.03)

Rural Urban [Suburb]

0.01
(-0.01 – 0.04)

0.01
(-0.01 – 0.03)

-0.07 **
(-0.12 – -0.02)

-0.06 *
(-0.11 – -0.01)

Rural Urban [Small
Town]

0.05 ***
(0.02 – 0.07)

0.04 **
(0.02 – 0.07)

-0.04
(-0.10 – 0.01)

-0.04
(-0.10 – 0.01)

Rural Urban [Rural]

0.09 ***
(0.06 – 0.12)

0.07 ***
(0.04 – 0.10)

-0.04
(-0.11 – 0.04)

-0.04
(-0.11 – 0.03)

Observations

4462

4462

1418

1418

R2 / R2 adjusted

0.606 / 0.605

0.619 / 0.618

0.182 / 0.177

0.190 / 0.184

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Table 5: Corrupt Elites Full Regression
Corrupt Elites
Predictors

Public Office
***

(Intercept)

0.34
(0.31 – 0.37)

Public Office

0.35 ***
(0.33 – 0.37)

Culture
***

0.60
(0.57 – 0.64)

Economy
***

0.59
(0.55 – 0.62)

Kitchen Sink
0.36 ***
(0.32 – 0.40)
0.32 ***
(0.30 – 0.34)

0.08 ***
(0.06 – 0.10)

0.06 ***
(0.04 – 0.08)

-0.10 ***
(-0.13 – -0.08)

-0.10 ***
(-0.12 – -0.08)

Traditional Family
Values

0.04 ***
(0.02 – 0.06)

0.03 ***
(0.02 – 0.05)

Rural people don’t Get
Enough Respect

0.11 ***
(0.08 – 0.13)

0.07 ***
(0.05 – 0.10)

culture harmed by
immigrants
Feminism Thermometer

globalization effect jobs

0.05 ***
(0.02 – 0.08)

0.02
(-0.01 – 0.04)

Free Trade Oppose

0.08 ***
(0.06 – 0.11)

0.04 ***
(0.02 – 0.06)

-0.09 ***
(-0.12 – -0.06)

-0.06 ***
(-0.08 – -0.03)

Self- reported Social
Class
Income

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.00)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.00)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.00)

-0.00 **
(-0.01 – -0.00)

education

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.01)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.01)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.01)

-0.01 ***
(-0.01 – -0.00)

age

-0.00 ***
(-0.00 – -0.00)

-0.00 ***
(-0.00 – -0.00)

-0.00 ***
(-0.00 – -0.00)

-0.00 ***
(-0.00 – -0.00)

Party ID [Republican]

0.14 ***
(0.13 – 0.15)

0.09 ***
(0.08 – 0.11)

0.15 ***
(0.14 – 0.17)

0.09 ***
(0.07 – 0.10)

Party ID [Independent]

0.08 ***
(0.07 – 0.09)

0.06 ***
(0.05 – 0.07)

0.09 ***
(0.07 – 0.10)

0.05 ***
(0.04 – 0.07)

race [Black]

0.01
(-0.00 – 0.03)

0.01
(-0.00 – 0.03)

0.02 **
(0.01 – 0.04)

-0.01
(-0.02 – 0.01)
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race [Hispanic]

-0.00
(-0.02 – 0.01)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.02)

0.00
(-0.02 – 0.02)

-0.01
(-0.02 – 0.01)

Rural Urban [Suburb]

0.01
(-0.00 – 0.02)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.02)

0.01 *
(0.00 – 0.03)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.01)

Rural Urban [Small
Town]

0.02 **
(0.01 – 0.03)

0.01
(-0.01 – 0.02)

0.02 **
(0.01 – 0.03)

0.00
(-0.01 – 0.01)

Rural Urban [Rural]

0.04 ***
(0.03 – 0.06)

0.03 ***
(0.02 – 0.05)

0.05 ***
(0.03 – 0.06)

0.02 **
(0.00 – 0.03)

Gender [Female]

-0.00
(-0.01 – 0.01)

0.02 ***
(0.01 – 0.03)

0.01
(-0.00 – 0.02)

-0.00
(-0.01 – 0.01)

Observations
2

2

R / R adjusted

4203

4203

4203

4203

0.391 / 0.389

0.310 / 0.308

0.273 / 0.270

0.436 / 0.433

* p<0.05 ** p<0.01 *** p<0.001
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Early Childhood Intervention and Income Inequality: An Analysis
on the Intergenerational Mobility of Head Start Participants
PAUL HINTON
Carleton College
ABSTRACT: The Head Start program is an early childhood intervention program funded by the
federal government. Designed for low-income families, it promotes school readiness among its
participants. In my research, I examine the effects of Head Start on the intergenerational mobility
of its participants. Using data from the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and
the NLSY Child and Young Adult Supplement (CNLSY), I measure the degree of earnings
persistence between parents and their children for students in preschool and Head Start. I find
that participation in Head Start is associated with an increase in mobility, which remains true
after controlling for family effects.
I. Introduction
Countries with lower intergenerational mobility tend to have higher income inequality.1 I
investigate whether increased access to education through the Head Start program leads to more
intergenerational mobility. This higher intergenerational mobility could lead to a decrease in
income inequality, a growing problem in the United States. The Head Start Program is a
comprehensive early childhood intervention program that educates low-income children to prepare
them for primary school. In addition to a traditional preschool education, the program provides
health, nutrition, and parent involvement services.2 Past literature has investigated the long-term
effects of Head Start on metrics such as participant earnings, test scores, and crime rates.3,4,5
Researchers judge the immediate success of programs like Head Start through measures
such as test scores. While research finds that test scores increase right after a child’s participation
in the program, these increases dissipate over time in what has been called the “Head Start fade.”6
However, test scores are not the only determinant of success for the program. Children can still
benefit in the longer run as a result of better school preparation. Increased school readiness for
students could cause a change in trajectory throughout primary school and make them more likely
to have positive future outcomes. If Head Start participants improve their economic status relative
to their parents more than students who do not enroll in Head Start, then enrollment in Head Start
could decrease income inequality in the United States for future generations.
I believe my research contributes to the literature surrounding Head Start. Previous
research focuses on test scores and individual young adult outcomes such as high school
graduation and teen parenthood.7,8 My research provides an alternate lens for looking at its
potential benefits. By looking at the intergenerational mobility of Head Start participants compared
to non-participants, I find that Head Start participants have more economic mobility. That is, the
income of a Head Start participant’s parents is less predictive of the participant’s future income
than it is for someone who does not participate in Head Start. This suggests that early childhood
intervention programs such as Head Start accrue lasting benefits for its participants.
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II. Context and Theory
Connecting Mobility, Inequality, and Education
Previous research finds associations between income inequality and other phenomena that
helps explain rising income inequality in countries such as the United States. A country’s
intergenerational mobility is one potential link that could account for this rise. Corak (2013)
discusses this relationship through the Great Gatsby Curve.9 Among OECD countries, those with
higher income inequality also tend to experience lower intergenerational mobility.10 As a measure
of intergenerational mobility, Corak uses the intergenerational earnings elasticity (IGE) of a
country.11 The IGE is the coefficient ! from the regression equation of one generation’s income
"!,# versus a previous generation’s income "!,#$% :
#$"!,# = & + !#$"!,#$% + (! .
In this equation, + represents each individual, , represents the current generation and , − 1
represents the previous generation. The coefficient & is the trend in average income across
generations and ( is an error term that captures any other influences on the current generation’s
income. This is the primary empirical strategy I use in my analysis of Head Start participation and
intergenerational mobility; I expand on the strategy in Section III.
The coefficient ! in the above equation measures the degree to which a parent’s earnings
allow us to predict a child’s earnings. Higher values of ! imply lower intergenerational mobility.
For some percent variation in a parent’s income, the intergenerational elasticity tells us the
expected percent variation in a child’s income. For example, if a parent’s income is 50 percent
above the mean income for his generation, then an IGE of 1 implies a child will also have an
income 50 percent above the mean income for the child’s generation. An IGE of 0, on the other
hand, implies a parent’s income has no relationship to the child’s income. A parent’s income
bracket is thus more likely to be the same as the child’s future income bracket if we observe low
intergenerational mobility. Corak (2013) compares the IGE to a country’s level of income
inequality using the Gini coefficient.12 In his data, countries with a higher Gini coefficient also
have a higher IGE. The United States is at the upper end of the relationship: it has high income
inequality and low intergenerational mobility compared to other countries.13 Since Corak’s study,
research has found multiple explanations for the relationship between inequality and mobility.
One such study by Jerrim and Macmillan (2015) suggests education is the primary link
between income inequality and intergenerational mobility.14 They present empirical evidence of
this relationship across countries that participate in the Programme for the International
Assessment of Adult Competencies (PIACC). Instead of regressing log child income on log parent
income, the authors instead regress log child income on the highest level of parental education,
claiming this method will capture financial, social, and cultural effects on the child.15 They analyze
two different effects in their paper: (1) the association between educational attainment of parents
and children and (2) the overall returns on education for the child. Jerrim and Macmillan find both
effects are positively associated with income inequality among the countries in the survey, with
the persistence of educational attainment between parents and children being the stronger result.16
From this, they conclude transmission of education is important for intergenerational mobility,
particularly through financial investments in education. If these financial investments are primarily
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at the top of the income distribution, then low-income families are left behind in education and
income inequality is expected to be higher.
One potential consequence of differential investment in education is differing school
quality. Grawe (2010) investigates the relationship between intergenerational earnings mobility
and school quality for male students, which he proxies using the pupil-to-teacher ratio.17
Theoretically, this proxy’s effect on the IGE could be either positive or negative. A higher pupilto-teacher ratio could imply a lower school quality because schools are unable to hire more
teachers. In these scenarios, each student may receive less individual attention and would therefore
not learn as much as he would at a school with a lower ratio. On the other hand, a lower pupil-toteacher ratio may imply that, while a school hires many teachers, the average teacher has lower
qualifications than in an identical school with the same budget that hires fewer teachers. Grawe
finds a positive relationship between intergenerational mobility and the pupil-to-teacher ratio; for
an increase in the pupil-to-teacher ratio, the mobility of sons increases.18 While this study may say
nothing about the effects of improvements in early childhood intervention, it suggests that school
quality could affect mobility.
Assuming that communities with different average income levels have different levels of
financial investment in education, socioeconomic segregation represents a potential hindrance to
improvements in educational investment and attainment for low-income groups. In their paper
“Understanding the Great Gatsby Curve,” Durlauf and Seshadri (2018) argue that social factors
determine education and human capital, with education acting as the mediator between parental
income and the future income of their offspring.19 The authors show that an equilibrium outcome
of the Great Gatsby Curve can occur as a result of high socioeconomic segregation.20 Central to
this analysis is the assumption that people prefer to live with more affluent neighbors in larger
areas. These preferences lead to socioeconomic segregation of neighborhoods.21 For
neighborhoods with a higher average income, members contribute more to public investments in
education than neighborhoods with a lower average income. These investments will translate into
greater overall investment in human capital for higher-income children in more affluent
neighborhoods. The authors propose this difference in investment causes a disparity in
accumulated human capital between children of low-income neighborhoods and high-income
neighborhoods.22 By assuming early accumulation of human capital predicts labor market
outcomes in adulthood, Durlauf and Seshadri conclude that socioeconomic segregation leads to
low intergenerational mobility and persistent income inequality.23 Empirical research could further
test this theory, but my research focuses only on the individual decisions of parents to invest in
their children’s human capital, not societal decisions as a whole.
Many students in the United States go to school depending on their residential district,
implying residential segregation and school segregation are closely connected.24 Arenas and
Hindriks (2021) investigate the latter phenomenon in their research on intergenerational mobility
and unequal school opportunity.25 They simulate different outcomes of intergenerational mobility
and efficiency to investigate the relationship between income inequality and low mobility. In this
instance, the authors define a change in efficiency as the change in average human capital.26 They
use the US parental income distribution to assess the tradeoff between school desegregation and
efficiency.27 In their model, unequal school opportunity includes both unequal school quality and
different probabilities of access to the best schools, which is very similar to the story of
socioeconomic segregation told by Durlauf and Seshadri.28 This unequal opportunity causes a gap
between high- and low-income families where higher-income families will match with higherquality schools. Arenas and Hindriks assume that investment in human capital and school quality
2
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are complements.29,30 Therefore, a higher rate of positive assortative matching implies higher
school quality and higher average investment in human capital. In their simulation, Arenas and
Hindriks test which effect dominates by changing school segregation and school inequality
variables. They find the increase in mobility from “creating” more equal schools is higher than the
loss in efficiency from this equalization.31 Finding ways to make schools more equal could
therefore improve economic mobility. Later, I discuss how early childhood interventions such as
Head Start could improve overall school quality.
Traditional Models of Intergenerational Mobility
My research focuses on a parent’s individual decision to invest in his or her child’s human
capital and how this decision relates to intergenerational mobility. Becker and Tomes (1979) build
the primary economic theory for intergenerational mobility.32 Starting with the first principles of
utility maximization, a parent faces the decision to invest either in his own consumption or in his
child’s consumption. The parent obtains some discounted utility from his child’s utility—this
depends on an intergenerational discount factor that represents the parent’s degree of altruism
toward his child. As an equation, we represent this as
/ = 0(2) + ! ∗ 0(2 & )
where U is the parent’s overall utility, 2 is the parent’s consumption, 2′ is the child’s consumption,
and ! is the intergenerational discount factor. Because this equation separates the utility of a
parent’s consumption from the utility of his child’s consumption, we can just focus on maximizing
the child’s utility in our analysis. By assumption, the child’s consumption 2′ is equivalent to his
future earnings:
2 & = 6 = 7ℎ' + 9(1 + :).
Here, 7 is inherent ability, ℎ' is the parent’s investment in human capital, 9 is the endowment that
a parent gives to a child, and : is the interest rate on the endowment. If a parent maximizes his
child’s future earnings, then the parent also maximizes his utility from his child’s consumption. A
parent determines his child’s future earnings through investment in the child’s human capital and
endowments to the child. Investment in human capital, ℎ' , is an increasing function that exhibits
decreasing marginal returns because 0 < = < 1. For two children with the same investment in
human capital, the child with a higher inherent ability 7 will also have higher future wages. As a
simplifying assumption, we assume the price of each unit of human capital is $1. The endowment
given to the child, 9, earns interest : over time at a rate of (1 + :). Solving for the optimal
investment in a child’s human capital is therefore reduced to taking the partial derivatives of our
first order condition:
()
= 7=ℎ'$%
(*
()
(+

=1+:

From these conditions, setting >6/>ℎ equal to >6/>9 gives the optimal investment in a child’s
human capital. Here, >6/>ℎ is the marginal benefit of an additional unit of investment in human
capital and >6/>9 is the marginal cost of the additional investment. We think of this marginal
3
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cost as an opportunity cost—instead of investing money into a child’s human capital, the parent
could instead use the money to give a bequest to the child that earns an interest of 1 + r. Equating
marginal benefit to marginal cost, we derive a parent’s optimal investment in a child’s human
capital.
However, if credit constraints are present, then the parent’s optimization problem must
change.33,34 Now, the parent no longer has enough capital to give an endowment to his child.
Therefore, the value 9 in the first order condition becomes zero and any investment in the child is
only in his human capital. The marginal cost of a parent’s investment in a child’s human capital is
()
therefore also affected by some credit constraint @. The new marginal cost is therefore (+ = 1 +
: + @. The marginal cost curve shifts up and results in a decreased investment in a child’s human
capital compared to a situation with no credit constraints. Figure 1 depicts this difference in the
two scenarios, with h representing optimal investment without credit constraints and h’
representing optimal investment with credit constraints.
Figure 1: Optimal Allocation of Investment in a Child’s Human Capital

Solon (2004) presents a theoretical model that solves for a steady state of intergenerational
mobility.35 In this model, a child’s human capital depends on a parent’s investment in the child’s
human capital, a public investment in the child’s human capital, and an additional human capital
endowment of the child independent of the investment in the child’s human capital.36 This
endowment is the child’s ability and represents traits the child receives either through nature or
nurture. Solon gives examples of family culture, family reputation, and inherent ability as potential
effects on a child’s human capital endowment.37 A higher endowment implies the child will have
higher human capital. Two important conclusions from the steady state equilibrium in this model
are that (1) parents invest more in their child’s human capital if their income is higher and (2) the
intergenerational earnings elasticity is lower if a community’s investment in public education is
higher.
Corak’s (2013) findings empirically confirm conclusion (1).38 In the past 50 years, parental
investment in enrichment expenditures for education such as computers and private schooling have
increased by about $5,000 in 30 years for those in the top income quintile but have stayed about
4
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the same for those in the bottom income quintile.39 This conclusion is important because a higher
private investment in human capital could lead to a higher human capital in children and therefore
higher future earnings for children of families from higher income brackets. A remedy for this
inequality could be public investment improvements for a child’s education. As conclusion (2)
states, higher public investment results in a lower intergenerational earnings elasticity. Parents
who otherwise could not afford more investment in their child’s education now receive the benefits
of a public investment in their child’s education. Programs such as Head Start seek to improve the
suboptimal investment in a child’s human capital through public investment in the child’s human
capital, which Becker and Tomes (1979) call a productive activity of the government.40,41 This
improves the overall stock of human capital for children at the lower end of the income distribution
and leads to higher wages. These higher wages then cause a decrease in the intergenerational
earnings elasticity.
Early Childhood Intervention’s Promising Effects
Even though investments in a child’s human capital can occur at any point during the
child’s youth, Johnson and Jackson (2019) argue through the concept of dynamic complementarity
that early educational investments can help break the cycle of poverty.42 This concept comes from
Cunha and Heckman (2007) in their paper “The Technology of Skill Formation.”43 They state that
the skills a child learns early on in development improve later investments in a child’s human
capital.44 This synergy has compounding effects as a child continues to gain skill and improve his
human capital. Without early skill building, a child will fall behind and therefore be unable to reap
the benefits of later investment in his education.45 By preparing a child for elementary school
education, the Head Start program can provide a direct channel for children to become schoolready when entering the K-12 system.
In addition, spillover effects to non-Head Start participants from children enrolled in Head
Start could improve the learning environment for all students. Because children who enroll in Head
Start may be in a more socioeconomically segregated area, these positive spillover effects might
cause improved educational and earnings outcomes for all students, not just those who participated
in Head Start. While my research only focuses on the intergenerational effects of students who
participate in Head Start, future analysis could also analyze the intergenerational effect of Head
Start on an entire community, not just on individual participants in Head Start. This analysis would
then tie back into the earlier discussion of socioeconomic segregation through education; if Head
Start had benefits from spillover effects, this could improve education in lower-income
neighborhoods and thus yield a decline in income inequality.
Extending this idea of community benefits of early childhood intervention, Art Rolnick
and Rob Grunewald (2003) argue in favor of early child development programs and perform a
cost-benefit analysis of the Perry Preschool program.46 This was an early childhood intervention
program in Ypsilanti, Michigan that provided high-quality education for children who were three
and four.47 Instead of public investments in economic development, such as subsidizing businesses
and improving professional sports stadiums, Rolnick and Grunewald argue that public investment
in an early child development program would provide a much higher rate of return.48 Over the five
years of the Perry Preschool program’s existence, they estimate the total overall benefits to
participants and the public in Ypsilanti to be $108,002 and the cost to be $12,356 in 1992 dollars.49
Benefits for the public come in the form of a decrease in crime and welfare payments and in a
more efficient K-12 education.50

5
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A similar analysis by Barnett (1995) finds comparable benefits to the Perry Preschool
program.51 In addition to his Perry Preschool analysis, Barnett reviews 36 previous studies on early
childhood intervention programs to examine their long-term effects on children from low-income
families.52 He finds positive long-term effects in grade retention and special education placement
to be among the most significant observations from the studies.53 Although others have
investigated the long-term effects of small, targeted programs, I assess the far-reaching program
of Head Start to determine whether positive long-term effects of Head Start on intergenerational
mobility exist.
Head Start’s Long-Run Outcomes
The literature on Head Start has primarily looked at the program’s effects on outcomes
other than intergenerational mobility. Deming (2009) first replicates previous research on initial
test score outcomes for Head Start participants, then analyzes Head Start’s impact on six different
outcomes including college attendance, crime, and high school graduation.54 He finds that after
applying family fixed effects in the regression, students who participate in Head Start are predicted
to score 0.145 standard deviations higher on standardized tests than students who had no preschool
at ages 5-6.55 Deming then goes on to show that although students have improved test scores right
after Head Start, the improvements fade out by the time they are in middle school.56 This pattern
is similar to Lee and Loeb’s (1995) previous results.57
More central to Deming’s paper, however, are his results on long-term outcomes of
participants. When Deming regresses an index of these outcomes—which includes college
attendance, crime rates and high school graduation—on participation in Head Start, he finds a
statistically significant impact of 0.228 standard deviations for children who participate in Head
Start compared to children who do not.58 This result implies that long-term impacts of Head Start
extend beyond just initial test score gains. Deming reports improvements in multiple individual
outcomes: the likelihood of high school graduation increases, the likelihood of completing some
college increases, and the likelihood of idleness decreases.59 People were considered idle if they
were not enrolled in school and reported zero wages in 2004. These findings suggest long-term
benefits of Head Start participants are present and thus prompts further investigation into the
program’s future benefits for children.
Garces et al. (2002) perform a similar analysis to Deming’s—they look at four young adult
outcomes for white and Black participants using data from the Panel Study of Income Dynamics
(PSID).60 These outcomes are high school graduation rates, some college education, log earnings,
and crime rates.61 When controlling for observable characteristics, white Head Start participants
are 20 percentage points more likely to complete high school than their siblings who did not attend
Head Start. However, this result does not hold for Black Head Start participants.62 But Garces et
al. do find a decrease in crime rates for Black Head Start participants compared to their siblings
who had no early childhood education.63 This crime reduction suggests a positive social benefit
from Head Start that could be measured in a cost-benefit analysis. Most notable is the finding that
earnings between the ages of 23 to 25 are significantly higher for children who attended Head Start
compared to children that either had no early education or attended preschool.64 Higher earnings
for children from low-income backgrounds could help break the cycle of poverty and provides a
good grounding for my research on the intergenerational mobility of children in Head Start.
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III. Hypothesis, Data, and Empirical Strategy
Hypothesis
In my research, I aim to continue Deming’s work and explore the implications of the Head
Start program on intergenerational income mobility. I hypothesize that the intergenerational
earnings elasticity, or IGE, of Head Start participants is smaller than the IGE of non-participants.
This hypothesis would suggest the Head Start program improves the mobility of participants and
would provide evidence to support improvements in public education aimed to benefit lowerincome families if the benefits outweigh the costs of the program.
Econometric Methods
In my regression, I combine the empirical Head Start research done by Deming (2009) with
Grawe’s (2010) model on intergenerational mobility.65,66 Grawe interacts school quality with
average family income instrumented by state to measure the effect of school quality on the IGE.67
He includes this state instrument in his model because he uses census data and is unable to connect
individual sons with their fathers in the sample.68 Because using NLSY data allows me to directly
link children with their mothers, I do not need to include any instrumental variables in my
regression. I use a multivariate linear regression to estimate the log of each child’s earnings as a
function of the log of family earnings:
A!,, = !- + !% A!,. + !/ BC! + !0 D + !1 (A!,. × BC! )
where A, is the log of the child’s family income, A. is the log of family income for the parents of
the child, BC! is a dummy variable indicating whether the child participated in Head Start, A is a
vector of child and parent ages that I discuss later, and + indexes the child. The parameters of
interest in this model are !% , the predicted intergenerational elasticity between parents and
children, and !1 , the effect on the intergenerational elasticity if a child participates in Head Start.
I hypothesize Head Start participation will increase mobility in my sample. If this is true, then I
will observe a negative coefficient !1 in my regression, implying participation in Head Start
decreases the IGE and thus increases intergenerational mobility.
Garces et al. (2002) and Deming (2009) include a control for a child’s participation in
preschool in their regression.69,70 This is because they want to separate the effects of Head Start
from other early childhood interventions and compare Head Start to these other interventions. I
take a similar approach in my regression, estimating the IGE for Head Start participants, preschool
participants, and children with no early childhood intervention.
In a separate regression, I also estimate all of the variables in the above equation with
sibling fixed effects. The coefficients on the independent variables in my OLS regression could be
capturing other family effects that my model does not specify. The fixed effects model controls
for constant characteristics in households, which could include factors such as parental education,
the number of members in the household, and other unobserved family background traits. This
method does come with limitations. Namely, this method more than halves my sample size because
I only include children who have siblings in the sample.
Data
All of my data come from the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) Investigator in the
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (NLSY79) and Children of the National Longitudinal
7
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

54

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

Survey of Youth (CNLSY) surveys.71 In their research on levels of intergenerational mobility in
different geographic locations in the United States, Chetty et al. (2014) use family income
observations.72 I follow their approach, using family income observations for my intergenerational
elasticity estimates. I adjust child family income observations in 2009, 2011, and 2013 for inflation
with a base year of 2013. Following Lee and Solon (2009), I then average all income observations
greater than zero and log their average, excluding any parent or child with a reported income of
zero for all three years.73 I apply the same transformations to parent family income in 1993, 1995,
and 1997. A small number of parent income observations include out of range codes close to one
million dollars for their 1995 income. I exclude these observations from my data, and this did not
change the results. In every survey year, the NLSY top codes some share of the top income
observations.74 I choose to include these observations in my sample. The age variables in my data
are from the last year of income responses: For parents, this is 1997, and for children, this is 2013.
The CNLSY asks questions about a child’s Head Start and preschool participation every
two years. I take the responses for each child across all years, and if a response ever reports a child
attending either Head Start or preschool, then I code the associated variable as “yes.” For scenarios
when the response is “yes” for both Head Start and preschool, I recode the preschool variable as
“no” and the Head Start variable as “yes.” It is feasible that respondents think Head Start is a form
of preschool, so they would respond “yes” to both questions—this is the assumption that I make
when creating my variables. My non-categorical variable summary statistics are shown below in
Table 1 and my categorical variable summary is shown in Table 2:
Table 1: Summary Statistics

Table 2: Early Childhood Education

I also run a fixed effects regression using a subset of my original sample. It consists only
of CNLSY participants with siblings. This leads to sample attrition for two reasons: Some children
in my sample did not have any siblings and some children may have had siblings, but their siblings
did not meet my income criteria. In either case, these children are left out of my sample. The
summary statistics for my fixed effects sample are shown in Tables 3 and 4:
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Table 3: Fixed Effects Summary Statistics

Table 4: Fixed Effects Early Childhood Education

Table 5 serves as a clarification for the age ranges at which I observe children and their
parents. I first restrict my sample to children from ages 22-33 in 2013. The rationale on the lower
bound is to avoid measurement error as much as possible—I do not want to observe any incomes
from before a child turned 18. This is because the child could mistakenly report income from a
part-time job in total family income, even though he is still a dependent. On the upper bound, I
want to avoid having to make IGE comparisons across cohorts like Grawe (2010).75 While analysis
about IGE comparisons between cohorts could be fruitful, it is beyond the scope of my current
research, which only focuses on IGE comparisons for a particular age group. This age restriction
on children also tightens the range of parent ages, as seen below.
Table 5: Age Range Information

Possible Econometric Issues
Even with a solid theoretical base for my regressions, endogeneity and multicollinearity
pose a threat to my empirical results. In an ideal data set, I would have access to every individual’s
permanent income. However, this is unrealistic because I only average income observations for
three years. This leads to life cycle bias, which occurs when the true variance in a population’s
lifetime income is either understated or overstated. Figure 2 depicts theoretical earnings profiles
for three individuals. Assume age A* is truly representative of an individual’s lifetime earnings.
The variance in earnings between individuals at age A1 is much smaller than the variance at A*,
and the variance in earnings between individuals at age A3 is much larger than the variance at A*.
When we observe income earlier (later) in a person’s life than A*, the predicted mean income of
a population understates (overstates) the gap in earnings. For the IGE, this shows that no “true”
IGE exists when we observe income at different ages. Instead, the IGE will be different at different
ages. Interacting parent income with parent age allows the IGE to vary depending on the parent’s
age, controlling for parent earnings at different stages in life. In separate robustness checks, I find
that including these terms in my regression does not meaningfully change my results.
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Figure 2: Graphical Depiction of Life Cycle Bias
Income

A1

A*

A3

Age

Trends in earnings follow a quadratic path over time. At young ages, individuals have
lower earnings because they do not have experience in the workforce. As they gain experience,
their income grows. This initial growth is faster when an individual’s lifetime earnings is higher.
At some point, people approach retirement age where they work less and therefore earn less than
they did at their prime age of earnings. As a result, I include linear and quadratic age parameters
for children and parents.
While I can control for many endogeneity issues such as life cycle bias, I will be unable to
control for two primary sources of bias: measurement error in my independent variables and top
coding in the NLSY. If parents state that their child participated in Head Start due to recall error,
but the child participated in a different preschool program, this would move the estimate of !1
toward 0. Measurement error will increase the noise of the data and therefore reduce the effect of
any relationship that may exist between Head Start participation and income. In addition to
misstatement of Head Start participation, classical measurement error on parent income biases the
estimate of !% and !1 downward.76
Another source of bias in one of my independent variables is top coding in the NLSY. To
protect the identities of individuals with high incomes, the NLSY does not provide the reported
incomes of individuals with unusually high income values.77 In 1991 and 1993, the NLSY79
aggregates all values above a cutoff of $100,000, averages them, and replaces them with this
average. In 1995, a similar approach is used, but this time with the top two percent of respondents
with valid income values. Both cases bias upward the coefficient on parent family income.
In addition to endogeneity, multicollinearity may be present in my regressions. The Head
Start program is primarily composed of individuals at the bottom of the income distribution, so
parent income could be correlated with Head Start participation. To check for this potential
multicollinearity, I analyze the variance inflation factors and correlation matrices of these
variables, finding that multicollinearity does not pose a large threat to my model.
IV. Results and Discussion
Table 6 shows results from my OLS, weighted OLS, and fixed effects regressions. Across all three
regressions, the IGE is between 0.53 and 0.62. This is in line with other IGE estimates, which
range from 0.4 to 0.6.78 Even though the IGEs from my regressions are slightly higher than the
approximate IGE of 0.5 in the United States,79 they would most likely be closer to Corak’s
approximation if parent income were not top coded in my sample. The decrease in the IGE from
0.576 in the OLS model to 0.533 in the weighted OLS model suggests that some earnings
10
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persistence was due to the nature of the NLSY. The survey overrepresents minority and lowincome populations, so adding weights mutes these effects.
Table 6: Effects of Head Start and Preschool on IGE

The coefficient on the interaction between a student’s participation in Head Start and parent
income, Log Parent Avg Income*Head Start, is statistically significant in both the OLS and
Weighted OLS estimates. For my sample, this implies that children who participate in Head Start
11
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have a lower IGE than children who do not participate in Head Start. Holding all other variables
constant, we find the IGE for a Head Start participant by adding the coefficient on the interaction
between Head Start and parent income to the coefficient on Log Parent Avg Income. This results
in a predicted IGE of 0.316 for Head Start participants in the weighted OLS model compared to
an IGE of 0.533 for children who do not participate in any pre-kindergarten program.
This result matches my hypothesis that participation in Head Start results in a smaller IGE
and thus increases mobility. As mentioned by Corak (2013), we must be careful in assigning a
particular direction to this economic mobility.80 The IGE only provides an average measure of the
degree of mobility in a given sample and does not say anything about mobility for members of
different income brackets. However, because families of Head Start participants are primarily at
the bottom of the income distribution, much of the increase in mobility from participation in Head
Start could plausibly come from this group. Using this interpretation, my intergenerational
mobility model predicts children who participate in Head Start experience more mobility than
children who do not participate in any early childhood intervention program. Care must be taken
when interpreting these results because all coefficients that include parent income may have
upward bias due to top coding. If bias were present, then the IGE effects that I find may not be as
strong.
While these results are promising, when I add additional family controls through fixed
effects, the coefficient on the interaction between Head Start and a parent’s log average income
loses its significance. One possible explanation is that my fixed effects sample size is much smaller
than my OLS sample size. This could cause an increase in standard errors that then make the
coefficient lose its significance. Another explanation is that the family controls muted the effect
of Head Start on intergenerational mobility. Head Start participants could share similar unobserved
family characteristics that are also associated with the Head Start program. These family
characteristics could be the reason that higher mobility exists for Head Start participants instead
of the program itself.
Not surprisingly, the coefficient on the interaction between a student’s participation in
preschool and parent income is not statistically significant. Returns to human capital investment
and credit constraints have competing effects on this coefficient. Similar to Head Start participants,
preschool participants receive positive returns to education. According to Becker and Tomes’s
(1979) theory on human capital accumulation, these positive returns lead to higher future
earnings.81 Parents will send their child to preschool if the investment in preschool will pay off for
the child. This is more likely to occur if a child’s return on investment in human capital, his ability,
is higher. A scenario of optimal investment could happen if government offices such as the
Administration for Children & Families provide subsidies or tax credits for low-income families.
This could then encourage investment and create a situation where no family has credit
constraints.82 Children with the highest abilities would then attend early education programs
regardless of their family’s income. This scenario would imply the interaction between preschool
and parent income has a negative coefficient. Depending on the randomly endowed abilities of
children, they will move either up or down in the income distribution depending on that ability,
not the income of their parents.
However, as discussed in Section II, if government assistance is not enough, then credit
constraints force some families to provide suboptimal investment in a child’s education. If only
families at the top of the income distribution can afford to send their children to preschool, then
only the children at the top of the income distribution will receive human capital investments.
Therefore, mobility will be lower than if no credit constraints exist. Children at the lower end of
12
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the income distribution will not get the necessary investments in education to earn more when they
are adults. This would imply the interaction between preschool and parent income has a positive
coefficient. Because this coefficient is not statistically different from 0 in my results, I cannot say
which of the two effects dominates.
The overall effects of preschool and Head Start on a child’s future income are also notable.
While we would expect preschool to have a strong positive effect on child earnings later on in life,
the coefficient on this variable is not statistically significant in all three models. Therefore, children
who participate in preschool have similar predicted earnings to children who do not participate in
preschool. This is a strange result—if we follow Johnson and Jackson’s (2019) theory of dynamic
complementarity, then children who participate in early childhood intervention should have higher
predicted earnings than those who do not.83 One potential explanation for this oddity is that
different preschools have varying school quality. If some children who attend preschool do not
accumulate very much human capital, then they will also have lower future earnings. We would
then predict this through small (and sometimes negative) coefficients on preschool in our
regression results.
Unlike with the coefficient on preschool, the coefficient on Head Start is statistically
significant in both of my OLS regressions and is positive for all child income observations one
standard deviation from the predicted coefficient in my fixed effect regression. This implies that,
holding all other variables constant, children who participate in Head Start have higher predicted
earnings than children who do not participate in Head Start. These higher predicted earnings
suggest that the Head Start program has a long-term positive effect on its participants. Along with
my result about increased mobility for Head Start participants, this suggests that federal early
intervention programs such as Head Start provide opportunities for children who come from lowincome families to have higher long-term earnings, ultimately escaping the poverty trap.
One drawback of using the IGE as my primary mobility measure is that I cannot compare
the IGE on any population subgroup to the entire distribution. Bhattacharya and Mazumder (2011)
explain that not many studies examine racial differences in intergenerational mobility.84 For
example, if they find the IGE of a sample of a Black population, they would not be able to compare
that IGE to the IGE of the entire population distribution because it only describes the rate at which
earnings of Black children regress to the mean earnings of Black parents.85
Similarly, I cannot compare the IGE of Head Start participants to the overall IGE of my
sample. However, I can compare the IGE to non-Head Start participants and preschool
participants. In addition, Head Start is a choice for families rather than an inherent characteristic,
such as race. Therefore, it is still valuable to look at the differences in mobility between Head Start
and other forms of childhood education.
Figure 3 provides a visualization of the relationship between parent and child earnings. As
parent earnings start to increase, child earnings also increase for both Head Start and preschool
participants. The coefficient on log parent earnings reflects this fact. However, for Head Start
participants, this increase happens at a slower rate because of the negative coefficient on the
interaction between Head Start and parent income. A positive coefficient on the Head Start dummy
variable implies that the intercept of child earnings for participants of Head Start is higher than the
intercept of child earnings for preschool participants. We therefore observe some point y* where
a child’s earnings for Head Start and preschool participants is equal. This represents the point at
which it no longer pays off for parents to send their child to Head Start and should instead choose
to send their child to preschool.
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Figure 3: The Predicted Effect of Head Start Participation on Intergenerational Earnings
Regressions
Log Child Earnings
Preschool

Head Start

y*

Log Parent Earnings

Checks for Robustness
In addition to the regression results reported here, I also perform regressions that include
interactions between parent age and family income to control for potential life cycle bias of parent
income. After calculating the IGE for the mean age of parents and children, my results are similar
to those reported above. Tables 7-9 show the results of several tests for covariance and inclusion.
The Variance Inflation Factors for each variable detail the percentage that the variance is inflated
for each coefficient compared to if there was no multicollinearity. Normally, an inflation factor
above five is cause for concern, but I include dummy variables and squared terms in my model.
Because the inflation factor on parent log income is low and the rest of my variables are
theoretically important, I choose to keep all of these variables. I also perform an F-test of inclusion
for my Head Start variable, with the results of this test shown in Table 8. Because the p-value on
Head Start and the interaction between Head Start and parent income is significant at the one
percent level, I choose to keep these variables. No variable has a high covariance with other
variables in Table 9, so from these three tests, I conclude multicollinearity is not a problem in my
regressions. I also perform a Shapiro-Wilk test for normality and a Breusch-Pagan test for
heteroscedasticity. While the Shapiro-Wilk test finds that my residuals are not normal, and this
could be a result of the top-coding of high incomes. Additionally, all variables in my model are
theoretically significant, so I choose to keep them. After performing the Breusch-Pagan test, I
conclude that heteroscedasticity is not a major concern in my model.
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Table 7: Variance Inflation Factors

Table 8: F Test for Inclusion of Head Start

Table 9: Test for Variable Covariance

Extensions
While my analysis on the IGE of Head Start participants is a strong foundation for looking
at differences in intergenerational mobility, a few extensions of my work could provide a more
complete picture of my results. For example, I control for family effects in my regression using
sibling fixed effects, but my regressions do not specify what family characteristics affect my
results. Additional research could include regressions with variables for inherent family
characteristics, such as whether or not a child’s father lives in the household or how many earners
live in the household. Finding variables that control for these family characteristics would provide
more precise estimates of the coefficients in my model because they would keep the same sample
size as my OLS regressions, unlike my fixed effects model.
The IGE is useful for measuring the overall mobility of a given population, which is why
I use it as my primary mobility predictor. However, upward mobility is another useful measure
that calculates the probability an individual will surpass his parent in income.86 Researchers
15
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display these results in a rank mobility matrix detailing probabilities of mobility across the income
distribution. These matrices also allow researchers to compare population subgroups to the entire
population.87 As previously mentioned, this comparison is not possible using the IGE because
splitting up a sample will only show regression to the subgroup mean, not the population mean.88,89
Bhattacharya and Mazumder advocate for the use of upward mobility because it allows
computations of intergenerational mobility at the margin.90 They find that for children with parents
at the bottom quartile of the income distribution, white children are more likely to move to a higher
income bracket than Black children.91 An extension of my work on the mobility of Head Start
participants could use upward mobility to assess the probability of upward mobility for children
of families at specific income brackets. This would give a more complete picture of how mobility
changes across the parent’s income distribution as a result of Head Start.
While my research details some of the potential benefits of Head Start, I never assess the
program using a cost-benefit framework. Deming (2009) notes that a full analysis of the Head Start
program would look at the future earnings of Head Start participants and compare them to the costs
of the program.92 Future research could further investigate Head Start’s overall effects using my
framework and compare them to the average cost of the program per child.
V. Conclusion
Early childhood intervention programs represent promising opportunities to improve the
outcomes of children who would not otherwise be able to learn at a young age. Head Start in
particular is a large, national program that emphasizes a holistic education, including traditional
learning activities as well as meal programs, health programs, and parental involvement. With
more participants reaching adulthood, continued research can assess the program’s benefits on
participant earnings. With more research about Head Start’s effects, knowledge of the benefits of
early childhood intervention programs and public investments in education will improve.
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Bias in the Jury Box: The Sociological Determinants of Jury
Selection for Capital Cases in North Carolina
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ABSTRACT: An evaluation of four Wake County capital cases from 2014-2018 reveals the
disparate effects that the jury selection process had on Black and female potential jurors and
especially on Black female potential jurors. The requirement that capital jurors be willing and able
to sentence death systematically excluded Blacks and females, with Black females excused for this
reason at a rate over three times higher than White males. Black potential jurors not struck for
death qualification were disproportionately excluded by prosecutorial peremptory strikes at a rate
nearly two times greater than Whites. Final analyses conclude that Black females had significantly
lower probabilities of being seated on account of their racial and gender identity. This research
highlights how the jury selection process produces White male-dominant juries that undermine
defendants’ Sixth Amendment right to a jury of their peers.
Introduction
The United States is one of the only democratic states that maintains capital punishment
as codified law. This practice has fluctuated throughout American history, with historically high
execution rates contrasted by modern-day lows. Capital punishment has been on the books since
the country’s founding and its constitutionality remained unquestioned until the Supreme Court
case of Furman v. Georgia (1972), which concluded that the practice was “arbitrary and
capricious” in part because of overreaching juror discretion that allowed extralegal factors to
influence weighty decisions of life and death.1 Consequently, the Court implemented a
nationwide moratorium. States that intended to maintain their capital punishment statutes had to
refine their procedures to protect against the vulnerabilities to bias that had concerned the
Supreme Court’s majority.2 States scrambled to redefine their death sentencing parameters and
established distinct statutes for capital cases to comply with the idea that sentencing death is
different from other criminal punishments. However, states ignored the possibility that arbitrary
and capricious influences in death sentencing may not be concentrated in the procedures a jury
uses to sentence death, but rather in the procedures used to hand-pick jury members.
Research Questions
Though the Sixth Amendment of the United States Constitution guarantees an impartial
jury of one’s peers to criminal defendants, the modern-day process of jury selection has been
criticized for contributing to a lack of representation in the jury box.3 This is especially true for
capital cases, where jury selection is defined by the procedural requirement that jurors be “death
qualified,” or that they be admittingly willing and able to sentence death.4 Death qualification
a
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acts as a stringent parameter for those who can be selected for a jury, excluding individuals who
have religious or personal hesitations to impose death. Requiring that jurors hold similar
opinions about the death penalty to sit trial defines the jury pool by a parameter that may be
intrinsically related to other sociological factors, such as race, gender, religion, age, etc., which
could perpetuate the very biases the Supreme Court has been concerned about. Nonetheless, jury
selection has been overlooked by the Supreme Court as a foundational explanation for partiality
in death penalty application in the U.S. To determine if this nuance of the capital jury selection
process is burdening the diversification of jury members, I evaluate whether death qualification
systematically excludes potential jurors of a specific race and/or gender.
The process of jury selection also has a long history of racialized effects perpetuated by
prosecutorial strategies. This history begins with the original interpretation of the Sixth
Amendment, which promised only a jury of White peers, given that many states prevented the
service of Black jurors.5 It was not until the 1879 ruling of Strauder v. West Virginia that the
Supreme Court found these provisions unconstitutional, stating that Blacks must be allowed to
participate as jurors in order to fulfill the Sixth Amendment’s promise.6 Prosecutors and local
officials abided by this ruling on its face while continuing to ensure the exclusion of Black
potential jurors through discriminatory tests requiring that individuals meet arbitrary standards of
moral character or intelligence to be jury-eligible.7 Though the Supreme Court has since ruled
that race cannot be a determining factor for selecting jurors, the racialized manipulation of the
jury selection process has become ingrained in case procedures.8
To determine whether modern-day jury selection practices are continuing to infringe
upon the constitutional rights of capital defendants, I study the extent to which jury selection
processes contribute to the disproportionate exclusion of potential jurors by race and gender. In
particular, I evaluate the effects of death qualification on the final racial and gender composition
of capital juries. I also evaluate whether the prosecution uses its limited number of peremptory
strikes—or rejections from sitting on the jury—to disproportionately remove jurors of a
particular race. Given data constraints, I narrow the scope of this project to North Carolina
capital cases from 2014-2018.
Literature Review
Social science research has examined biases in jury selection using a variety of methods,
though the bulk of the literature has produced results through experiments and surveys. I
evaluate these results in order to situate my study among existing theories about whether jury
selection practices contribute to jury bleaching, or the process of making a jury more White. To
do so, I first explain the procedural intricacies of jury selection for capital cases in North
Carolina, relevant legal history, and overarching theories of race and gender.
A. Jury Selection: The Procedural Rules
During jury selection, the State and the defense are presented with two options for
striking potential jurors: they may employ a “for cause” exclusion, arguing that an individual is
not legally qualified to serve on the jury, or they may use peremptory strikes to strike potential
jurors for any reason, so long as these are not motivated by the individual’s race, gender, or
ethnicity.9 Excusals for cause are unlimited and are used in capital trials against individuals who
are not death qualified because they are unable to comply with the legal duty to sentence death
even when the circumstances of the case warrant that punishment. They are also used to
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eliminate individuals who express biases against the State or the defense, or the criminal justice
system in general, if it appears these opinions may significantly influence their conduct as jurors.
Peremptory strikes, on the other hand, are limited by state statutes and are not associated
with an explicit reason for their usage. In North Carolina, both the State and the defense are
allotted 14 peremptory strikes, with extras provided for each alternate juror, amounting to three
extra strikes for capital cases (North Carolina Code § 15A‑1217). Peremptory strikes are free to
be used as broadly as the prosecution or defense prefer, so long as neither side implicates race or
gender in their decision to strike a juror. Peremptory strikes were adopted to ensure that all jurors
are equipped to sit trial. However, social science research has since evaluated whether in practice
they do more harm than good.
B. The Effects of Death Qualifying a Jury
Death qualification was first questioned in the 1985 Supreme Court case Wainwright v.
Witt, in which defendant Johnny Paul Witt argued that because the prosecutor weeded out
potential jurors based on their opinions of the death penalty, his jury was hand-picked with the
intent to sentence death.10 The Supreme Court ruled against Witt, with the Court’s majority
arguing that the process of death qualification actually restrains the bias of venirepersons, or
jurors, by preventing those who would never be able to sentence death—even if doing so would
be justified given a state’s criminal statutes—from sitting on the jury.11 The Court also added that
this logic can be applied in the reverse, such that potential jurors who express an affinity for
sentencing death can be excluded from jury service because these individuals may be biased to
sentence death even when doing so would not be proportional or in accordance with state
statutes.12 Despite the implementation of this safeguard, studies show that strong death penalty
supporters are more likely to be deemed “fit to serve” than death penalty opponents because the
strength of their opinions is less evident in questioning during jury selection than anti-death
penalty sentiments.13
Even though the Court’s logic in reaffirming death qualification has been explained by a
desire to restrain bias in capital cases, studies show that death qualification creates a bias in
those selected for jury service that is rooted in the differences in the demographics of those in
support of the death penalty.14 Though death qualification is not necessarily tantamount to a
person’s death penalty opinions, given that an individual may support the death penalty and
refuse to personally impose it, the two are highly related.
Death penalty opinions of Americans are systematically differentiated by several
demographic and sociological characteristics. Surveys indicate that Blacks, women, young
liberal individuals, and those of certain religious denominations are more inclined to oppose the
death penalty.15 In turn, research has bridged the gap between death penalty opinions and death
qualification by evaluating whether those more likely to be in opposition to the practice are also
more likely to be struck from capital case trials. I am most interested in studying the effects of
death qualification by race and gender because these characteristics significantly differentiate
death penalty opinions.
a. Racial Effects
Death qualifying a jury complicates the ability to compose a jury of one’s peers because
of the systematic differences in how Americans of different races feel about the death penalty.
There is a clear and consistent racial gap in support for the death penalty, such that the mean
difference in favorable opinions of the death penalty between Whites and Blacks is 20%.16 A
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2019 North Carolina public opinion poll shows that when asked to choose an appropriate
punishment for first-degree murder, 30% of White respondents opted for the death penalty,
compared to only 11% of Blacks.17 These differences in death penalty support have the potential
for disparate effects during jury selection. A survey conducted by Lynch and Haney of a juryeligible subject pool in California determined that over half of Black respondents were deemed
excludable by death qualification, compared to only 30% of Whites.18 A survey conducted by
Summers and colleagues of 994 jury-eligible Nebraskans found similar results, with Blacks
failing to meet death qualification at a rate two times higher than Whites, demonstrating how
death qualification can contribute to the underrepresentation of Black jurors and may decrease
their presence in the deliberation room.19
b. Gender Effects
Death qualification also has disparate impacts on the genders that comprise a jury, as
there exists a relatively stable 12% mean difference in death penalty support between men and
women that contributes to women being less likely to be death qualified than men.20 A 2019
North Carolina public opinion poll showed congruence with these results, wherein 33% of males
preferred the death penalty as a punishment for first-degree murder, compared to only 19% of
females.21 In the Lynch and Haney study, of those who would be excluded from the jury pool,
62% of women would be excluded for failing to be death qualified, compared to only 53% of
men.22 The Summers and colleagues study affirms these results, demonstrating consistency in the
trends of gender-based exclusion due to death qualification.23 Though I use the results of these
studies to inform my research, rather than engineering a survey sampling jury-eligible
individuals, I evaluate the actual jury pools summoned for a series of capital cases to determine
the rate at which the death qualification process excluded Black potential jurors compared to
Whites and female potential jurors compared to males.
C. Death Qualification and Death Sentencing
The racial and gender gaps in death penalty favorability create a jury pool that is
demographically distinct: death-qualified jurors are more likely to be White, male, conservative,
and middle-class.24 Studies show that death qualification not only determines the sociological
characteristics of who sits on the jury, but it also influences the perspectives in the deliberation
room. This effect would be irrelevant if the formative beliefs of death-qualified individuals–who
are majority White males–had little to no influence on deliberations, but that is not the case.25 In
a study by Thompson and colleagues, a jury-eligible subject pool watched footage of conflicting
testimony by a prosecution witness and a defense witness. Death-qualified individuals were
significantly more likely to favor the prosecution than were non-death-qualified individuals,
suggesting that those sitting on capital juries may be predisposed to aligning with evidence
presented by the State, which could impact the likelihood of both a conviction and of a death
sentence.26
Importantly, existing literature goes beyond establishing a link between death-qualified
individuals and their proclivity to hold biased opinions that could influence the decision to
sentence death. Studies also demonstrate how death qualification directly impacts an individual’s
evaluations of the procedures used to determine a death sentence. For most death penalty
practitioner states, including North Carolina, aggravating and mitigating circumstances define
these procedures.27 With this system, a death sentence is warranted if the aggravating factors, or
the aspects of the crime that emphasize the offender’s culpability, outweigh the mitigating
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factors, or the personal and situational circumstances considered to offer grace to offenders.
Butler and Moran show that death-qualified individuals from a pool of 450 people called for jury
duty in Florida provided higher endorsements for aggravating factors, and lower endorsements
for mitigating factors when presented with facts from a hypothetical capital case.28 Though
studying the effect of death qualification on death sentencing is beyond the scope of my study,
discussing this research contextualizes the significance of my findings about the effects of death
qualification on jury composition.
D. Other Biases in Jury Selection
In recent years, the use of peremptory strikes by the State and the defense have been
named a potential source of bias that depletes diversity in the jury box, much like death
qualification. Presumably, these strikes are to be used against a select number of individuals that
either the State or the defense think represent a potential for bias and are thus not fit to serve,
though they may be qualified to do so given legal parameters. However, because these strikes
generally do not require on-the-record justifications, it is difficult for courtroom officials to parse
whether they are used with discriminatory intent.
It was not until the 1986 Batson v. Kentucky case that the Supreme Court evaluated
whether prosecutors could use an individual’s race as a justification for peremptorily striking
them from the venire, or the jury.29 The Court ruled that this practice was in violation of the
Equal Protection Clause and required that any strike by either the State or the defense be based
solely on race-neutral and gender-neutral reasons—or reasons that are unrelated to one’s race
and/or gender.30 In other words, striking potential jurors on the basis of race and/or gender was
deemed discriminatory and unconstitutional.
Beyond this constitutional restriction, the use of peremptory strikes can be as arbitrary as
calling into question the personal characteristics of a potential juror, making someone’s marital
status, employment history, or favorite pastimes valid reasons to prevent them from fulfilling
their civic duty of sitting on trial.31 Both the State and the defense can present Batson challenges
against strikes that appear to have been motivated by race, which is the only instance in which
either side is required to provide an explanation for their use of a strike. However, the Court’s
outlined evidentiary framework requires that Batson claims prove purposeful discrimination in
the use of a peremptory strike. This is a difficult standard to satisfy, which has resulted in very
few successful Batson challenges, despite trends of racialized jury selection supported by
existing literature.32 Thus, research evaluating biases in peremptory strikes adds to the discussion
of whether the parameters for successful Batson challenges are too narrowly defined, or if the
permissibility of peremptory strikes is too broad by allowing any race-neutral justifications that
could simply disguise racialized motives.
When for cause strikes during the death qualification process do not sufficiently cleanse
the jury pool of those who pose a threat to the success of the State, prosecutors can rely on their
peremptory strikes to ensure that those who sit on their capital cases are more likely than not to
secure a death sentence. This effectively translates to using these strikes against Black potential
jurors, who pose the biggest threat to prosecutorial success on account of their death penalty
opinions and empathetic viewpoints that favor the presentation of mitigating factors.33 My study
relies on a method existing literature has utilized to demonstrate these racial biases in peremptory
strikes, which involves statistical analyses of juror questionnaires—questionnaires completed by
individuals at the start of the jury selection process that provide basic personal information—to
understand how the sociological characteristics of a venireperson impacted their chances of
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being struck by the State. This information about potential jurors is also gathered from responses
given during voir dire, or the pre-trial process of juror examination that occurs in the courtroom,
where individuals are questioned either in groups or individually by the judge, prosecution, and
defense about an array of personal characteristics to determine whether they are fit to sit trial.
Baldus and his colleagues pioneered this methodology by evaluating the racialized use of
peremptory strikes in over 300 Philadelphia County capital cases over a 17-year period, when
controlling for race-neutral characteristics about an individual that could present as reasons to
strike them.34 The study found that, on average, prosecutors peremptorily struck 51% of Black
potential jurors, but only 26% of comparable non-Black potential jurors. Interestingly, defense
strikes showed an opposite trend, striking only 26% of Black potential jurors, but 54% of
comparable non-Black potential jurors.35
Existing literature shows that even beyond Philadelphia County, racialized rates of
peremptory strikes persist. Grosso and O’Brien examined whether race influenced prosecutorial
peremptory strikes in the jury selection proceedings of each death row inmate in 2010,
representing more than half of the counties in North Carolina over a 25-year period. The results
showed Black potential jurors were struck at a rate 2.5 times higher than their non-Black
counterparts, when controlling for relevant sociological characteristics.36 This study acts as the
baseline for mine because it informs the context of jury selection in North Carolina. However,
my study analyzes peremptory strike rates in North Carolina for a shorter time period and within
just one county. My research aims to demonstrate the extent that the racialized trends identified
by Grosso and O’Brien persist within the scope of my study.
Hypotheses And Theory
Given the conclusions in relevant literature, there are several ways in which the jury
selection process is vulnerable to racial biases that impact the final composition of the jury. My
theory is that the jury selection process was designed to allow both the prosecution and the
defense to excuse potential jurors who may compromise the impartiality of the jury. However, in
practice, the exclusionary procedures of jury selection are subject to race and gender effects. I
expect that these effects will align with the prosecution’s motive to secure a jury that is more
likely to favor their side by convicting and sentencing death. In other words, the prosecution will
utilize these exclusionary practices by race and gender to ensure a pro-prosecution jury. A proprosecution jury is one that has more favorable opinions of the death penalty and is more likely
to favor the State’s presentation of evidence, which literature suggests are qualities more
commonly held by White men.37 38 Thus, I expect the identity-based effects of jury selection will
influence who is eventually seated on a jury, benefitting the presence of White males on capital
juries while significantly threatening the presence of Blacks and females. My theory suggests
that within the scope of my study, the exclusionary practices of jury selection will differentiate
removals of potential jurors by sociological characteristics, namely race and gender, to ensure
that the final seated juries align with the State’s pro-prosecution ideal.
For the purposes of my study, I evaluate how the processes of death qualification and
peremptory strikes secure a pro-prosecution jury through disparate racialized and gendered
effects on final jury pools. I expect that the requirement to death qualify a capital jury will
systematically exclude jurors in accordance with current trends of public opinions on the death
penalty. My hypotheses for the death qualification effect are as follows:

https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

72

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

H1: Black potential jurors will hold more negative opinions of the death penalty than
their White counterparts, which will contribute to higher excusal rates due to death
qualification rates for Black potential jurors compared to Whites.
H2: Female potential jurors will hold more negative opinions of the death penalty than
their male counterparts, which will contribute to higher excusal rates due to death
qualification rates for female potential jurors compared to males.
The theory motivating these hypotheses is rooted in the public opinion gap between
Whites and Blacks and men and women in support of the death penalty.39 Because the jury pool
should operate as a representative sample of the community, these public opinion trends should
persist for potential jurors, which would cause the disproportionate exclusion of Black and
female jurors on the basis of not being death qualified.
I expect that even beyond the effects of death qualification, prosecutors will continue to
narrow potential jurors based on race by finding other ways to exclude Black individuals, as
supported by consistent findings in literature. I expect to find the following:
H3: Black potential jurors will have a disproportionately higher share of their total share
of the jury pool struck by the State than Whites. When controlling for what that is known
about a potential juror (their sociological characteristics and potential for biases), Black
potential jurors will still have a higher likelihood of being struck by the State than their
White counterparts.
I expect that as a result of the processes of death qualification and peremptory strikes the
prosecution will secure final juries that do not reflect the shares of race and gender in the original
jury pool and thus cannot truly be considered juries of one's peers. The final juries will reflect the
race and gender effects of these three components of the jury selection process such that:
H4: The final seated juries will be White male-dominant, overrepresenting the share of
White males in the original jury pool and underrepresenting the share of Blacks and
females.
Support for my hypotheses would suggest that the capital jury selection process
systematically excludes individuals with specific sociological characteristics, calling into
question whether the constitutional right to a representative jury is truly being upheld in capital
trials.
Data Collection
To conduct my analyses, I used jury selection data from the jury pools of the four capital
case trials in Wake County, North Carolina between 2014-2018: Devega v. State of North
Carolina (2014), Smith v. State of North Carolina (2016), Holden v. State of North Carolina
(2017), and Richardson v. State of North Carolina (2018). The data I retrieved was publicly
available via the Wake County clerk of court.
Wake County is a demographically diverse, heavily populated urban county, meaning the
four jury pools should represent that diversity. Though courtroom practices for capital jury
selection are somewhat standardized across North Carolina’s prosecutorial districts, I cannot
infer that my results apply to other geographical contexts given that different counties have
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different prosecutors that may abide by individualized strategies for jury selection. Thus, I am
bound by my case selection, which limits the generalizability of my results.
The jury pools of the four capital cases are defined by statutory procedures that outline
who is jury-eligible and how North Carolina residents are randomly summoned to jury duty. In
North Carolina, juror summons are created from the source list of registered voters (ROV) and
licensed drivers registered with the Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV). Those who are
unregistered or unlicensed are automatically excluded from the population that is used to draw
jury pool samples. Studies show that this basis for exclusion disproportionately affects Black and
transient individuals.40 For this reason, the jury pools of the four capital cases may not accurately
or wholly represent the demographic diversity in Wake County. The jury pool is further
narrowed by the jury-eligible qualifications enumerated by the state: jurors must be U.S. citizens,
18 years or older, a resident of the county in which they were summoned, able to speak English,
and had their civil rights restored if previously convicted of a felony. These parameters define
the individuals in the jury pools of all four capital cases included in my analysis.
The jury selection data includes juror questionnaires completed by all venirepersons who
responded to their jury summons by appearing in court, as well as a clerk report for each capital
case that records whether individuals summoned for that case were subsequently seated on the
jury or excused from the jury. If an individual was excused, the type of strike is listed in the
report: defense peremptory strike, State peremptory strike, defense for cause motion, State for
cause motion, Court strike—wherein the judge presiding over the case finds cause that an
individual is unfit to sit trial—or hardship—wherein an individual was unable to sit trial because
of personal conflicts, such as work or childcare. I also created a variable to note the explicit
reason or reasons why each individual across the four jury pools was struck. This data is
recorded during the voir dire for each type of excusal except for State and defense peremptory
strikes, which do not require explanations. This variable was used to track how many individuals
were explicitly struck due to death qualification.
A total of 490 individuals were summoned, appeared in court, and completed the initial
juror questionnaire. Because the questionnaire did not contain inquiries of an individual’s
opinions of the death penalty, the judges presiding over these cases asked this question of
potential jurors during voir dire, and both the State and the defense followed up with each
individual’s response. Thus, I used the voir dire to collect death qualification data for the
venirepersons of all four capital cases. However, some individuals who completed a
questionnaire did not undergo the voir dire process if they were excused for hardship at the
beginning of the process, did not appear, or were sent home once the jury has been selected and
there is no longer a need to continue questioning other individuals. This means I only collected
data about death penalty opinions for individuals who made it to the voir dire stage.
All four questionnaires include the same inquiries: name, age, race, sex; marital status;
employment status, spouse’s employment status, children’s employment status; highest level of
education completed; whether or not an individual has ever served on a jury or been a witness or
defendant in a criminal case; whether or not an individual been a victim of a crime or been
convicted of a felony, or knows of anyone that has; whether or not an individual is a member of a
church; whether or not an individual has close friends or family employed in law enforcement;
what magazines/newspapers/or television shows an individual reads or watches. I converted this
qualitative data for all observations who completed a questionnaire into quantitative binary and
categorical variables that are compiled in a master dataset.
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I created a categorical variable to represent responses to questions of an individual’s
death penalty opinions, which were used by the State and the defense to gauge death
qualification. I applied this coding schema to the written responses of potential jurors in the
Devega case, as well as the oral responses of potential jurors who reached the voir dire stage
from the Devega, Smith, Holden, and Richardson cases. This variable is recorded as follows:
1: The respondent expresses an absolute inability to sentence death under any condition.
2: The respondent expresses a disinclination to sentence death, though acknowledges
caveats to when and why they would choose to do so.
3: The respondent expresses an undecided or neutral perspective toward sentencing death.
4: The respondent expresses an inclination to sentence death, though acknowledges
caveats to when and why they would choose not to do so.
5: The respondent expresses an absolute inclination to sentence death in all cases where
the death penalty is an available punishment.
Because responses to the question of death qualification were incredibly varied, it was
important that I created a measure that simplified and grouped these responses, while still
capturing the nuances in individual opinions. For instance, many respondents expressed a
hesitation to sentence death due to normative views but admitted that in exceptional cases a
crime might warrant a death sentence. These individuals were coded in the second category.
Another large sect of respondents expressed an ability to sentence death, but only when doing so
would be proportional to the crime in question. These individuals were coded in the fourth
category. Individuals who were coded as a 5 believed that the death penalty should be applied in
all first-degree murder cases–as this is the only offense that is death-eligible in the state.
In order to accurately and efficiently record relevant information from all four capital case
voir dires, which totaled to over 16,000 pages, I applied for and received funding from Honors
Carolina to employ four undergraduate students to assist in the process. I trained these students
on how to interpret responses in the voir dire and how to appropriately code them in accordance
with the codebook. Though training these students and providing stringent protocols for
measurement was one method to ensure reliability, I also conducted random tests of interrater
reliability throughout the data collection stage. This involved randomly choosing a handful of
data entries completed by Student A to be re-done by Student B. Without Student B seeing how
Student A coded these entries, I requested that Student B complete the same set of entries in
order to ensure that the data was being recorded identically between students. Each observation
coded by a student on the team was not included into the master dataset without my review. This
process detected and prevented human error, as well as instances where students may have
interpreted a potential jurors’ response in a way that biased their categorization or coding.
Despite these preventative measures, I acknowledge that the results of my analyses could
have been threatened by human error in the data collection process. Though I reviewed the data
for each observation in my dataset, I cannot confirm that there are no misalignments with the
coding schema.
Methodology
To evaluate my hypotheses H1 and H2, I first analyze the share of death penalty opinions
by race and then by gender to determine whether Blacks and females are in fact less likely to
favor the death penalty than their White and male counterparts. I utilize a multivariate regression
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to test how an individual’s sociological characteristics are associated with their score on the
death qualification scale I devised. Then, I compare the rate of excusals for death qualification
for Black potential jurors compared to White, as well as for females compared to males. This is
how I determine whether there was a statistically significant difference in death qualification
excusals by race or by gender. I then complete these analyses for a combination of both race and
gender.
For H3, I emulate methodology by Baldus et al. and first evaluate the distribution of State
strikes by race and gender. I then use a series of logistic regression models to analyze the
relationship between an individual’s race and gender and their likelihood of being struck by the
prosecution, when controlling for other relevant information that could influence the State’s
decision to strike a juror. By controlling for what is known about potential jurors, I can uncover
the extent to which the use of prosecutorial peremptory strikes is systematically differentiated by
race.
The analysis of my hypothesis H4 includes several logistic regression models displaying
the relationship between race and gender and one’s likelihood of being seated, when holding
constant what is known about a potential juror that could also impact their odds of being seated
on a jury. I display a series of figures representing differences in the predicted probability of
being seated by race and gender when holding constant what is known about a potential juror
that could also impact their odds of being seated on a jury. These analyses reveal whether race
and gender alone are the explicit targets of exclusion from the jury pool.
Results
Across all the capital cases evaluated, 551 individuals were summoned, replied to their
summons, and were assigned to either the Devega, Smith, Holden, or Richardson trial. Those
who did not reach the questionnaire or voir dire stage are missing critical data, leaving only 490
observations with race data. Because race is critical to my analyses, observations missing race
data are excluded from all analyses. Of the 490 observations that identify race, only 338 reached
the voir dire. Of those, some were excused before answering questions about death qualification,
which further limits my sample size for analyses including these variables. I recognize that these
sample size restrictions could hinder the significance of my results.
Table 1: Distribution of Race and Gender of All Potential Jurors
Juror Race and
Gender

White Male

White
Female

Black Male

Black
Female

Other Male

Other Female

Total

N

196

160

43

43

26

22

490

%

40.00%

32.65%

8.78%

8.78%

5.31%

4.49%

100.00%

Of the 490 observations in my dataset, 72.65% were White, 17.55% were Black, and
9.80% identified as another race. The small sample size for individuals of other races across all
four jury pools is important to note, as it suggests that analyses of this population may not be
statistically significant. The gender distribution reveals 45.92% of the jury pools were females
compared to 54.08% males. Table 1 combines this information to show the distribution of both
race and gender in the jury pool, with White men comprising the largest share.
Hardships were the leading cause for excusal. Many of the observations excused for
hardship did not reach the questionnaire or the voir dire stage, so they comprise the majority of
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the missing data. The next highest frequency of eliminations derives from State motions, which
nearly quadruples the amount of defense motions. This is because the voir dire process is
conducted such that the State is the first to question each potential juror, since they have the
burden of proof. Before the defense is able to question a juror, the State has already had the
opportunity to either make a motion for cause if the individual is unfit to sit trial, use a
peremptory strike, or approve a potential juror to be seated. This table shows how the State’s
advantage during voir dire significantly influences who is excused from the jury before the
defense has a say.
Table 2: Distribution of Excused Versus Seated Jurors by Race and Gender
White Male

White Female

Black Male

Black Female

Other Male

Other Female

Total

Not Seated on
Jury

163
(83.16%)

143
(89.38%)

36
(83.72%)

42
(97.67%)

25
(96.15%)

22
(100.00%)

431
(87.96%)

Seated on
Jury

33
(16.84%)

17
(10.62%)

7
(16.28%)

1
(2.33%)

1
(3.85%)

0
(0.00%)

59
(12.04%)

Total

196
(100.00%)

160
(100.00%)

43
(100.00%)

43
(100.00%)

26
(100.00%)

22
(100.00%)

490
(100.00%)

*

p = 0.017**
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

Table 2 represents the percent of individuals by both race and gender across all four jury
pools who were either seated or excused. Excusals include all outcomes listed in Table 4 that are
not “Seated.” The statistical significance indicates that there is a meaningful relationship
between a juror’s race and gender and whether they are seated on the jury. This offers initial
support for my theory that the jury selection process is subject to racial and gender effects that
influence the final composition of the jury. Black females, females of other races, and males of
other races were the least represented in the final juries across all four capital cases. Because the
largest share of seated jurors were White males, there is also initial support for my expectation
that White male jurors are seated at a rate that overrepresents their original share of the jury
pools. Nonetheless, Table 2 does not confirm whether the two jury selection processes I have
identified (death qualification and peremptory strikes) are contributing to the racial and gender
composition of the final jury pools. Thus, to further gauge support for my hypotheses and
understand jury selection significantly differentiates seated juries by sociological characteristics
like race and gender, I begin by evaluating the extent to which death qualification led to the
disproportionate excusal of Black jurors compared to White jurors.
a. The Racialized Effect of Death Qualification
An understanding of the distribution of race, gender, types of eliminations, and
eliminations by race and gender is essential to contextualize the test of my first hypothesis
regarding the differential impact of death qualification by race. To conduct my analysis, I first
evaluated the distribution of death penalty opinions for those who made it to the voir dire, were
asked this question, and had race recorded (totaling 304). A 1 on the death qualification scale
was recorded for potential jurors who were always opposed to the death penalty, a 2 was
recorded for those who were almost always opposed, a 3 was recorded for those who had neutral
views, a 4 was recorded for those who were almost always in favor of the death penalty, and a 5
was recorded for those who were always in favor. The majority of respondents across all capital
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cases were on the 4-5 end of the scale, indicating relative or full support for the imposition of the
death penalty, respectively (see Table 3). I hypothesized that observations on the 1-2 end of the
scale would disproportionately represent Black respondents, which would call for the excusal of
Black potential jurors due to death qualification at a higher rate than Whites.
Table 3: The Distribution of Death Penalty Opinions*
Death Qualification Scale

N

%

1 Always Opposed

64

21.05%

2

64

21.05%

3 Neutral

2

0.66%

4

147

48.36%

5 Always Favor

27

8.88%

Total

304

100.00%

*Note: Data was obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data.

Table 4 shows the distribution of death penalty opinions by race, (significant at p < 0.00).
Over 60% of White jurors expressed either conditional or full-fledged support for the death
penalty, scoring either a 4 or a 5, respectively, whereas over 60% of Black jurors were either
entirely opposed or almost always opposed to the death penalty, scoring a 1 or a 2, respectively.
This differentiation in death penalty opinions by race offers initial support for my hypothesis H1.
Table 4: The Distribution of Death Penalty Opinions by Race*
Death Qualification Scale

White

Black

Other
Races

Total

1
Always Opposed

38
(17.04%)

20
(35.71%)

6
(24.00%)

64
(21.05%)

2

44
(19.73%)

14
(25.00%)

6
(24.00%)

64
(21.05%)

3 Neutral

0
(0.00%)

1
(1.79%)

1
(4.00%)

2
(0.66%)

4

120
(53.81%)

20
(35.71%)

7
(28.00%)

147
(48.36%)

5
Always Favor

21 (9.42%)

1
(1.79%)

5
(20.00%)

27
(8.88%)

Total

224
(100.00%)

56
(100.00%)

25
(100.00%)

304
(100.00%)

*

p = 0.001***
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data.
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Model 1 shows the results of several multivariate regressions testing the relationship
between an individual’s score on the death penalty opinion scale (1-5) and their race, where
Black potential jurors and jurors of other races are compared to White potential jurors, who are
the reference group. Controls include a potential juror’s level of education, level of religious
involvement, whether they have previously served on a jury, whether they have friends or family
in law enforcement, and whether they have had a negative criminal justice experience. Controls
were chosen based on their potential to influence death penalty opinions, as informed by existing
literature, and are consistent across all models.
Model 1: Death Penalty Opinions and Race

Race (Whites are
reference group)
Black

Other

(1)
Reduced
Model

(2)
Education

(3)
Religious
Involvement

(4)
Prior Jury
Service

(5)
Law
Enforcement

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

(6)
Criminal
Justice
Experience
Death
Penalty
Opinions

-0.760***
(0.000)

-0.854***
(0.000)

-0.718***
(0.001)

-0.717***
(0.002)

-0.711***
(0.002)

-0.630**
(0.014)

-0.228
(0.423)

-0.103
(0.722)

-0.047
(0.873)

-0.002
(0.995)

0.053
(0.870)

0.817*
(0.051)

-.151*
(0.082)

-0.123
(0.155)

-0.128
(0.167)

-0.127
(0.175)

-0.065
(0.515)

-0.155***

-0.158***

-0.159***

-0.105

(0.005)

(0.007)

(0.008)

(0.110)

.166
(0.505)

0.168
(0.503)

0.244
(0.384)

0.059
(0.735)

-0.016
(0.934)

Level of Education

Level of Religious
Involvement

Prior Jury Service

Law Enforcement

Criminal Justice
Experience
N
R2

-0.0409
304
0.045

297
0.051

291
0.075

265
0.077

264
0.077

(0.155)
198
0.112

Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

Throughout all six versions of Model 1, Black potential jurors scored significantly lower
on the death penalty opinion scale compared to the average score of White potential jurors. In
version 6 of Model 1, which accounts for all of the control variables, the average score on the
death penalty opinion scale of Black potential jurors scored was .63 points lower than the
average for Whites. Model 1 also identifies religious involvement as a sociological characteristic
that is significantly related to death penalty opinions, wherein increased involvement in religion

Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

79

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

indicates decreased favorability for the death penalty. It is important to note that given the R2, the
variables included in all versions of Model 1 have low explanatory power, suggesting that there
are likely uncaptured variables that better explain differences in death penalty opinions.
Nonetheless, the significant mean difference in the death penalty opinions between White and
Black potential jurors lends initial support to my hypothesis that Black potential jurors have less
favorable views about the death penalty than their White counterparts. My hypothesis suggests
that because death penalty opinions are significantly related to race, there will also be a
significant differentiation in death qualification excusals by race.
Table 5: Death Qualification Excusals by Race*
White

Black

Other

Total

Not Struck
for Death
Qualification

168
(75.34%)

27
(48.21%)

16
(64.00%)

211
(69.41%)

Struck for
Death
Qualification

55
(24.66%)

29
(51.79%)

9
(36.00%)

93
(30.59%)

Total

223
(100.00%)

56
(100.00%)

25
(100.00%)

304
(100.00%)

p = 0.000***
*

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was only obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data. The individuals
captured in this table that were struck for death qualification were struck on account of unfavorable death penalty
opinions (scoring a 1 or a 2 on the death qualification scale).

Table 5 represents the share of individuals by race who were explicitly excused due to
not being able to sentence death, or not being death qualified (significant at p < 0.00). All
individuals who scored a 1 on the death qualification scale were excused for this reason, while
45.31% of individuals who scored a 2 were excused for this reason. Individuals who scored a 2
but were not excused for this reason expressed an ability to comply with the law, which rendered
them ineligible to be excused by a for cause motion for death qualification. No observations who
scored in the 3-5 range were excused because of an inability to sentence death. Overall, 30.59%
of individuals who reached the voir dire stage were struck because of an expressed inability to
sentence death, which demonstrates the significant role death qualification plays in whether a
potential juror is seated or not. Of all the Black potential jurors who reached the voir dire stage
and were asked about their death penalty opinions, 51.79% were subsequently excused because
their views rendered them unable to sentence death, which is more than double the share of
Whites excused for this reason (24.66%). This differentiation in death qualification excusals by
race supports my hypothesis H1.
Potential jurors who scored a 5 on the death qualification scale could have also been
deemed not death qualified due to the fact that their beliefs favored the imposition of the death
penalty for all first-degree murder cases, even when North Carolina statutes would suggest that a
death sentence is not a proportional punishment. Like individuals who scored a 2 on the scale,
not all who scored a 5 were the automatic subject of a death qualification excusal. Instead, only

https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

80

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

individuals who expressed that they would be unable to set aside their views and follow the
judge’s instructions were deemed not death qualified and subsequently excused. Individuals who
scored a 5 but vouched for their impartiality were not eligible for a for cause death qualification
excusal.
Of the individuals who were coded as a 5 on the death qualification scale, 48.15% were
subsequently excused due to their bias in favor of sentencing death that deemed them not death
qualified. The majority of these excusals for death qualification were by defense motions,
whereas the State only excused one potential juror for cause for this reason. This follows my
theoretical reasoning that the State is not incentivized to excuse potential jurors who strongly
favor the death penalty even if they outwardly admit bias because these individuals could ensure
prosecutorial success at trial. Thus, it is the defense’s burden to excuse these individuals.
It is evident that death penalty opinions as well as motions made for cause against nondeath-qualified individuals are significantly differentiated by race, supporting my hypothesis H1
and suggesting that the death qualification process is inherently tied to identity-based
characteristics. The relationship between race, death penalty opinions, and juror outcomes are
analyzed further in later sections of this paper.
b. The Gendered Effect of Death Qualification
My hypothesis H2 expects that females will have more negative opinions of the death penalty
than males, which will result in their disproportionate exclusion due to death qualification. Table
6 shows the distribution of death penalty opinions by gender for individuals who were asked
about their death penalty opinions and had race data. The majority of both men and women
scored on the 4-5 end of the scale. However, 48.51% of females scored on the 1-2 end of the
scale, compared to 37.06% of males. Nonetheless, the difference in the distribution of death
penalty opinions by gender is not statistically significant. Therefore, I cannot support the claim
that the distribution of death penalty opinions across all four jury pools was significantly
differentiated by gender.
Table 6: The Distribution of Death Penalty Opinions by Gender*
Death Qualification Scale

Female

Male

Total

1
Always Opposed

33
(24.63%)

31
(18.24%)

64
(21.05%)

2

32
(23.88%)

32
(18.82%)

64
(21.05%)

3 Neutral

0
(0.00%)

2
(1.18%)

2
(0.66%)

4

58
(43.28%)

89
(52.35%)

147
(48.36%)

5
Always Favor

11
(8.21%)

16
(9.41%)

27
(8.88%)

Total

134
(100.00%)

170
(100.00%)

304
(100.00%)

*

p = 0.254
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data.
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Model 2 shows the results of a multivariate regression analyzing the relationship between
an individual’s score on the death penalty opinion scale (1-5) and their gender, when controlling
for a potential juror’s level of education, level of religious involvement, whether they have
previously served on a jury, whether they have friends or family in law enforcement, and
whether they have had a negative criminal justice experience. In all six versions of Model 2, the
average death penalty opinion score for female potential jurors was significantly lower than the
average for males, with females scoring about .34 points lower on average than males on the
five-point scale in version 6 of Model 2. As in Model 1, which evaluated this relationship for
race, higher levels of religious involvement were significantly associated with less favorable
death penalty opinions.
The results of Models 1 and 2 confirm that average scores on the death penalty opinion
scale are significantly different between White and Black potential jurors and female and male
potential jurors. Thus, while the distribution of death penalty opinions was not significantly
different between men and women (see Table 9), Model 2 suggests that average opinions of the
death penalty do significantly differ by gender, which offers initial support for my hypothesis
H2.
Model 2: Death Penalty Opinions and Gender

Gender (Males are
the reference
group)
Females

(1)
Reduced
Model

(2)
Education

(3)
Religious
Involvement

(4)
Prior Jury
Service

(5)
Law
Enforcement

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

Death
Penalty
Opinions

(6)
Criminal
Justice
Experience
Death
Penalty
Opinions

-0.293*
(0.065)

-0.300*
(0.062)

-0.331**
(0.039)

-0.306*
(0.072)

-0.308*
(0.073)

-0.314*
(0.092)

-0.041
(0.615)

-0.029
(0.725)

-0.030
(0.733)

-0.026
(0.763)

0.032
(0.735)

-0.194***

-0.194***

-0.195***

-0.155**

(0.000)

(0.001)

(0.001)

(0.017)

0.186
(0.462)

0.188
(0.459)

0.354
(0.216)

0.054
(0.761)

-0.130
(0.499)

Level of Education

Level of Religious
Involvement

Prior Jury Service

Law Enforcement

Criminal Justice
Experience
N
R2

-.620**
304
0.011

297
0.012

291
0.054

265
0.054

264
0.055

(0.026)
198
0.074

Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01
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Full support for my hypothesis H2 would require that differences in death penalty
opinions by gender result in a greater share of females being excused on account of negative
opinions of the death penalty than the share of men excused. Table 7 shows that individuals
struck on account of unfavorable death penalty opinions is significantly differentiated by gender
at p < 0.00. Of all the female potential jurors who were asked about their death penalty opinions
and had race data, 38.81% were subsequently excused because their views rendered them unable
to sentence death, whereas only 24.12% of male potential jurors were excused for this reason. It
is important to note that this gap in excusals for death qualification is slimmer than the gap by
race, suggesting race is more strongly related to removals for death qualification than gender.
Table 7: Death Qualification Excusals by Gender*
Female

Male

Total

Not Struck
for Death
Qualification

82
(61.19%)

129
(75.88%)

211
(69.41%)

Struck for
Death
Qualification

52
(38.81%)

41
(24.12%)

93
(30.59%)

Total

134
(100.00%)

170
(100.00%)

304
(100.00%)

p = 0.006***
*

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was only obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data. The individuals
captured in this table that were struck for death qualification were struck on account of unfavorable death penalty
opinions (scoring a 1 or a 2 on the death qualification scale).

Being that the distribution in death penalty opinions was not significantly differentiated
by gender across the jury pools, this gendered difference in death qualification removals suggests
female potential jurors may have been targeted for their negative death penalty opinions more so
than men. This is evidenced by the fact that while the same number of men and women scored a
2 on the death qualification scale, nearly 60% of these women were excused for not being death
qualified, which is nearly double the share of men scoring 2s that were deemed not death
qualified. However, I cannot confirm that the death penalty opinions between men and women
who scored 2s were identical. It could have been the case that women in this category expressed
more unequivocal opposition than did men, which may not have been accurately captured in the
data and could explain why they were excused at a higher rate. Nonetheless, Table 7 confirms
that death qualification is significantly linked to gender and aids in allowing the prosecution to
keep more males than females in the jury pool. This offers additional support for my theory that
the death qualification process is intrinsically linked to identity-based characteristics, which
allows the prosecution to secure a pro-prosecution White male-dominant jury without sounding
alarms about explicit racial or gender biases.
c. The Effect of Death Qualification by Race and Gender
To further investigate the effect of death qualification excusals, I completed the analyses of
hypotheses H1 and H2 for a combination of both race and gender. This analysis captures more
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nuance than that for race and gender alone and informs whether death penalty opinions and death
qualification excusals are related to specific race and gender interactions (see Table 8). Table 8
shows that more than 70% of White men who reached the voir dire stage and were asked about
their opinion of the death penalty expressed favorable views, scoring a 4 or a 5 on the death
qualification scale. A slimmer majority of the share of White females and females of other races
also scored on the favorable end of the spectrum, which calls into question the extent to which
gender alone is associated with negative death penalty opinions, rather than a combination of
race and gender. Over 60% of both Black females and Black males expressed views in
opposition to the death penalty, scoring a 1 or a 2 on the death qualification scale.
Table 8: The Distribution of Death Penalty Opinions by Race and Gender*
Juror Race and Gender
Death
Qualification Scale

White
Male

White
Female

Black
Male

Black
Female

Other
Male

Other
Female

Total

1
Always Opposed

16
(12.80%)

22
(22.45%)

12
(38.71%)

8
(32.00%)

3
(21.43%)

3
(27.27%)

64
(21.05%)

2

20
(16.00%)

24
(24.49%)

7
(22.58%)

7
(28.00%)

5
(35.71%)

1
(9.09%)

64
(21.05%)

3 Neutral

0
(0.00%)

0
(0.00%)

1
(3.23%)

0
(0.00%)

1
(7.14%)

0
(0.00%)

2
(0.66%)

4

75
(60.00%)

45
(45.92%)

11
(35.48%)

9
(36.00%)

3
(21.43%)

4
(36.36%)

147
(48.36%)

5
Always Favor

14
(11.20%)

7
(7.14%)

0
(0.00%)

1
(4.00%)

2
(14.29%)

3
(27.27%)

27
(8.88%)

Total

125
(100.00%)

98
(100.00%)

31
(100.00%)

25
(100.00%)

14
(100.00%)

11
(100.00%)

304
(100.00%)

p = 0.001***
*

p < 0.10,

**

p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data.

Model 3 replicates the analyses of Models 1 and 2 for race and gender to show how
different race-gender interactions score on the death penalty scale on average, compared to
White men. Across all six versions of the regressions in Model 3, there were significantly lower
average death penalty opinion scores for White females, Black males, and Black females, when
compared to the average scores of White men. Results from individuals of other races were not
consistently significant, likely because their total sample size is too small to garner significant
results. Version 6 of Model 2 controls for a potential juror’s level of education, level of religious
involvement, whether they have previously served on a jury, whether they have friends or family
in law enforcement, and whether they have had a negative criminal justice experience. In this
model, the average death penalty opinion score for White females was about .50 points lower
than the average score for White men. In the same model, the average death penalty opinion
score for Black females was .74 points lower than the average for White men. The greatest mean
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difference is between White men and Black men, as the average death penalty opinion score for
Black men was about .98 points lower than the average for White men.
Model 3: Death Penalty Opinions and Race-Gender Interactions

Death Penalty
Opinions

(3)
Religious
Involvement
Death Penalty
Opinions

(4)
Prior Jury
Service
Death Penalty
Opinions

(5)
Law
Enforcement
Death Penalty
Opinions

(6)
Criminal Justice
Experience
Death Penalty
Opinions

-0.500***
(0.006)

-0.514***
(0.005)

-0.544***
(0.003)

-0.509***
(0.009)

-0.506**
(0.010)

-0.495**
(0.021)

Black Males

-1.053***
(0.000)

-1.142***
(0.000)

-1.025***
(0.000)

-1.019***
(0.001)

-1.017***
(0.001)

-0.975***
(0.005)

Black Females

-0.888***
(0.003)

-1.019***
(0.001)

-0.887***
(0.004)

-0.881***
(0.005)

-0.872***
(0.006)

-0.741**
(0.022)

Other Males

-0.694*
(0.067)

-0.642*
(0.089)

-0.556
(0.151)

-0.512
(0.231)

-0.447
(0.321)

0.346
(0.594)

Other Females

-0.135
(0.748)

0.121
(0.782)

0.077
(0.859)

0.083
(0.853)

0.092
(0.838)

0.779
(0.148)

-0.160*
(0.062)

-0.133
(0.121)

-0.138
(0.135)

-0.137
(0.140)

-0.088
(0.376)

-0.158***

-0.164***

-0.164***

-0.114*

(0.004)

(0.005)

(0.006)

(0.081)

0.149
(0.550)

0.150
(0.548)

0.199
(0.481)

0.038
(0.827)

-0.048
(0.801)

Race and gender
(White males are the
reference group)
White Females

(1)
Reduced
Model
Death Penalty
Opinions

Level of Education

Level of Religious
Involvement

Prior Jury Service

(2)
Education

Law Enforcement

Criminal Justice
Experience
N
R2

-0.437
304
0.073

297
291
265
0.082
0.108
0.105
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

264
0.104

(0.127)
198
0.140

This gap in support for the death penalty between White men and White women, White
men and Black women, and White men and Black men suggests that death qualification may
have a stronger effect by a combination of race and gender than my analyses of hypotheses H1
and H2 revealed. These results by race and gender also confirm that White men have a
significantly higher favorability for the death penalty on average than other potential jurors,
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which my theory would suggest would make the prosecution more likely to seat these
individuals. Later analyses regarding the final compositions of the four capital juries serve to
either confirm or deny this logic.
The statistically significant results in Table 9 confirm that death qualification excusals for
individuals with negative opinions of the death penalty (scoring a 1 or a 2) are not only
differentiated on account of race and gender alone but are also disproportionately affected by the
interaction between the two. The most prominent gap in death qualification excusals is between
White males and Black females, as Black females were deemed not death qualified due to
negative opinions of the death penalty at a rate over 3 times higher than the White men. Over
half of Black females who reached the voir dire stage were struck due to negative views of the
death penalty, which shows the significant impact this process has on this group of potential
jurors. No other race and gender combination had a majority share of their representation in the
jury pools struck for death qualification.
Table 9: Death Qualification Excusals by Race and Gender*
White
Male

White
Female

Black
Male

Black
Female

Other
Male

Other
Female

Total

Not Struck
for Death
Qualification

103
(82.40%)

65
(66.33%)

17
(54.84%)

10
(40.00%)

9
(64.29%)

7
(63.64%)

211
(69.41%)

Struck for
Death
Qualification

22
(17.60%)

33
(33.67%)

14
(45.16%)

15
(60.00%)

5
(35.71%)

4
(36.36%)

93
(30.59%)

Total

125
(100.00%)

98
(100.00%)

31
(100.00%)

25
(100.00%)

14
(100.00%)

11
(100.00%)

304
(100.00%)

p = 0.000***
*

p < 0.10,

**

p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was only obtained for individuals who had race and death penalty opinions data. The individuals
captured in this table that were struck for death qualification were struck on account of unfavorable death penalty
opinions (scoring a 1 or a 2 on the death qualification scale).

H1 and H2 and suggest that within the scope of my analysis, the practice of death
qualifying the juries systematically removed Black females and decreased their chances of being
represented in the seated capital juries. Black males had the next largest share of their
representation across the jury pools struck for death qualification, emphasizing the important role
race plays in this trend.
d. The Race and Gender Effect of Peremptory Strikes
My hypothesis H3 expects the disproportionate use of prosecutorial peremptory strikes
against Black potential jurors compared to the use of these strikes against White potential jurors.
Table 10 shows significant results for the distribution of State peremptory strikes by race. Of all
those summoned to jury duty across the four capital cases, Black potential jurors had the highest
proportion of their total share across the jury pools struck by the prosecution (16.28%). The
share of Black jurors struck by the State was nearly two times greater than the share of White
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jurors. The share of females struck by the State was not significantly different from the share of
males struck (9.51% and 7.64% respectively).
Table 10: State Strikes by Race*
White

Black

Other

Total

Not Struck
by the State

327
(91.85%)

72
(83.72%)

44
(91.67%)

443
(90.41%)

Struck by
the State

29
(8.15%)

14
(16.28%)

4
(8.33%)

47
(9.59%)

Total

356
(100.00%)

64
(100.00%)

48
(100.00%)

490
(100.00%)

p = 0.068*
*

p < 0.10,

**

p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was only obtained for individuals who had race data.

My hypothesis H3 expects the disproportionate use of prosecutorial peremptory strikes
against Black potential jurors compared to the use of these strikes against White potential jurors.
Table 10 shows significant results for the distribution of State peremptory strikes by race. Of all
those summoned to jury duty across the four capital cases, Black potential jurors had the highest
proportion of their total share across the jury pools struck by the prosecution (16.28%). The
share of Black jurors struck by the State was nearly two times greater than the share of White
jurors. The share of females struck by the State was not significantly different from the share of
males struck (9.51% and 7.64% respectively).
Conducting this analysis by both race and gender also did not produce significant results
(see Table 11). However, White women, Black women, and women of other races had higher
shares of their population struck than their male counterparts. Black females were the most
heavily targeted, with 18.60% of their total share of the jury pools eventually being struck by the
State, whereas only 7.14% of the total share of White men were struck by the State. These trends
show that Black potential jurors, especially Black women, are peremptorily struck by the State at
higher rates than Whites, especially White men. Though there are no significant results in the
distribution of State strikes by gender or by race and gender, I can confirm that the State used
peremptory strikes disproportionately against Black potential jurors compared to their total share
of the jury pool, offering initial support for my hypothesis H3.
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Table 11: State Strikes by Race and Gender*
White Male

White
Female

Black
Male

Black
Female

Other Male

Other Female

Total

Not Struck by the
State

182
(92.86%)

145
(90.62%)

37
(86.05%)

35
(81.40%)

24
(92.31%)

20
(90.91%)

443
(90.41%)

Struck by the
State

14
(7.14%)

15
(9.38%)

6
(13.95%)

8
(18.60%)

2
(7.69%)

2
(9.09%)

47
(9.59%)

Total

196
(100.00%)

160
(100.00%)

31
(100.00%)

43
(100.00%)

26
(100.00%)

22
(100.00%)

490
(100.00%)

*

p = 0.265
p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was only obtained for individuals who had race data.
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Model 4: Odds of Prosecutorial Strikes and Race-Gender Interactions
(1)
Reduced
Model

(3)
Education

(4)
Religious
Involvement

(5)
Prior Jury
Service

(6)
Law
Enforcement

(7)
Criminal Justice
Experience

State Strike
(0,1)

(2)
Death
Penalty
Opinions
State Strike
(0,1)

State Strike
(0,1)

State Strike
(0,1)

State Strike
(0,1)

State Strike
(0,1)

State Strike
(0,1)

1.345
(0.445)

1.570
(0.287)

1.602
(0.270)

1.624
(0.259)

1.481
(0.385)

1.471
(0.395)

1.877
(0.186)

Black Males

2.108
(0.152)

2.186
(0.206)

2.468
(0.170)

2.224
(0.233)

1.879
(0.379)

1.863
(0.130)

2.198
(0.304)

Black Females

2.971**
(0.023)

5.004***
(0.004)

5.457***
(0.006)

5.052***
(0.009)

4.982**
(0.012)

4.863**
(0.014)

3.804**
(0.048)

2.417**

2.424**

2.270**

1.842

1.863

1.945

(0.020)

(0.021)

(0.034)

(0.135)

(0.130)

(0.128)

0.292
(0.247)

0.290
(0.244)

0.283
(0.234)

0.261
(0.207)

0.259
(0.205)

0.317
(0.285)

1.015
(0.943)

1.010
(0.518)

1.027
(0.903)

1.029
(0.896)

1.063
(0.788)

1.086

1.109

1.113

1.104

(0.518)

(0.437)

(0.424)

(0.490)

0.849
(0.778)

0.839
(0.762)

1.234
(0.738)

0.897
(0.787)

0.964
(0.931)

Race and gender
(White males are
the reference
group)
White Females

Death Penalty
Opinion Scale
(4 scores are the
reference group)
2 - Almost always
opposed

5 - Always in favor

Level of Education

Level of Religious
Involvement

Prior Jury Service

Law Enforcement

Criminal Justice
Experience
N
Pseudo R2

1.354
238
0.092

220
216
211
191
0.095
0.098
0.097
0.089
Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

191
0.089

(0.666)
156
0.085

To further analyze my hypothesis H3, I ran a series of logistic regressions evaluating the
relationship between a potential juror’s race and their likelihood of being struck by the State
from 0 to 1, where 0 indicates an individual was not struck by the State and 1 indicates that they
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were (see Model 4). Version 7 of Model 4 controls for an individual’s death penalty opinions,
level of education, level of religious involvement, whether they have previously served on a jury,
whether they have friends or family in law enforcement, and whether they have had a negative
criminal justice experience, as these variables have the potential to influence the State’s decision
to strike an individual. Given the results of previous analyses, I chose to exclude individuals of
other races from Model 4, as their small sample sizes have produced consistently insignificant
results. I also chose to narrow the death penalty opinion scale such that the only categories
included were 2, 4, and 5, where 4 was the reference group. This is because all individuals who
scored a 1 were excused for cause, which means they perfectly predicted failure to be struck by
the State in Model 4. I also excluded 3 due to insufficient data. However, it is important to note
that in excluding these categories from both race and death penalty opinions, I compromised the
overall sample size.
Throughout all versions of the model, Black women had significantly higher odds of
getting struck by the State compared to White men. In version 7 of the logistic regression model,
Black females had 280% higher odds of being struck by the State than White males, when
holding the other independent variables constant. No other race and gender combination had
significantly higher or lower odds of being struck by the State in any version of Model 4, which
emphasizes how the use of State strikes across all jury pools targeted these potential jurors.
These results support my claim that Black potential jurors are disproportionately struck by the
State and suggest that this is particularly true for Black females.
Model 4 also highlights the significant role death penalty opinions played in the odds that
an individual was struck by the State, even when controlling for race and gender. I chose to make
a death penalty opinion score of 4 the reference category to highlight the difference in excusal
rates against individuals who were almost always in favor of the death penalty, as my theory
would suggest the State would opt not to strike these individuals. Given the pseudo R2
calculations, the version of the model wherein the included independent variables have the most
explanatory power over the variation in state strikes is version 3. In that version of the model,
potential jurors who scored a 2 on the death penalty scale but were willing and able to sentence
death had about 142% higher odds of being struck by the State than did potential jurors who
scored a 4, which supports my theory. However, the difference in the probability of being struck
between individuals who scored a 2 versus those who scored a 4 was not statistically significant
as more controls were added and as the sample size declined. Nonetheless, the significant results
in Model 4 point to the State’s strategy to strike potential jurors on the basis of race and gender
as well as by negative death penalty opinions. This finding supports my hypothesis H3 and my
theory that the State excludes individuals from the jury who are not pro-prosecution, which
includes Black females and those with unfavorable death penalty opinions.
It is important to note that across all four cases included in my analysis, 9 Batson claims
were made by the defense against peremptory strikes used by the State. One Batson claim was
made against a White man, who the defense suspected was unconstitutionally struck on account
of his disability. However, the other 8 claims were made against White women and Black
women. The defense argued these motions by stating that the State used peremptory strikes
against Black or White female potential jurors in instances where White male jurors with similar
juror profiles (death penalty opinions, employment status, etc.) were not struck by the
prosecution. The Batson procedure called for the State to defend their use of peremptory strikes
in these 9 cases with on-the-record explanations verifying that race and/or gender did not
motivate their decision to strike these individuals. The justifications provided by the State to
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strike these jurors included: age, education, marital status, employment status, death penalty
opinions, biases against law enforcement, experiences with the criminal justice system, etc. All
these explanations were accepted at face-value by the presiding judges as being both race and
gender-neutral, which resulted in no successful Batson claims. Nonetheless, my results suggest
that even when controlling for reasons that might justify the State’s decision to strike a juror–
including some of the actual justifications the State provided during Batson motions–Black
potential jurors and specifically Black females had significantly increased odds of being struck
by the State compared to their White male counterparts. Although my results support the basis
for these Batson claims, the procedure in place allowed the prosecution to evade consequences
for the racialized and gendered effects of their peremptory strikes.
Though my hypothesis H3 is only concerned with State strikes, I conducted the same
analyses for defense strikes to gauge whether the defense also utilized its strikes in a manner that
had racialized effects. It is important to emphasize that by the time the defense had been able to
question potential jurors during the voir dire, the State had already decided whether to make a
motion for cause against a potential juror, strike them peremptorily, or accept them. In other
words, by the time the defense had to make decisions on whether to strike a potential juror, the
jury pools were already disproportionately White. At the start of the defense's stage of the voir
dires, the combined jury pools consisted of 137 individuals with 86% Whites and 8% Blacks.
The share of Black potential jurors at this stage was less than half of their original share of the
combined jury pools. However, the share of White potential jurors at this stage had increased
more than 10% from their original share of the combined jury pools, on account of the processes
of death qualification and peremptory strikes that my results confirm contributed to the disparate
exclusion of Black potential jurors compared to Whites.
Table 12: Defense Strikes by Race*
White

Black

Other

Total

Not Struck
by the
Defense

309
(86.80%)

84
(97.67%)

45
(93.75%)

438
(89.39%)

Struck by
the Defense

47
(13.20%)

2
(2.33%)

3
(6.25%)

52
(10.61%)

Total

356
(100.00%)

86
(100.00%)

48
(100.00%)

490
(100.00%)

p = 0.008***
*

p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.00

*Note: Data was only obtained for individuals who had race data.

Table 12 shows that Whites were disproportionately struck by the defense. However, the
fact is that by the time the defense was able to make decisions about potential jurors, there was
an overwhelming share of White potential jurors and few Black potential jurors. Thus, the
racialized difference in defense strikes could be the result of the defense’s careful decision to
strike as few Black potential jurors as possible to increase their odds of being seated, rather than
the result of bias against White jurors. When looking at defense strikes by both race and gender,
White men had the highest share of their total population struck by the defense (14.29%),
compared to all other race-gender interactions.
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While analyses of State peremptory strikes confirmed my hypothesis H3 in revealing a
significant difference in the odds of being struck between Black females and White males, the
reverse was not true for defense strikes. Thus, the exclusion of Whites, and especially of White
males, by the defense is likely in response to the actions the State took to disproportionately
exclude Black potential jurors from the jury pools.
e. The Outcomes of Potential Jurors by Race and Gender
My final hypothesis H4 posited that White men would be overrepresented on seated
juries compared to their original share across the jury pools because the jury selection processes
of death qualification and prosecutorial peremptory strikes would have allowed the State the
opportunity to construct a pro-prosecution jury, or one that is as White and as likely to sentence
death as possible. Table 2 showed that White males and Black males had the highest share of
their jury pool populations seated on the juries, followed by White females, males of other races,
Black females, and women of other races. Figure 1 contextualizes that data in showing the
original distribution of race and gender of all individuals that were assigned to one of the four
capital case trials in my study as a proportion out of 100% (labeled “Assigned Trial”). This is
compared to the share of race and gender across the four seated juries (labeled “Seated”). Figure
1 also shows the proportion of race and gender combinations excused by each type of excusal in
the voir dire: hardship, Court strikes, State motion or strike, defense motion or strike, and
unneeded–for surplus individuals that were not called to voir dire and were excused after the jury
was seated. The y-axis is in order from top-to-bottom based on the sequential stages of the jury
selection process.
Figure 1*

Figure 1 confirms the significant overrepresentation of White males, whose share of the
final juries was nearly 20% more than their original share across the jury pools. This is explained
by the fact that the State excused small shares of White men. Even though the defense struck a
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greater proportion of White men than their original share on the jury pool, this did not mitigate
the effect of the State’s actions, resulting in the disproportionate representation of White men on
the final juries. This finding lends initial support to my hypothesis H4 and to my overarching
theory that the State would seat as many White males as possible, as their generally pro-death
penalty and pro-prosecution beliefs provide the best odds for a conviction and a death sentence.
White females, Black females, and females of other races were all underrepresented
compared to their original share across the jury pools, albeit to varying degrees. Men were seated
on final juries at a rate 2 times higher than females, confirming that seated juries were maledominant. Interestingly, Figure 1 shows that Black males were overrepresented on the final juries
compared to their original share of the jury pools, which contradicts my expectations. Even
though the Court and the State moved to excuse a greater proportion of Black male jurors than
were originally in the jury pools, the defense did not excuse any Black males that reached their
stage of the voir dires. Thus, Black males had the opportunity to sit on final juries on account of
the defense’s careful actions. However, the overrepresentation of Black males on seated juries
does not negate my findings that death qualification and prosecutorial peremptory strikes
contributed to the disproportionate exclusion of Black potential jurors. Instead, it suggests that
these exclusions did not significantly affect the likelihood that Black males were seated on final
juries.
My results have confirmed that the sociological characteristics of race and gender are
significantly linked to processes of jury selection. However, to further understand whether race
and gender alone significantly affected the odds of being seated on a capital jury, I analyzed a
series of logistic regression models testing the relationship between the odds of being seated on a
jury from 0 to 1–where 0 indicates an individual was not seated on a jury and 1 indicates that
they were–and a potential juror’s race and gender, controlling for their death penalty opinions,
level of education, level of religious involvement, whether they previously served on a jury,
whether they have friends or family in law enforcement, and whether they have had a negative
criminal justice experience (see Model 5).
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Model 5: Odds of Being Seated and Race-Gender Interactions
(1)
Reduced
Model

Race and gender (White
males are the reference
group)
White Females

Black Males

Black Females

(3)
Education

(4)
Religious
Involvement

(5)
Prior Jury
Service

(6)
Law
Enforcement

Seated (0,1)

(2)
Death
Penalty
Opinions
Seated (0,1)

Seated (0,1)

Seated (0,1)

Seated (0,1)

Seated (0,1)

(7)
Criminal
Justice
Experience
Seated (0,1)

0.587*

0.686

0.682

0.755

0.856

0.882

1.041

(0.096)

(0.296)

(0.302)

(0.455)

(0.693)

(0.752)

(0.927)

0.960

1.433

1.576

1.571

1.573

1.572

1.136

(0.929)

(0.511)

(0.440)

(0.454)

(0.483)

(0.484)

(0.865)

0.118**

0.147*

0.151*

0.154*

0.155*

0.167

0.142*

(0.038)

(0.071)

(0.079)

(0.083)

(0.088)

(0.104)

(0.090)

0.361**

0.384**

0.379**

0.362**

0.344**

0.520

(0.014)

(0.021)

(0.021)

(0.022)

(0.017)

(0.165)

Death Penalty Opinion
Scale
(4 scores are the reference
group)
2 - Almost
always opposed

Level of Education

1.010

1.004

1.030

1.023

0.981

(0.958)

(0.985)

(0.885)

(0.910)

(0.930)

1.051

1.052

1.037

0.984

(0.671)

(0.684)

(0.776)

(0.909)

Level of Religious
Involvement

Prior Jury Service

1.257

1.319

1.423

(0.658)

(0.595)

(0.568)

Law Enforcement

1.491

1.582

(0.272)

(0.257)

Criminal Justice
Experience
N
Pseudo R2

1.677
442
0.029

198

194

189

169

169

(0.528)
141

0.063

0.061

0.061

0.064

0.070

0.055

Exponentiated coefficients; p-values in parentheses
*
p < .10, ** p < .05, *** p < .01

For this series of regressions, I further narrowed the death penalty opinion scale such that
the only categories included were 2 and 4, with the first being compared to the latter. This is
because all individuals who scored a 1, 3, or a 5 were excused, meaning they would perfectly
predict failure to be seated in every version of Model 5. Only individuals who scored a 2 or a 4
were eventually seated on the juries, given that these were the categories that indicated an ability
to sentence death within the scope of the law.
The difference in the probability of being seated between individuals who scored a 2–or
were disinclined to sentence death–versus those who scored a 4–or were inclined to sentence
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death–on the death penalty opinion scale was nearly always significant. In version 6 of Model 5,
wherein the independent variables had the highest explanatory power over variation in a
potential juror’s odds of being seated, individuals who scored a 2 on the death penalty opinion
scale had about 66% lower odds of being seated on the jury than those who scored a 4, when
controlling for other sociological characteristics relevant to jury selection, including race and
gender. However, as the sample size decreased in version 7 of Model 5, there was not a
significantly different relationship in the probability of being seated between individuals who
scored a 2 on the death penalty opinion scale and those who scored a 4. This decrease in
significance could also be due to the fact that death penalty opinion scores and whether an
individual had a negative criminal justice experience are negatively correlated at p < 0.05.
The models that show a statistically significant difference in the odds of being seated by
death penalty opinions is an important finding, given that both individuals who score a 2 and
those who score a 4 are qualified by North Carolina statute to sit on capital juries, yet individuals
with less favorable death penalty opinions had a lower likelihood of being chosen to do so. Thus,
seated capital juries are not representing the opinions of summoned jury pools. Though not
significant, only 15.25% of seated jurors scored 2s on the death penalty opinion scale while all
others scored 4s. The only seated jurors who scored 2s were White. All Black seated jurors
scored 4s, even though this does not align with the distribution of death penalty opinions among
the Black individuals summoned to jury duty (see Table 8). The lack of variation in death
penalty opinions of seated jurors made it such that an overwhelming majority of those seated
were in favor of the death penalty, which aligns with my theory that the prosecution would aim
to seat jurors that are most likely to sentence death.
Version 1 of Model 5 shows that White females have a significantly lower likelihood of
being seated than White males. However, this relationship was no longer significant after the
inclusion of death penalty opinions as a control variable. Black males did not have a significantly
higher or lower likelihood of being seated compared to White males in any version of Model 5.
This finding is counter to my expectations, given that my results for hypotheses H1-H3 identified
racialized effects of jury selection that I theorized would result in the disproportionate exclusion
of Black men from final juries. However, Figure 1 shows that Black males were actually
overrepresented on seated juries, which could mean that exclusions by race were
disproportionately affecting Black females compared to Black males.
The results of Model 5 show that Black females had a significantly lower probability of
being seated than White males. However, results for version 6 of Model 5 were slightly above
the p < 0.10 threshold for statistical significance. This is important to note given that this version
of Model 5 included the most explanatory independent variables, and the additional control
variable in version 7 of Model 5 did not contribute any new information to the model.
Nonetheless, the significance consistently remains around the p < 0.10 threshold throughout all
versions of the model, supporting the idea that Black females have disproportionately lower odds
of being seated. In version 7 of Model 5, significant results show that Black females had about
an 86% lower likelihood of being seated on a jury compared to White males, when controlling
for other sociological characteristics.
To further understand the relationship between race and gender and being seated on a
capital jury, Figures 2 through 5 represent the predicted probability of being seated for versions
1, 3, 6, and 7 of the logistic regression models displayed in Model 5, respectively, where each
displayed predictive probability by race and gender accounts for the control variables included in
each model. The controls hold an individual’s death penalty opinions, level of education, level of
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religious involvement at mean value, whereas the binary control variables–whether an individual
previously served on a jury, whether they have friends or family in law enforcement, and
whether they or their friends and family had a negative criminal justice experience–are held at
median value. Figures 2 and 5 are included to display the differences between the reduced model
and the version of the model accounting for all controls. Figure 3 is included to show the change
when controls are added. Figure 4 is included because the model it represents had the highest
pseudo R2 value. The dotted line reflects the average probability that any individual across the
four jury pools was seated on a jury, as shown in Table 5.
Figure 2:

Figure 4:

Figure 3:

Figure 5:

The results from the reduced model displayed in Figure 2 show that Black females had a
significantly lower predicted probability of being seated when no controls were included,
compared to the overall average likelihood of being seated. The range of confidence intervals for
Black females did not overlap with the average probability marker, though confidence intervals
for all other race-gender combinations did overlap with the average. White men and Black men
had estimations above the average, whereas White women and Black women did not. The figure
most clearly displays the significant difference in the predicted probability of being seated
between White males and Black females, with White males having a predicted probability of
being seated about 5 times higher than that of Black females.
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The display of Model 7 holds constant an individual’s death penalty opinions, level of
education, level of religious involvement, whether or not they had previously served on a jury,
whether or not they had family or friends in law enforcement, and whether or not they had a
negative experience with the criminal justice system. Figure 5 displays wider confidence
intervals for race-gender combinations that all overlap with the average marker. In this figure,
the estimation of the predicted probability of being seated is about equal for White males, White
females, and Black males, while Black females maintained a significantly lower estimation.
Thus, this figure shows that even when holding both death penalty opinions and experiences with
the criminal justice system constant for all potential jurors, Black females are still likely to be
disproportionately excluded from seated juries compared to other jurors. Though I expected
these jury selection processes to be explaining racialized and gendered exclusions from seated
juries, it can be deduced that for Black females, their race and gender alone is also negatively
impacting their odds of being seated. This Black female effect furthers the racialized and
gendered effects of death qualification and peremptory strikes, which have both been found to
disproportionately exclude Black females.
In Figures 2 through 5, the predicted probability of being seated for Black females
remained consistently below the average and significantly below the predicted probability
estimations of other race-gender combinations, even when holding additional variables constant.
These results suggest that the predicted probability of being seated is influenced by race and
gender in isolation. However, these results do not negate the impact that the process of death
qualification had on the composition of the final jury, but instead suggest that even when holding
death penalty opinions constant, Black females would still have a significantly lower probability
of being seated compared to other race and gender combinations. Thus, Black females bear the
brunt of the racialized and gendered effects of jury selection, which systematically denies them
from serving on capital juries.
Discussion & Conclusion
The results of my analyses confirm that within the scope of my study, the defendants’
Sixth Amendment constitutional right to a jury of their peers was not upheld. This promise was
first targeted by the death qualification process, which systematically excluded Blacks and
females, with disparate impacts for Black females. These results affirm that the death
qualification process decreased the likelihood that seated jurors in the Devega, Smith, Holden,
and Richardson trials were Black or female. Because the defendants in these trials were Black
males, the representation of Black jurors was even more critical in the judgment of these men.
The death qualification process also impacted the opinions held by seated jurors. Since
individuals can only be seated if they are willing and able to sentence death, the opinions in the
deliberation room are inherently skewed. Thus, the death qualification process makes it such that
seated jurors are differentiated in ways that make them more pro-prosecution and more inclined
to sentence death. Eliminating the death qualification requirement would allow jurors to have
different opinions of the death penalty, potentially increasing the diversity in the demographics
of those seated and allowing more impartial and balanced deliberations. However, further
research would benefit from evaluating whether not death qualifying a jury would present more
threatening biases in opinions that could also affect the imposition of a death sentence.
Peremptory strikes furthered the racialized and gendered impact of death qualification
and specifically resulted in the disproportionate removal of Black females. This further validates
the claim that the Sixth Amendment is being undermined during jury selection, as Black females
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are systematically denied the right to fulfill their civic duty when summoned for jury duty. Given
the ease with which Batson claims are denied, there is essentially no safeguard in place to
identify or prevent racialized or gendered prosecutorial peremptory strikes. Although my results
confirmed biased peremptory strikes, the lack of successful Batson claims against these strikes
suggests there must be serious consideration as to whether the Batson standard of purposeful
discrimination is too difficult to satisfy. Though the motivation behind peremptory strikes is to
give the State and the defense limited liberty in who they see fit to sit on the jury, the result is
evidently counteracting the constitutional liberties of defendants.
My study affirms the fact that the jury selection process targets Black and female
potential jurors, with an emphasis on the exclusion of Black females. The end result is a White
male-dominant jury that denies the constitutional rights of criminal defendants. Though my
results are bound by data from Wake County between 2014-2018 and thus subject to external
validity constraints, existing literature has confirmed these trends in a slew of different contexts.
Given the fact that jury selection is a quasi-standardized practice across North Carolina, there is
reason to believe that these biases have impacted other capital cases across the state, which calls
into question the fairness of the trials of the 134 current North Carolina death row inmates. To
confirm that claim, further research would benefit from a state-wide analysis of how both death
qualification and prosecutorial peremptory strikes have impacted the final composition of capital
juries. A state-wide analysis would include a larger sample size, which would address the
weaknesses my study had regarding generalizability and statistical significance.
My analyses demonstrated evident and consistent racialized and gendered biases in the
jury selection practices of four capital cases in Wake County, North Carolina. This study adds to
a breadth of existing social science research identifying jury selection as a detriment to
defendants’ Sixth Amendment constitutional right. The State of North Carolina should not wait
for more research to confirm these results. These biases in capital jury selection pose a
significant threat to the constitutionality of the death penalty application within the state, which
begs the question: Is it time to do away with this antiquated criminal punishment?
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Studying the Economic Impact of the Demonetization Across
Indian Districts
ARNAV JOSHI
University of Pennsylvania
ABSTRACT: This thesis studies the economic impact of the Indian demonetization which was
a unique monetary event that made 86.9 percent of the total currency in circulation illegal
tender overnight. The decision to demonetize high-value currency notes was taken by the
Indian government on November 8th, 2016, leading to a severe shortage of cash. This thesis
tries to analyze how the impact of the demonetization differed across districts in India and how
the characteristics of those districts pertaining to education, electricity and tap water access,
employment, and technology access can help explain these differences. The thesis uses satellite
data on human-generated night light activity to quantify the impact of the demonetization on
economic activity. It is found that districts that had a higher literacy rate and a higher
percentage of households with access to electricity experienced a less severe economic impact
of the demonetization. The economic impact due to the demonetization was more severe in
districts with a higher percentage of marginal workers in their workforce. Amongst the various
sectors of employment, agriculture, manufacturing, and construction were affected less
severely by the demonetization compared to wholesale and retail trade. These insights have the
potential to help policymakers minimize the negative economic impacts of a policy like the
demonetization by understanding which districts or sub-geographical regions are more
susceptible to these impacts.
Introduction
On November 8th, 2016 the government of India decided to demonetize high-value
currency notes of denomination Rupees 1000 and Rupees 500, which constituted 86.9 percent
of the total currency in circulation. The decision was taken by the Government of India to
eliminate corruption, black money, counterfeit currency, and terror funding. The decision was
also guided by the aim of reaping potential medium-term benefits in the form of reduced
corruption, greater digitization of the economy, and greater formalization of the economy.1
The Indian public could exchange the demonetized cash by either swapping the old
currency with new currency (subject to daily limits) or they could deposit the old cash in their
bank accounts. Between October (the last month before the demonetization) and December
31st, 2016, (the last date for exchanging the old bills for the new ones) currency in circulation
in India fell by around 8.4 trillion rupees.2
India has traditionally been a cash-intensive economy. According to the Report of the
Committee on Digital payments3 (2016), around 78 percent of all consumer payments in India
are effected in cash. Moreover, the informal sector in India is large, contributing 43.2 percent
to Gross Value Added and employing more than 80 percent of the labor force.4 Due to these
reasons, the currency squeeze during the demonetization hurt economic activity.
The liquidity shock caused by the demonetization had an impact on the growth of gross
value added (GVA) in India. This impact was the result of a decline in demand due to a shortage
of cash for discretionary spending and disruption in productivity due to workers, who get their
wages paid in cash, experiencing temporary loss of work. The gross value added (GVA) growth
1
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for 2016-17 as a whole was estimated by the Reserve Bank of India at 6.9 percent, as against
the 7.6 percent communicated by the Reserve Bank of India before demonetization.
The demonetization adversely impacted organized manufacturing leading to a decline
in the sales of fast-moving consumer goods (FMCG), contraction in the manufacturing
purchasing manager’s index (PMI), and a deceleration in export growth. It also resulted in a
slowdown in domestic demand for automobiles, consumer durables, and apparel, and textiles.
The service sector was also affected, with the services PMI and service tax collection - an
indicator for unorganized services- falling sharply. The impact of the demonetization on
agricultural production, however, was muted and transient due to healthy progress in Rabi
(crops are sown in winter) sowing with food-grain production increasing by 8.1 percent in
2016-17.
This thesis aims to understand the economic impact of the demonetization by using
district-wise cross-sectional data. The objective of the thesis is to study how different
characteristics of districts in India can help explain the economic impact of the demonetization
in those districts. The thesis will analyze the characteristics of districts related to education,
electricity and tap water access, employment, and technology access and will use satellite data
on human-generated night light activity to quantify the economic impact of the demonetization.
The data for district characteristics are obtained from the NITI Aayog District Statistics
and the Indian National Census of 2011. The nightlight intensity data is obtained using the
Visible and Infrared Imaging Suite (VIIRS) Day Night Band (DNB) on board the Joint Polarorbiting Satellite System (JPSS) satellites. A linear regression model is then used to identify
how the change in night-light activity varies across districts and which characteristics of these
districts help explain this change.
It is found that the total population of a district and the percentage of households with
mobile phones are not statistically significant variables in the regression model. Districts with
a higher literacy rate and a higher percentage of households using electricity or solar energy as
the main source of lighting experienced a less severe impact of the demonetization.
Surprisingly, districts with a higher percentage of households receiving tap water experience a
more severe economic impact of the demonetization.
Districts with a higher percentage of marginal workers face a more severe economic
impact of the demonetization, while the opposite holds for districts with a higher percentage of
non-workers. Amongst the different sectors of employment, the economic impact of the
demonetization is less severe in districts with a higher percentage of workers in agriculture,
forestry, or fishing; manufacturing, and construction. Districts with a higher percentage of
workers working in wholesale and retail trade faced a more severe economic impact of the
demonetization.
Literature Review
A) Past Experiences with Demonetization in India
Demonetization as a tool of fighting crime, tax evasion, and activities in the
underground economy has been advocated in the past, and analyzing literature about past
experiences with demonetization in India is insightful.
In 1946, bills of denomination 500 rupees or above were demonetized in India to fight
against black market money and tax evasion.5 However, the scheme was generally regarded as
a failure as 94 percent of the demonetized currency was returned to the Reserve Bank of India
and it caused considerable hardship to the general public. The Indian government also
demonetized currency bills of denomination 1000 rupees and above in 1978. This move was
marginally more successful than the one in 1946 as 86 percent of the demonetized currency
was exchanged for lower denomination bills.
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The unique aspect of the demonetization in India in 2016 was that it was carried out
during a period of economic stability, but with very little time given to the public to exchange
their demonetized bills. This led to a cash shortage that hurt economic activity. Much like the
previous instances of demonetization in India, people found ways to effectively and swiftly
launder money, and 99.3% of the revoked currency was returned within the sixty-day window
provided by the government.6
B) Descriptive Statistics and Time Series Methods
The existing literature on the economic impact of the demonetization in India consists
of research that analyzes the macroeconomic impact of the demonetization at the national level
using descriptive statistics. The Reserve Bank of India’s (RBI) preliminary assessment of the
macroeconomic impact of the demonetization, for instance, states that the demonetization led
to a transient disruption in nation-wide economic activity. RBI’s assessment looks at nationally
aggregated data and concludes that the impact of the demonetization on gross value added
growth, albeit modest, was felt in November and December of 2016-17.
While this assessment gives a good picture of the macroeconomic conditions at the
national level, it fails to capture regional variations in the economic impact of the
demonetization. As hard data on the unorganized sector are collected infrequently, it also fails
to accurately capture the impact of the demonetization on the unorganized or informal sector.
This thesis will try to capture regional variations of the economic impact by using district-wise
cross-sectional data. It will also better capture the impact on the unorganized sector by utilizing
night light intensity data to quantify economic costs.
There have also been studies that use time series methods to analyze the
macroeconomic impact of the demonetization at the national level. Aggarwal and Narayanan7
estimate the impact of the demonetization on domestic trade in agricultural commodities. They
analyze data on arrivals and prices from close to 3000 regulated markets in India for 35 major
agricultural commodities. They use a combination of difference in differences techniques and
synthetic control methods to identify the causal impact of the demonetization. They find that
the demonetization displaced domestic agricultural trade in regulated markets by over 15% and
the trade in perishables by around 23% in the short run.
The paper by Aggarwal and Narayanan7 provides insight into the impact that the
demonetization had on agriculture, which accounts for the largest share of the informal
workforce8. However, national time-series aggregates cannot alone provide empirical evidence
of the effects of the demonetization as the episode constitutes only a single observation and
because other economic shocks occurred during the period9. This is one of the reasons why this
thesis studies the consequences of the demonetization using cross-sectional data instead of time
series aggregates.
C) Survey Based Methods
Several studies also use survey-based data to examine the economic impact of the
demonetization. Zhu et al.10 analyze the short-run responses of poor rural households to the
demonetization. They collect data from four villages in the Sundarbans region of West Bengal
and estimate a household income loss of 15.5% over the two months after the demonetization.
In a similar study, Krishnan and Siegel11 survey around 200 families in urban slums in Mumbai
and find that household incomes fell by about 10%.
Kurosaki12 uses a panel dataset on registered and unregistered manufacturing firms to
show that even after the demonetization shock, both types of firms remain cash-dependent.
Karmarkar and Narayanan13 use panel data on more than 100,000 households from the
Consumer Pyramids (CP) survey of households carried out by the Centre for Monitoring the
Indian Economy (CMIE). They find that the demonetization had a transient impact on
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household income and expenditure with significant heterogeneity in the impact across
households in different asset quartiles.
This thesis is similar to the above-mentioned papers in that it can capture the household
level characteristics of different districts that led to the varied economic impact of the
demonetization. However, unlike some of the above-mentioned papers, the data used in the
thesis spans the entire nation and is not limited in terms of geographical scope.
D) Using Cross-Sectional District-wise Data
This thesis builds primarily on the paper written by Chodorow-Reich et al.9 which uses
district-wise cross-sectional data to analyze the impact of the demonetization on economic
activity. Methodologically, this approach relates to a burgeoning literature using crosssectional, regional variation to study macroeconomic topics as reviewed in Nakamura and
Steinsson14 and Chodorow-Reich.15
The paper by Chodorow-Reich et al.9 uses data from the Reserve Bank of India to
construct a local area demonetization shock which is the ratio of post-demonetization to predemonetization currency in an area. The paper also uses survey data on household employment
and satellite data on human-generated night light activity to measure the demonetization’s
effects at the district level. Both household employment and night light activity reveal
economically sharp, statistically highly significant contractions in areas experiencing more
severe demonetization shocks.
This thesis builds on the paper written by Chodorow-Reich et al.16 by utilizing data on
characteristics of districts pertaining to education, electricity and tap water access,
employment, and technology access. This will provide insight into what characteristics made
certain districts more susceptible to the negative economic impacts of the demonetization.
In summary, the thesis builds on the existing literature by capturing regional variations
despite being national in scope. It uses cross-sectional data instead of time series aggregates
and analyzes the impact on the formal and informal sectors by looking at satellite data on
human-generated night light activity. It builds on the paper written by Chodorow-Reich et al.16
by taking into account data on district characteristics to examine what made certain districts
more susceptible to the negative economic impacts of the demonetization.
Night Light Intensity: A Proxy for Economic Activity
Nightlight data serves as a good proxy for economic activity because consumption and
production during the evening require some form of lighting.17 The correlation between
nightlight intensity, which is the sum of nightlights divided by the area, and GDP levels has
been well established. Henderson et al.18 introduce a comprehensive framework to help
increase the reliability of GDP estimates for developing countries using nightlight data. One of
their key findings is that the estimated elasticity between nightlight growth and measured GDP
growth is roughly 0.3. Chen and Nordhaus19 use a similar framework and find that nightlight
intensity data is a good proxy for GDP especially for countries where no national economic
information is available or the quality of statistical systems is poor.
The high correlation between nightlight intensity and GDP also holds at the subnational
level. Doll et al.20 find that nightlight intensity is correlated with the Gross Regional Product
across eleven European countries and the United States. Bhandari and Roychowdhury21 find
that GDP at the district level in India is significantly explained by nightlight intensity.
The correlation between nightlight intensity and GDP captures the fact that access to
electricity increases as countries develop and that electricity consumption increases with
income levels.22 It is also found that nightlight intensity in South Asia is more strongly
correlated with economic activity in manufacturing and services than in agriculture.17 This is
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as access to electricity among farmers is low in South Asia and even when they do have access
to electricity, they use it for activities such as water pumping which do not generate nightlight.22
Using nightlight intensity data as a proxy for economic activity is advantageous as it
captures informal activity. Official GDP data cannot capture informal activity and there are
several challenges to the collection of high-quality GDP data including the absence of
standardized national income accounting methods, low levels of efficiency of surveyors, and
the subjective response of responders in the ground survey.23 Another issue is that in several
countries, subnational estimates of GDP are not available at a reasonable frequency. Nightlight
data is available at high levels of spatial disaggregation, can be obtained relatively easily in
real-time, and is not subject to politically motivated interference.24
Nightlight intensity data have been used as a proxy for economic activity in several
applications. Ghosh et al.25 use nightlight data and find that the magnitude of Mexico’s
informal economy and the inflow of remittances are 150 percent larger than their existing
official estimates in the gross national income. Min26 uses nightlight data to study trends in
rural electrification in India and Doll et al.27 provide satellite-derived estimates of the rural
population without access to electricity in developing countries. Pandey and Seto28 use
nightlight data to study the impact of urbanization on agricultural land loss in India and find
that the land loss is concentrated in smaller cities and districts with high rates of economic
growth.
Several other applications of nightlight data in economics are outlined in Donaldson
and Stoneygard.29 Donaldson and Stoneygard30 also describe some unique challenges
associated with using nightlight data. Nightlight data show spatial dependence and when using
nightlight intensity as a dependent variable, the error term in a multivariate regression is not
distributed independently. Potential measurement errors and the complexity of remote sensing
datasets can also make them difficult to model using linear functions. It is important to keep
these considerations in mind when using nightlight intensity data.
Data and Descriptive Statistics
This paper utilizes a combination of the NITI Aayog district statistics,31 Indian National
Census (2011) data,32 and nightlight intensity data provided by the Earth Observation Group.33
NITI Aayog or the National Institute for Transforming India is the policy think tank for the
Government of India and provides directional and policy inputs. The NITI Aayog and Census
data are used to understand district characteristics and the nightlight data is used as a proxy for
economic activity.
The district characteristics which are used in this paper are outlined in Table 1. The
descriptive statistics for the district characteristics are provided in Table 2. Appendix A shows
choropleth maps of India created using some of these district characteristics. The data regarding
district characteristics were recorded in 2011. It is assumed that the district characteristics in
2016 (when the demonetization took place) are closely related to those measured in 2011.
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The nightlight intensity data are obtained using the Visible and Infrared Imaging Suite
(VIIRS) Day Night Band (DNB) onboard the Joint Polar-orbiting Satellite System (JPSS)
satellites. The data used in this paper are obtained from a product called the Monthly Cloudfree DNB composite. This product has an image resolution of 15 arc seconds and covers
latitudes ranging from 75N to 60S and longitudes ranging from 180W to 180E. This paper uses
a configuration of the product that includes data impacted by stray light if the radiance values
have undergone the stray light correction procedure. The data can be downloaded in GeoTIFF
format and monthly data from April 2012 onwards are available. Appendix B provides an
illustration of what the nightlight data product looks like.
For each month, the average nightlight intensity is calculated for all districts in India.
The data obtained are monthly in frequency and have substantial seasonality. This paper
follows a procedure similar to the one outlined in Chodorow-Reich et al.34 to obtain seasonally
adjusted data. The data are seasonally adjusted by running a regression with the nightlight
intensity (in levels) as the dependent variable and district-specific linear time trends and month
6
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categorical variables as the independent variables. The regression is described in equation (1)
where ‘!"#ℎ%&"#ℎ%! ," ’ represents the nightlight intensity in the ‘i’th district at time ‘t’ with
‘t=1’ for April 2012. Nightlight data from April 2012 to March 2016 are used to run this
regression.
!"#ℎ%&"#ℎ%! ," = *# + *$ ,! ∗ -.! + *% ,! ∗ /01 + ⋯ + *$$ ,! ∗ 345 + *$% ,! ∗ % (1)

The national average of the coefficients obtained for the month categorical variables
and the linear time trend is provided in Table 3. Appendix C graphs the values of nightlight
intensity obtained using the seasonal and trend coefficients for four districts in India. The
nightlight data from April 2016 onwards are adjusted by subtracting the nightlight intensity
value predicted using the regression coefficients from the actual nightlight intensity value
observed. Finally, the monthly data are aggregated to quarterly data to remove high-frequency
volatility. The month of October is dropped from 2016Q4 so that 2016Q4 is almost entirely
post demonetization.
To demonstrate that nightlight intensity can be used at the sub-national level as a proxy
for economic activity, the following analyses are carried out. First, the correlation coefficient
between the total nightlight intensity and total electricity supply35 is calculated for states across
7
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

107

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

India using annual data from 2012 to 2017. The average value of the correlation coefficient is
0.48. The correlation coefficient between average nightlight intensity and Per Capita Net State
Domestic Product36 is also calculated for states across India using annual data from 2012 to
2017. The average value of the correlation coefficient is found to be 0.44. A table of correlation
coefficients by state is presented in Appendix D.
The three datasets are merged by joining them on the basis of district names. After
merging the three datasets and dropping out districts with missing data, data about district
characteristics, and average nightlight intensity for 585 districts are available.
Model and Results
To understand how the characteristics of a district affected the economic impact of the
demonetization in that district, a regression model is run with the difference in nightlight
intensity between 2016Q4 and 2016Q3 as the dependent variable and the district characteristics
as the independent variables. The regression model is described in equation (2), where ‘i’
represents the ‘i’th district and ‘Q3’ and ‘Q4’ represent the third and fourth quarters of 2016
respectively. The results of this regression are provided in Table 4.
!"#ℎ%&"#ℎ%! ,"# − !"#ℎ%&"#ℎ%! ,"$ = *% + *& ∗ -.%/&0.12&/%".!! + ⋯ + *&& ∗ 4"%56/789/%5! (2)

To ensure that the model specification is robust, the correlation coefficients between
the difference in nightlight intensity between 2016Q3 and 2016Q2 (pre-demonetization) and
the district characteristics are calculated. The maximum absolute value amongst the correlation
coefficients calculated is 0.29 (obtained for the variable PercentWholesaleRetailTrade). This
shows that the pre-demonetization changes in nightlight intensity are not strongly correlated
with the district characteristics. The correlation coefficients obtained are provided in Appendix
E.
A) Total Population and Access to Mobile Phones
We find that the TotalPopulation variable is not statistically significant. The total
population of a district is used as a control variable in this regression. We also find that the
PercentHouseholdsWithMobilePhones variable is not statistically significant and this is
somewhat surprising.
Chodorow-Reich et al.37 find that districts that experienced sharper declines in money
following the demonetization experienced sharp declines in overall economic activity and had
faster growth of alternative payment mechanisms such as e-wallets. So, there should
be a strong negative correlation between change in economic activity and the adoption of ewallets. If we assume that the percentage of households with mobile phones in a district is
strongly positively correlated with the adoption of e-wallets in that district, then there should
also be a strong negative correlation between the change in economic activity and the
percentage of households with mobile phones.
However, it is possible that districts that saw increased adoption of e-wallets had
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sharper declines in money post demonetization, but not necessarily a high percentage of
households with mobile phones. The percentage of households with mobile phones may not be
not strongly positively correlated with the adoption of e-wallets post demonetization. This is a
plausible explanation for why the variable is not statistically significant.
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B) Literacy Rates and Electricity and Tap Water Access
Prusty38 finds that the overall literacy rate had a long-term impact on per capita personal
disposable income in India during 1952-2006. Rao39 finds that electricity access at mean supply
levels is associated with at least 18 percent higher income for households in India. Therefore,
districts with higher literacy rates and greater access to electricity and tap water should have
households with higher incomes and a lesser percentage of workers working in the cashintensive informal sector. The demonetization should have a less severe economic impact in
these districts.
It is found that the LiteracyRate variable is statistically significant at the 10% level with
a coefficient of 1.324, the PercentageHouseholdsWithElectricityOrSolar variable is
statistically significant at the 10% level with a coefficient of 0.717, and the
PercentageHouseholdsWithTapWater variable is statistically significant at the 5% level with a
coefficient of -0.902. These results show that districts with higher literacy rates and greater
access to electricity had a less severe economic impact due to the demonetization. The negative
coefficient associated with the PercentageHouseholdsWithTapWater is surprising, as it
indicates that districts that had a greater percentage of households with access to tap water
faced a greater economic impact due to the demonetization. Apoorva et al.40 find that household
surveys in India do not reliably estimate household tap water use and this might be a reason
why the surprising result associated with the percentage of households receiving tap water is
obtained.
C) Marginal workers and Non-workers
The Indian National Census of 2011 divides workers into main workers (who worked
for a majority of the previous year), marginal workers (who worked for less than the majority
of the previous year), and non-workers (who did not work during the previous year). The
PercentMarginalWorkers and PercentNonWorkers variables are statistically significant at the
1% level with coefficients -4.402 and 3.564 associated with them respectively.
This result shows that districts with a higher percentage of marginal workers faced a
more severe economic impact due to the demonetization. Marginal workers are more likely to
be on the lower rungs of the economic strata and are mostly employed by the cash-intensive
informal sector, which helps explain this result. Districts with a higher percentage of nonworkers, however, faced a less severe economic impact. Non-workers consist of students,
dependents, people performing household duties, pensioners, and rentiers. The result shows us
that the impact that the demonetization had on non-workers was lesser compared to marginal
workers.
D) Occupation Data
The 2011 Census also provides data about the occupations of main and marginal
workers in each district. The four categories of occupations chosen for this regression analysis
- agriculture, forestry and fishing; manufacturing; construction; and wholesale and retail trade
account for 80% of the main and marginal workers in a district on average. The
PercentAgricultureForestryFishing, PercentManufacturing, PercentConstruction, and
PercentWholesaleRetailTrade variables have coefficients 4.271, 8.170, 15.090, and -23.583
associated with them respectively, and are all statistically significant at the 1% level.
These coefficients show us that wholesale and retail trade was a sector that was heavily
affected by the demonetization. Districts with a higher percentage of workers in agriculture felt
a less severe impact of the demonetization. The impact of the demonetization on agriculture
was muted due to healthy progress in Rabi sowing.41
Nationally aggregated statistics show that the index of industrial production which is a
proxy indicator for unorganized manufacturing contracted by 1.7% in December 2016 and the
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organized manufacturing sector was also adversely affected. They also show that the
production of cement which is an indicator for the construction sector contracted by 13.3% in
December 2016.41 As a result, it is surprising to see that districts with a higher percentage of
workers employed by the manufacturing and construction sectors were less severely affected
by the demonetization. The manufacturing and construction sectors could have performed
better compared to the wholesale and retail trade sectors and other sectors excluded from the
regression such as services, accommodation, and food, etc. This might be a plausible
explanation for the positive coefficients associated with these variables.
E) Spatial Correlation
The district characteristics used as independent variables in this regression model may
be spatially correlated. According to Donaldson and Stoneygard42 nightlight data also show
spatial dependence when using nightlight intensity as a dependent variable. To account for
spatial correlation, standard errors in the regression model are clustered by state, resulting in
35 clusters. The standard errors are adjusted by implementing the Imbens and Kolésar43 and
Bell and McCaffrey44 degrees of freedom adjustments.
On accounting for spatial correlation, it is found that the PercentMarginalWorkers
variable is statistically significant at the 10% level, the PercentManufacturing and
PercentWholesaleRetailTrade variables are statistically significant at the 5% level and the other
variables are not statistically significant. This method only adjusts the standard errors and the
coefficient estimates for all the variables remain the same. This is a good check of the
robustness of the model and even after accounting for spatial correlation, some of the district
characteristics are statistically significant in explaining the economic impact of the
demonetization. The p-values obtained for all the independent variables are presented in
Appendix F.
Conclusion
This thesis examines the economic impact of the demonetization in India, by using
cross-sectional data at the district level. It adds to the existing literature by capturing regional
variations in the economic impact of the demonetization while being national in scope. Satellite
data on human-generated night light activity are used as a proxy for economic activity at the
district level. The results provide insight into what characteristics made certain districts more
susceptible to the negative economic impacts of the demonetization.
There are several opportunities to refine and expand the analysis presented in this thesis.
The nightlight intensity data can be cleaned using more sophisticated techniques, before
aggregating it at the district level. Individual nightlight observations below a certain threshold
can be removed, outlier observations can be removed from each location, or observations from
locations with background noise can be removed as described in Beyer et al.45 Data about
unemployment at the district level can also be used to examine the impact of the demonetization
on economic activity.
It is also important to remember that there were other economic events and policies that
affected the Indian economy during the period in which the demonetization took place. Some
salient examples include the election of President Donald Trump on the same day as the
demonetization was announced, a 60% rise in global prices of crude oil from January to
October 2016 and a better monsoon rainfall than in the previous year.46 While future
improvements are possible, this thesis provides policymakers an understanding of what made
certain districts in India more susceptible to the negative economic impacts of the
demonetization. Hopefully, these findings will help policymakers in India and other countries
make informed policy decisions in the future.
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Appendices
Appendix A:
Figure A.1: Literacy Rate Choropleth Map
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Figure A.2: Percentage of Workers Employed in Agriculture/Forestry/Fishing
Choropleth Map
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Appendix B: Nightlight Data Example

Appendix C: Regression Results Using Seasonality and Trend Coefficients
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Appendix D:
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Appendix E:

Appendix F:
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Conservatism, Collaboration, and Capacity: Political Explanations
for Canada’s Shift in Immigrant Admissions Logic
JAIDYN APPEL
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ABSTRACT: Canada is often regarded as the United States’ friendlier neighbor to the north, but
how welcoming is it really? A critical analysis of immigration and citizenship policy throughout
Canadian history reveals that Canada may not be the inclusive member of the world community it
is often conceptualized as. This paper examines some of the recent key changes in Canadian
immigration policy and their broader contexts, while benchmarking the policies against two
leading scholars' thoughts on how the relative presence of certain political ideologies in a country
drives its immigration policies to the left or right of the political spectrum. As early 21st century
policy changes are outlined, it becomes clear that the standard explanations for political parties as
explanatory factors in immigration legislation do not hold entirely true in Canada. Instead, a
broader, bipartisan political framework can be used to understand Canadian policy changes. The
paper concludes by explaining that party politics do account for some of the reasoning behind
changes in Canada, but that a surprisingly cooperative Liberal party, and a surprisingly lenient
bureaucratic framework, should be used to reframe Canada as a less friendly, unquestioned
welcomer of all than it is often seen as today.
Introduction: The Puzzle of Canada’s Shift towards Human-Capital Citizenship
Canada is one of the most popular destinations for immigrants worldwide. With one in five
Canadians born abroad, it is estimated that by 2040 immigrants will be responsible for nearly 100%
of Canadian population growth, ranking Canada among the top ten immigrant-receiving countries
in the world.1 In addition, rates of naturalization of immigrants in Canada are more than double
those in the United States, regardless of national background and education levels, soaring as high
as 79% in 2006, compared to just 30% in the United States.2
Since the 1962 termination of Canadian race-based citizenship requirements, the country’s
citizenship law has undergone numerous changes reflecting evolving cultural values. This policy
engineering has, for the most part, been done with one of two goals at its core: increasing family
immigration or increasing economic immigration with the hope of attracting newcomers who will
provide a boost to Canada’s skilled labor economy. In 1983, for example, family immigration
accounted for 55% of all new arrivals, an increase from 34% just eight years prior. Furthermore,
from 1971 to 1983, the percentage of economic immigrants plummeted from 73% to only 31% of
all new Canadian arrivals.3 Over the course of the past sixty years, policymakers have adjusted
quoats, restated goals, and adapted their positions to temporal understandings of the ideal Canadian
immigrant. Recently, these immigration and naturalization laws have taken a sharp turn away from
family unification priorities, in favor of admitting profitable and capital-producing, highly
educated new citizens. While family and refugee immigrants accounted for 55% of all immigration
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in 1983, this number was down to 30% in 2010, as proportional rates of economic immigrants
increased from 31% to 67% in the same time period.4
Antje Ellerman explains this change in terms of Canada’s shift towards “human-capital
citizenship,” which understands citizens as economic assets and producers of their own capitalistic
worth. Human capital, here, is the collection of hard and soft skills often associated with highstatus, high-salary positions.5 A country focused on human-capital citizenship would prove this
focus by enacting policy changes that demonstrate a higher value placed on economic immigrants
than family or humanitarian immigrants. These changes are certainly observable in 21st century
Canada. Immigration policy changes have included making it more difficult for children to
immigrate to Canada for reasons of economic dependence, awarding immigrants “points” for those
with job offers in fields requiring high levels of education, and effectively removing for elderly
relatives of Canadian citizens a path to permanent residency and/or citizenship.6 Though there had
been a precedent in Canada of prioritizing more highly educated and employable immigrants since
the mid 1990s, the changes implemented in the first fifteen years of the 21st century created an
especially challenging puzzle. These changes fast-tracked Canada’s shift towards economic
immigrant valuation, and human-capitalization. This observation prompts the question: “Why has
Canada adopted the citizenship policy changes that Ellerman says it has?”
The Canadian government during this time had numerous policy priorities that can offer
possible insight into their citizenship agenda. Goals were set for national financial growth, such as
“establishing Canada’s place in the world economically,” reviving the country’s “entrepreneurial
spirit,” and doubling foreign student recruitment.7 There were also direct policy moves that
addressed these economic aims, including requiring proof of economic worth and stability prior to
obtaining permanent residency, granting work permits for humanitarian refugees less generously,
and the further development of the immigrant point system to more highly value younger, more
educated and employable applicants.8 Evaluating the case of Canada in particular provides an
example of a country highly sought after by immigrants, but with recent modifications to its
immigration policy that exemplify the human-capital approach Ellermann introduces. In this paper,
I investigate the hypothesis that the ideologies of the conservative political party in power can
explain the shift towards human-capital citizenship that Ellermann observes. However, the
findings on the changes observed by Ellermann refute Howard and Janoski’s theories of party
influence on citizenship policy, given that common goals between Liberals and Conservatives, as
well as executive ministerial power, were more influential than the power of one party’s ideology
in human-capitalizing Canadian citizenship.
I. A Theoretical Explanation for Canada’s Evolving Logic
The aforementioned hypothesis makes sense given the timing of Conservative Prime
Minister Stephen Harper’s years in power, as well as common conceptions of conservatives’ views
on immigration. Multiple authors in the existing literature draw parallels between the power of
political parties and the resulting policy changes, which present the basis for the hypothesis. Both
Thomas Janoski and Marc Morjé Howard provide foundational knowledge for linkages between
liberal political parties and certain types of immigration policy.
Janoski provides causal links between the relative power of a country’s leftist party and
higher rates of integration through naturalization. Janoski explains how Sweden, which has a
greater degree of social democratic political party power than Norway, Denmark, and Finland,
experiences the highest naturalization rate of the four countries. Following World War II, social
democratic governments in Sweden established agencies that helped humanitarian-based
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immigrants with the naturalization process, fought to lower language test requirements, and
implemented a concerted national attitude reform project to decrease anti-refugee sentiment.9 This
evidence for the progressive, humanitarian immigration framework adopted in Sweden under
liberal governments can then be weighed against Harper’s government in Canada. Without a
liberal government, let alone social democratic one, Canadian citizenship policy was left up to the
discretion of a government that was not only conservative, but more conservative than recent
Canadian precedent, opening the door for the country’s leaders to take Canada in the opposite
direction, immigration-wise, from the one observed by Janoski in Sweden.10 In the case of Canada,
this would mean naturalization and integration rates would be low under Conservative leadership,
and that any type of immigration, whether economic or not, would be less likely with
Conservatives in power.11
Howard finds additional evidence for the influence of political party leanings on citizenship
policy and what the relative presence of a far-right movement means for a country’s immigration
law. Whereas Janoski provides evidence for the liberalizing power that social democratic political
parties can have, Howard explains how the pressures of public opinion, when coming from the
right in particular, influence immigration policy and prevent liberalization (which, in this case,
would mean moving towards a view of immigrants not as producers of human capital, but as those
in need of familial or humanitarian aid). Howard states that the presence of a far-right group in a
state’s political arena promises non-liberalization, but the absence of far-right mobilization does
not guarantee liberalization. In other words, the presence of a far-right movement can prevent
much more than its absence can facilitate.12 Applying this school of thought to the case of
Conservative Prime Minister Stephen Harper in Canada, the country would seem almost doubly
guaranteed to have shifted right towards an economic system of immigration. First, the 2003
founding of the Conservative Party and Harper’s 2006 election established the presence of a party
that was further-right than any other recent Canadian political party that had possessed significant
political power. Such a right-leaning party is thus more likely to support economic or humancapital immigration.13 Second, for the second half of Harper’s time in office, beginning in 2011,
Conservatives held a parliamentary plurality that emboldened them to pull national policy to the
right.14 There existed then not only the non-absence, but the more real and genuine presence of a
“further-right” stance in Canada than there previously had been, exemplifying a nascent apparatus
for moving citizenship policy to the right.
Where Howard provides a theory of citizenship law and Jansoki provides one of
naturalization rates, I investigate a broader system of immigration that encapsulates a country’s
attitudes and politics at a certain point in time. The connection between my investigation and
Howard and Janoski’s theoretical frameworks is not perfectly congruent, but the comparison is apt
nonetheless. The central hypothesis in my research is that certain party ideologies, rather than a
specific metric like Howard’s theory of law or Janoski’s theory of naturalization rates in which
those policies could be analyzed, lead a party to adopt certain citizenship or immigration policies.
It is important, however, to explain how party ideologies are to be understood. In this paper, a
party’s “ideology” refers to the set of beliefs that provides their foundation as a political group.
These ideologies can be exhibited, for example, as part of a campaign platform, or as talking points
at major political events. Of course, the true individual desires of these policymakers may differ
slightly, or even stray more drastically, from these openly espoused goals, but for the sake of this
paper ideologies will be defined as what are more openly expressed in the public sphere.
If this hypothesis is correct, we would see through Canadian history only Conservatives
(or conservative-adjacent politicians before the founding of the current Conservative Party)
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pushing for economic-focused immigration, and only Liberals or liberal politicians pushing for
increased family and/or humanitarian immigration policy. Proof of the theory would be
strengthened if there were a dearth of evidence of parties working together on citizenship policy,
signifying a logic of immigrant admissions in Canada that is divided entirely along party lines. In
actuality, however, the opposite is evident.
II. Early 21st Century Citizenship Policy Changes in Canada
In the 1990s, Canadian immigration quotas were adjusted to make much more room for
economic admittances, and the cap on allowances of family immigration was subsequently
lowered.15 The policies and quota revisions adopted in the 1990s further opened an alreadycracked door for the Canadian shift towards economic admissions, and changes in the early 2000s
stepped through with full force. The most relevant, recent changes in Canadian immigration policy
have been enacted as amendments to the Canadian Immigration and Refugee Protection Act,
initially enacted in 2001. These changes were facilitated by the government of Conservative party
Prime Minister Harper, who was elected in 2006 and remained in power until 2015. Harper’s
ideologies were much further to the right than recent Prime Ministers; he and his supporters were
often deemed “Harper Conservatives” to express the shift to the right in their policies as compared
with their other conservative predecessors. A new coalition, formed between more centrist political
actors, gave Harper’s government space to move to the right in immigration policy, which, in this
case, meant greater prioritization of economic immigration. This tipping of the scale was
intensified by the Harper Conservatives’ focus on the liberalization of Canada’s economy,
particularly within the context of immigration.16
For Harper’s first campaign in 2006, the official campaign platform of the Conservative
Party makes explicitly clear their economic idealization of Canadian immigration. In the official
platform statement released, Harper and the Conservatives write, “We need an immigration policy
that responds to Canada’s economic needs.”17 Harper and his government also made their ideas
known at major political events. At the World Economic Forum in 2012, among top influential
economic powers, Harper outlined a new economic plan for Canada that, in his own words,
necessitated “significant reform of [Canada’s] immigration system” and “mak[ing] economic and
labour force needs the central goal of immigration efforts in the future.”18 In 2007, Immigration
Minister Diane Finley stated that Canada was in a “global war for talent,” and traveled to India
with the expressed purpose of “send[ing] a message that Canada is looking for talented Indian
people, looking for the best and brightest to come [to Canada].”19 Though these cases by no means
express all or even most of the Harper government’s beliefs, they demonstrate forums through
which “ideologies” can be conceptualized, examples of how Harper’s government publicized their
ideologies, and what those ideologies were.
Changes to immigration policy began within Harper’s first term in office. The 2008 C-50
Bill was enacted with the primary goal of expediting the immigration application assessment
process, which essentialized applicants based on country of origin, education, employment
prospects, and age, among other factors intended to assess human capital.20 This categorical
reframing resulted in increased priority for economic immigrants and placed strict limits on who
and how many people could apply for citizenship on humanitarian grounds. Since 2012, the
Immigration Minister can designate certain countries as “safe,” indicating that any refugee
applicants from those regions have no legitimate reason to flee, and thus denying humanitarian
appeals for admission.21 The effects of these changes have been clear to see, as myriad federal
worker admissions programs – for highly-skilled or highly-educated applicants – have been
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reimagined in Canada since the start of the 21st century. Most notably, the points system (which
was originally established with the intent of keeping “mentally defective” people out of Canada)
moved in a more explicit career-driven direction, guaranteeing a higher point score for anyone
with a job offer than anyone without, regardless of all other factors.22 As a result, government
support for family and refugee admissions has waned, bringing national civilian support down
with it; across Canada, far fewer people in 2020 believed that refugees should be the most
prioritized immigrant class when compared with years prior.23
In 2015, Harper’s final year in office, additional policy changes made the path to Canadian
citizenship increasingly human-capital based. A system of permanent guaranteed residency for
admitted foreign workers was scrapped in favor of a framework in which workers were first
admitted on a temporary basis, and then had to prove the extent of their economic establishment
before transitioning to permanent residency.24 This adaptation favors workers in high-skill jobs
who are more likely not only to retain one job consistently, but also to establish greater financial
roots because of that job. The changes made by the Harper government in his three terms from
2006 to 2015 set heavy precedents for a new logic of immigrant admissions, as well as a revised
understanding of who should have the power to make immigration decisions. At a glance, the
Harper government’s modifications to immigration policy appear attributable to Harper’s and the
Conservative Party’s aim to reconstruct the Canadian population of their nation as a more educated
and wealthy group, especially given the aforementioned theoretical bases offered by Howard and
Janoski. However, further research indicates a greater range of factors at play.
III. Findings
Three primary causal factors stand out as influencing Canada’s shift towards more humancapital centered citizenship policy. As predicted, the rise of Harper and the Conservative Party was
influential in the changes observed, but it was to a lesser degree than expected. Contrary to the
theory presented, research shows that there was multi-party support for citizenship policy changes
that prompted human-capital citizenship, or at least a lack of resistance from the left on the humancapitalizing mission that was led by the right. Findings also indicate that the precedent for
executive ministerial power was furthered during Harper’s time in office, allowing immigration
policy leaders to make their changes without the need for parliamentary approval, public opinion
concurrence, or other roadblocks. While the changes enacted by a given administration’s
Immigration Minister are dependent on the political party, and therefore ideologies, of the Prime
Minister and their government, political party ideology alone is not the all-explaining variable it
was hypothesized to be. The human-capital citizenship policies were passed under the regime of
and with pressure from a Conservative government, but the influence of Liberal support, as well
as ministerial power, cannot be overlooked in passing these policies.
Conservatives: The Influence of One Political Party
Harper’s government’s conservative ideologies aimed to reconform Canadian citizenship
to be more human-capital focused. Harper’s government did not possess a parliamentary majority
until 2011, meaning many of the changes it enacted to further its immigration ideology were passed
outside the legislative sphere. Unfazed by this challenge, in 2008 Harper and his cabinet designated
a Canadian Experience Class, which allows high-skill immigrants to more easily obtain permanent
residency.25 In order to apply for permanent residency with this option, an applicant must have at
least one year of skilled work experience in a managerial, professional, or skilled trade field, as
well as pass a more stringent language test than standard applicants.26 The Harper regime also
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enacted policy changes that moved to suppress family immigration, one of the biggest threats to
their envisioned system whose admission of new immigrants was, as one scholar puts it, “premised
on its economic utility.”27 This suppression was aided with the introduction of a Super Visa
program which admitted parents and grandparents of Canadian citizens only as long-term visitors
for the foreseeable future, limiting family members to visitor status if they could not prove to be
strong economic producers. Under the Super Visa, parents and grandparents had to re-apply every
two years, with a ten-year cap, to stay in Canada as long-term visitors. The introduction of
temporary policy by Harper Conservatives into a previously permanence-based system
demonstrates a greater effort to welcome only those immigrants who were able, willing, and
expecting to support Canada economically. This shift is also evident given the fact that the Harper
government lowered the age maximum from 22 to 19 for children eligible for family sponsorship,
thus limiting possibilities for family reunification admission at the upper and lower ends of the age
spectrum.28
Finally, there is evidence of Harper’s regime steering immigrant application decisions from
government workers to employers themselves, reflecting a clear increased valuation of immigrants
who come for employment-based reasons. As Harper’s second Immigration Minister Jason
Kenney said in a statement that bluntly expresses the Harper understanding of immigrant
admissions, “[e]mployers are going to do a much better job at selection than a passive
bureaucracy.”29 Harper’s government rapidly expanded the scale of the Provincial Nominee
Program (PNP), which allows Canadian provinces to request immigrants in a certain industry if
they fill a specific, employment-based need in the province. Fewer than five thousand immigrants
had been admitted under the PNP in each year from 2000 to 2005, but these figures shot up to
33,000 per year, a 550% increase, during Harper’s time in office.30
To understand the size of the effects brought on by these changes, in 2005, one year before
Harper took office, Canada admitted 140,000 economic immigrants and 110,000 other immigrants.
In 2014, Harper’s final full year in office, 165,000 economic immigrants and 92,000 other
immigrants were admitted – an increase of only 7,000 total immigrants, but a proportional shift
from 56% economic to 64% economic.31 Furthermore, in this same time period the number of
International Mobility Programs work permit holders in Canada increased more than threefold,
from 74,000 to 257,000.32
It may seem logical to assume, especially given the theoretical groundings provided by
Howard and Janoski about the effects of the political party on immigrant and citizenship
liberalization, that these human-capitalization changes observed by Ellermann can be explained
by the fact that a conservative politician was in power. However, it is necessary also to understand
the institutional frameworks of multi-party policy agreement and non-parliamentary policymaking
strategies that facilitated the changes enacted by Harper. To illustrate the insufficiency of party
ideology in explaining Canada’s shifting logic, I turn now to discuss the power of Liberal
cooperation.
Liberals: The Influence of Two-Party Cooperation and Collaboration
Though many of the policies that moved Canadian citizenship law in the direction of
human-capital valuations were passed while Harper and his Conservative government were in
power, Conservatives were not the only group who facilitated these policy changes. The Liberals,
Canada’s other major political party, actively supported or were complacent to many of the Harper
Conservatives’ policies and also bore some of the responsibility for providing the economic
admissions precedent that Conservatives expanded on. This means that it was not simply
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Conservative political party members’ ideologies that can be used to explain Canada’s shift
towards human-capital citizenship, but the consent and shared policy goals and ideologies of the
Liberal party. Although Liberals and Conservatives in Canada are opposed to one another in many
spheres, little compromise was required, among such high levels of agreement in immigration
logic.
Facilitated by a Liberal Prime Minister in 1995, the Provincial Nominee Program was
established. The program allows provinces to place requests for employment-based immigrants in
a specific relevant industry.33 Not only does this establishment reflect the goal in Canada of
increasing economic immigrant admissions, but it also demonstrates the role Liberals played in
giving employers more admission decision power than government workers. Moreover, at the end
of the 20th century, with Liberals still in power and before the formation of the current Canadian
Conservative party, provinces fought for, and were granted, the right to develop their own more
targeted criteria for their provinces’ PNPs specifically – evidence of not just the passive allowance,
but the active commitment, on the part of Liberals to human-capitalize Canadian citizenship.34
Under that same Liberal Prime Minister in 1998, Citizenship and Immigration Canada’s
multiculturalism budget was cut in half. This budget supports action items such as anti-racist
education, investing money in programs that welcome new humanitarian or family refugees and
immigrants, and other work that would indicate the opposite of a human-capital agenda. These
changes were not necessarily passed with the goal of shifting towards a human-capital logic of
admissions, but they nonetheless provide an evidentiary basis for the fact that Liberals themselves
passed policies that carved a more difficult path for non-economic immigrants toward integration.
This action helped set the precedent for Harper’s government to assume support from the “rival”
Liberals across the aisle.
In 2001, a new Immigrant and Refugee Act was passed to justify the current immigration
law paradigm, given that the most recent act of similar stature had come 25 years prior in 1976.
There was multi-party support for the 2001 Act, despite the fact that the Immigration Minister who
introduced it in the House of Commons was Liberal Elinor Caplan. Caplan said at the time, “The
new century will belong to those who are best able to develop and expand their collective human
capital… If Canada is to compete and succeed, we must continue to attract skilled workers from
across the globe.” This direct value statement of human-capital citizenship from a Liberal
Immigration Minister counters my hypothesis that Conservative politicians’ ideologies are
responsible for human-capitalizing Canadian citizenship law, given that nearly identical ideologies
were introduced before the modern Conservative party had even been formed.35 This statement
also counters the idea that it was Conservative action combined with Liberal permission that pulled
Canada’s immigrant admissions in an economic direction. Though there was not as much humancapitalizing action taken explicitly by Liberals following Harper’s election in 2006, the events
outlined above show how Harper inherited an admissions logic that, thanks to Liberals, was
already moving in a more economic direction.
Not only is the Liberal government’s introduction of the shift towards human-capital logic
in the 2001 Bill salient, but the lack of opposition for the Bill from other parties is worth noting.
Ellermann argues that paradigmatic changes, like the shift from a family-centered to an
economically-focused national understanding of immigration in Canada, are often accompanied
by serious political contestation. However, such contestation was not present at any level in
Canada. Left-leaning Liberals and Progressive Conservatives adopted the 2001 Bill with
enthusiasm and the right-leaning Canadian Alliance, a primary predecessor of the Conservatives,
met the Bill with no real resistance. Furthermore, though they did not enthusiastically endorse the
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Bill in 2001, members of the Canadian Alliance expressed goals similar to those of Liberals: to
limit family and humanitarian immigration.36
In the previously mentioned 2008 Amendment to the 2001 Act, Conservatives spearheaded
the categorization of Canadian immigrants by class and placing increased priority on fast-tracking
the applications of those coming for economic reasons. However, in the process of voting on this
amendment, most Liberals either abstained or voted with the Conservatives. Despite potentially
having the power to stop this Conservative immigration move, depending on how smaller parties
had cast their votes, the Liberals did not lead a movement to do so. A member of one of these
smaller third parties, the Bloc Quebecois, accused the Liberals of their complicity in the process,
saying “I find it a bit sad to see the Conservatives profiting from the fact that the Liberals don't
really want to show their true colours -- that they’re not ready to defeat the government.”37
A common theme begins to emerge, as research shows that many changes initially
prompted under the government of one party actually appear to be much more bilaterally supported
than may be expected given a party’s known ideology. Multi-party support was influential again
in Harper’s final year in office, 2015, as a revamping of the Canadian points system was suggested.
The points system is one of the crudest examples of human-capital citizenship, as it numerically
evaluates applicants based on their employment prospects, education, and language skills. The
Government of Canada’s website suggests in plain terms that rejected applicants “may be able to
get a higher score by… completing another degree.”38 In 2015, a restructuring of the system made
it so that anyone with a job offer would earn more points than anyone without, regardless of family,
humanitarian, linguistic, or any other factors. Given typical thought on conservative immigration
ideologies, and assumptions surrounding the human-capital-driven motives of the Harper
Conservatives in particular, this policy may seem to support the hypothesis that the changes
Ellermann observes are because of party power. However, further research reveals that there was
“bipartisan agreement that the points system was in need of reform.”39 This was largely due to
employer complaints about trouble finding sufficient labor, and demonstrates how Conservatives
and Liberals responded uniformly, even following nine years of Harper Conservatives’ reign, on
matters of immigration.
This uniformity of Canadian immigration values has outlived Harper’s years as Prime
Minister. Research finds that, from 2016 to 2020, the percentage of Canadians who think refugees
should be the most highly prioritized immigrant category plummeted from 35% to 22%. This could
of course be for a variety of other reasons, including worldwide refugee crises, the Coronavirus
pandemic, or statements made by Harper’s successor, Liberal Justin Trudeau. Whatever the
reason(s), however, the findings suggest a more pro-economic immigrant attitude in Canada that
transcends Harper’s government as well as party lines, refuting the hypothesis presented in this
paper that the changes Ellermann observed in Canada were because of the power of one party. The
research also draws into question Howard and Janoski’s theories, given that neither the presence
of a social democratic left nor a far-right, which Howard and Janoski implicate in immigration
policy de-liberalization, pushed Canada in a human-capital direction.
Streamlining: The Expansion and Reliance on the Power of the Executive Branch
One final causal factor contributing to the shift to human capital immigration policy is the
precedent of deferring to ministerial executive power (here, the Prime Minister and/or Immigration
Minister) and their aims and voting patterns, without putting policy up to vote or debate in the
legislative branch. This practice was brought to new levels during Harper’s regime, as the political
ideologies of certain actors came to be less influential than the strategies used by those actors to
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enact policy they wanted to see. Findings on the furthering of ministerial executive power
complicate Howard and Janoski’s theories. Howard explains the presence of the far right as a
limiting factor in citizenship law liberalization, while Janoski understands the presence of leftist
parties to have the opposite effect. When ministerial executive power is considered, however, the
perspective widens to highlight the significance of enactment methodologies in addition to party
ideologies. These methodologies were introduced to Canada under the rule of Harper
Conservatives, meaning potential links could reasonably be made between conservative ideology
and streamlined policymaking, but the salient point here is that political party power as a
freestanding ideological variable is not sufficient to explain Canada’s policy shifts. Newfound
methods of policymaking are a separate and significant variable entirely.
In 2008, the Canadian government passed amendments to a 2001 Immigration Act that
allowed federal lawmakers to make changes to the categories of immigrants who would be
prioritized, giving the Immigration Minister the authority to make these decisions without
consulting Parliament. This change was not only influential in the arena of immigrant admissions,
as has been previously discussed, but was a watershed moment for Canadian immigration policy
administration as well, laying the groundwork for a system that has increasingly been controlled
much more at the executive level than the legislative. The change endowed immigration officials
with decision-making freedom that nearly dashed any hopes of parliamentary resistance to
executive powers’ immigration goals, as later evidence will show.
It is important, however, to recognize the wider context within which these amendments
were passed. Though they were indeed passed without Liberal pushback, indicating a possible link
to the aforementioned variable of Liberal cooperation, evidence shows that it was the methodology
of the passing of these key amendments that explains the lack of Liberal resistance. Pushed through
in an omnibus bill about the more menial topic of budget implementation, the amendments that
first enhanced ministerial power were passed because the bill needed to pass in order to structure
Canada’s budget for the coming year. Thus, the bill separating parliamentary debate from the field
of immigration was itself passed without parliamentary input, establishing a precedent for the years
to come.40
The initial use of this omnibus bill to alter political protocol established a trend of
Conservatives sneaking larger points of immigration legislation into bills that had to be passed for
reasons of bureaucratic maintenance. Indeed, policymaking came to be conducted frequently in
ways that made the road to public and/or parliamentary discussion or resistance more
challenging.41 For instance, when Harper’s Immigration Minister Jason Kenney was in charge of
Canadian citizenship and immigration, his office did not issue statements about their
comprehensive immigration goals and did not hold public or parliamentary forums.42 Kenney and
Harper were able to build a structure so protected from Parliament that one expert claimed it was
common “for immigration practitioners to jokingly refer to the Immigration and Refugee
Protection Act as the ‘Jason Kenney Immigration and Refugee Protection Act.’”43
In 2008, a formal Ministerial Instruction was passed that limited skilled worker immigrant
applications to those only with an arranged offer of employment in specific, high-skill
occupations.44 This change meant that even the most highly-educated and employable applicants
would be barred from entry without a job in a pre-approved field. In 2010, Minister Kenney took
this policy further, putting forth a more narrowly refined list of acceptable occupations and cutting
in half the number of these permits available. He cut this number in half again a year later.45 In
addition to the formal use of ministerial power, additional workarounds were used in order to limit
the chance of parliamentary debate over immigration policy. For example, the Department of
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Immigration often produced annual immigration statistics on the last day of a session of
parliament, leaving no time for debate.46
The changes listed above have multiple implications for understanding human-capital
citizenship and the theories put forth by Howard and Janoski. The enhancement of ministerial
executive power in Canada as a means to human-capitalize challenges the theory initially presented
in this paper, as human-capital citizenship policy can clearly be implemented outside of party lines,
and may depend more on two-party cooperation or simply the means that exist in a country for
laws and executive orders to be passed. It may be true that Canadian immigration policy required
the presence of the further-right Harper in order to introduce these human-capitalizing changes,
but enough evidence of multiple alternative factors exists to disprove my initial theory as the only
salient explanatory variable.
These findings also indicate that Howard’s theory that the presence of a stronger far-right
party will lead to less liberal immigration policy does not hold. At least in Canada, enough causal
links exist between Liberal-Conservative cooperation and ministerial executive power to disprove
the idea of the far-right as an impetus for de-liberalization. The right, in addition to the left and the
Immigration Minister, all enacted restrictive citizenship policies that placed Canada firmly in the
human-capital camp.
Janoski’s theory is based more on the effects of right party power on naturalization rates,
while this paper looked at types, rather than quantity, of naturalized immigrants as a measure of
Conservative influence. Nonetheless, Janoski’s findings discuss liberal party power as fostering
liberal immigration logic. This paper conceptualizes liberal and conservative logic as family versus
economic immigrant admissions, rather than Janoski’s more-versus-fewer idea of immigrant
admissions. Janoski, however, still makes an argument centered around political party power as
the explanation for a shift in immigration systems. This paper refutes this theory by suggesting
that a combination of party influence, multi-party support, and ministerial power has aided
Canada’s shift towards human-capital logic. These refutations are not to say that party power plays
no role, but they do indicate that Howard and Janoski overstate, in the case of Canada, the extent
to which immigrant admission policy changes can be attributed to political parties.
If Howard’s theory held true against Ellermann’s observations in the case of Canada, the
influence of the far-right would have been observed as a stronger factor in the shifting of
admissions logic. Though multiple human-capitalizing changes were enacted under the presence
of the right-wing Conservatives, it would be remiss to consider party power as the strong factor
that Howard posits it to be. Conservative ideologies may have prompted Harper’s government to
enact these changes, but the changes could only be actualized either with the support of Liberals
or, when unable to acquire Liberal support, through the sphere of executive power.
In applying Janoski’s theory to the changes Ellermann notices, we would expect to see a
Conservative-led push towards an economic frame of immigrant admissions, given the absence of
a social democratic party that Janoski associates with more humanitarian-based admissions logic.
However, similar to the application of Howard’s theory, party alone does not paint a full picture
of the changes Canada made, even under the Harper Conservatives. The lack of a legacy of social
democratic parties in Canada may have made the Harper government more optimistic about their
ability to push immigration in an economic direction, but the help it received from Liberals’ shared
goals, as well as strategic policymaking through executive pathways, is important to recognize in
gaining a full understanding of Canada’s policy shift.
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IV. Conclusion
Given the recent shift in Canadian immigration policy towards an economic logic of
admissions, Ellermann observed and classified these changes as moving Canada in the direction
of human-capital citizenship, defined as the valuation of potential immigrants according to their
ability to be economic producers. In order to better understand the reasons for these changes, I
asked the question, “Why has Canada adopted the citizenship policy changes that Ellerman says it
has?” Grounded in the theories posited by Howard and Janoski, and given the common logic about
conservative parties’ approach to immigrant admissions, I hypothesized that the ideologies of the
conservative political party in power can explain the shift towards human-capital citizenship that
Ellermann observes.
At first glance, Prime Minister Harper and the ideologies of his Conservative party are
evidence of the further-reaching effects of the human-capitalization of citizenship laws that a
highly conservative Prime Minister can have. Many of the policies that pulled Canadian citizenship
most extremely in a human-capital direction were during Harper’s nine-year reign, and from this
fact assumptions can be made that these changes were solely, or mostly, his or his party’s doing.
And, to some extent, findings indicate that party ideologies in Canada did influence agenda setting
and mechanisms that parties can use to pass their policies. However, stronger evidence of other
factors is available which shows the ways in which Harper Conservatives’ policies passed.
Ultimately, my hypothesis, along with Howard and Janoski’s theories, is refuted. Party
power certainly played a role in deciding which policies Harper and his Conservatives would
pursue in terms of immigration, but we see stronger evidence that policy goals shared by Liberals,
as well as strategic expansion of ministerial power and strategic workarounds to avoid
parliamentary discussion processes, go a long way toward explaining Canada’s changes. Further
evidence against my hypothesis, and against Howard and Jansoki’s theories, is provided by the
fact that the Canadian Liberal party initially enacted many of the laws that Conservatives then
expanded on in their human-capitalizing changes; this expansion was often done with either the
support or lack of resistance from Liberals.
These findings prompt broader questions about the actual influence of political parties on
immigration policies. Harper and the Conservatives undoubtedly pushed for many of the humancapitalizing policies in Canada, but future research should examine a wider range of factors before
positing that political party pressure (from the left or the right) explains changes in immigration or
citizenship logic. More critical investigations should be done on confounding factors, such as
multi-party agreement or the use of non-legislative policymaking avenues, before making claims
about the actual observable effects that any one political party can have.
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Identifying Potential Pork-Barrel Legislation Using Machine
Learning: A Preliminary Analysis
SUNIL GREEN
Purdue University
ABSTRACT: Pork-barrel legislation has been criticized by some as an excessive and potentially
corrupt use of Congressional appropriations. The task of finding the specific parts of legislation
that have been “pork-barreled”, however, requires many hours of labor by policy researchers.
Using data from government watchdogs and machine learning algorithms, the research explores
the idea of creating a model to flag specific line items of appropriations bills for policy researchers
to further explore as potential pork-barrel legislation. The model constructed uses data from the
Earmark Database by Taxpayers for Common Sense, and the Congressional Pig Book by Citizens
Against Government Waste to attempt to identify line items in appropriations bills as either
“potential pork” or “not potential pork”. Criteria for the model are based upon Citizens Against
Government Waste’s seven criteria for pork-barrel legislation as well as their identification of
egregious examples of pork-barrel projects. The research focuses on the fiscal years of 2008-2010
when Congressional rules required the disclosure of earmarks. The first prototype of a machine
learning model was trained on fiscal year 2008 data and showed limited effectiveness at
differentiating pork and non-pork in the 2008 Consolidated Appropriations Act.
Introduction: Defining “Pork-barrel” and “Earmark”
Pork-barrel legislation is a phenomenon in political science that has been fairly well
1,2
studied . The specific term, “pork-barrel” has a dark history, and arose by comparing the way
slaves rushed towards salted pork with how members of Congress rushed to secure federal funding
for projects for their constituencies3. This hyper-localized appropriations legislation is often
viewed as corrupt, has a long history in American discourse, and has drawn the ire of many
politicians over time. Similarly, the term “earmark” often has been used synonymously in much
political science literature, and American political discourse with “pork-barrel” to refer to
potentially corrupt hyper-local appropriations.4
Despite a fair amount of research on pork-barrel politics, and despite the existence of
multiple watchdog groups who criticize the earmarking process, there is some disagreement as to
what each term means. Both terms have been used in the literature and discourse rather loosely.
Of the many groups and institutions that research government spending or provide data about it,
three bodies largely influenced this research’s definition of “earmark” and “pork-barrel”. The
government watchdog and nonprofit Citizens Against Government Waste (CAGW) commonly
uses both terms synonymously and provides their definition of what is an earmark or pork-barrel
project in many of their reports as well as on their website.5 CAGW identified seven criteria that it
believes describe a “pork-barrel project” (or any earmark in their view), of which only 1 is needed
for it to be classified as so:
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•
•
•
•
•
•
•

Requested by only one chamber of Congress;
Not specifically authorized;
Not competitively awarded;
Not requested by the President;
Greatly exceeds the President’s budget request or the previous year’s funding;
Not the subject of congressional hearings;
Serves only a local or special interest

While CAGW may use both terms interchangeably, CAGW’s Director of Research, Sean
Kennedy, was quoted as making some small but important distinctions regarding pork-barrel
spending. In an article for FiscalNote, Kennedy was reported as saying, “Pork barrel spending is
in the eye of the beholder, but it can really be any spending that’s added in order to win votes.”6
The discrepancies between the CAGW’s official definition of both pork-barrel and earmark and
Mr. Kennedy’s quote are very important. Whereas pork-barrel projects carry with them the
connotation that they are used for the purpose of winning votes, every earmark in a piece of
legislation may not have been added explicitly for the main purpose of winning a vote.
Operationally then, “pork-barrel” and “earmark” should not automatically be treated as synonyms.
Furthermore, according to Kennedy pork-barrel is a broad “nebulous” term7. As such, it has been
used differently by different people and organizations.
Taxpayers for Common Sense (TCS), another nonprofit government watchdog, provides
different definitions and a clearer distinction between what it believes constitutes pork and an
earmark. TCS, like CAGW, advocates for the abolishment of earmarks and criticizes how the
process used to fund an earmark is not as competitive as the processes federal or state agencies use
to award a project. In an article explaining earmarks and the earmarking process, however, the
group distinguishes what it believes constitutes pork from an earmark. TCS writes that:
An earmark is not necessarily pork. The term ‘pork’ is often applied to government
spending, especially spending done by way of earmarking. But ‘pork’ is a loaded term,
associated with waste, fraud, or abuse. Many representatives bristle at the notion that their
earmarks are pork, pointing out how their earmarks fund roads, support schools, or create
jobs.
The article further elaborates, explicitly stating, “Anything that meets our definition of an earmark
is included as an earmark in our databases. Our databases do not separate earmarks for ‘good’
projects from earmarks for ‘bad’ projects.”8 What separates a “good” project from a “bad” project
is the focus of this research. Taking into consideration the implications of the term “pork-barrel”
as being wasteful and corrupt, this research classifies instances of “pork-barrel” as those projects
that TCS classifies as “bad.” Because of the increased specificity of their definition, this research
adopts the TCS standards for separating pork from an earmark.
Research Question
The goal of this research project is to use machine learning to build a model that identifies
earmarked projects that are blatant examples of pork. According to CAGW, nearly all pork-barrel
projects are specified in the appropriations bills (or Omnibus spending bills depending on the year)
created during the budgeting process.9 It is important to note that some studies have looked at
earmark line items in other bills.10 Even with an overbroad definition of pork, however, it is clear
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that the focus should be on the earmark data, and not the text of the bill itself. Simply put, the
nature and characteristics of an earmark determine whether a given provision is or is not pork.
Additionally, a specific change in congressional rules made a focus on earmarks even more
analytically compelling. In fiscal years 2008-2010, Congress passed earmark disclosure rules that
allowed for large amounts of data to be collected regarding earmarks. In 2011, earmarks were
banned via an “earmark moratorium” imposed by the Republican leadership at the time.11 Of
significant note is that in 2021 the earmark moratorium in Congress was lifted12. Given the large
amount of potential data available and the unique nature of pork as hyper-local legislation with
specific characteristics, the topic lent itself to be explored as a classification problem in machine
learning. Accordingly, I ask “to what extent can the identification of pork-barrel legislation be
automated, and how?” It is important to note that this research makes no normative claims as to
the purported evils of pork-barrel projects compared to other earmarks. It simply aims to build a
classifier that can help distinguish between the two.
Significance of Analysis and Tentative Explanations
While the pork-barrel legislation phenomenon has been documented by researchers
13,14,15
before,
only one other paper could be found that tried to use machine learning to study
earmarks and pork16. Most research regarding pork has used conventional social science research
methods rather than data science approaches. Many studies in the field, including the one that built
its own machine learning model, have also viewed pork as largely synonymous with the term
earmark. As noted above, the current research adopts the more specific TCS definitions of pork
and earmark in the construction of its classifier, thereby reducing the likelihood of false positives
resulting from automatically equating all earmarks as instances of pork.
There are at least two reasons why machine learning classifiers and the combination of
technology and social science research is limited for this topic. First, the fields of machine learning
and data science are themselves new and emerging. Consequently, many social science researchers
are not yet fully trained in data science methodologies. The potential for research combining these
fields remains high, as there exist many other problems that could use classifiers or other machine
learning algorithms to help advance research on the topic. Second, although the research problem
is ripe for the application of a machine learning approach, the fact is that data on the subject are
not standardized, hard to find, and oftentimes inconsistent. These data limitations will be discussed
in greater detail below.
Literature Review
Research on pork-barrel projects has been consistently pursued in political science over the
past few decades, with studies dating back as early as 1979 and continuing to the present day.17,18
Much of the research itself focuses on either the history of pork-barrel politics or on the application
of pork-barrel politics to other theories in political science. A 2007 paper on pork includes an indepth study on earmarks found in the 2005 highway bill and its relation to theories about legislative
malapportionment.19 The research asserts that smaller states are overrepresented in the Senate and
therefore receive more pork in Senate versions of bills as opposed to House versions. A Cambridge
study published in 2018 provides an in-depth overview of the presence of pork-barrel politics in
American history and analyzes data regarding early local congressional projects20.
There is also disagreement in the literature as to whether pork-barrel projects have the
effect that they are thought to have. One notable paper broke with the body of research in the field
by showing statistically significant results that bringing home pork increased a Congress member’s
vote share.21 Many earlier papers lacked evidence for this idea. The effectiveness of “pork” for
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members of Congress is therefore thought to be somewhat unclear. Regardless, evidence suggests
that members of Congress do actively seek out federal funding for hyper-local projects in the hopes
of securing their re-election.22
Other researchers have used machine learning classifiers and models to solve problems
found in the field of political science. Taiwanese researchers used machine learning models to
classify the large amounts of documents from The Parliamentary Library of Taiwan’s Legislative
Yuan.23,24 The scope of the problem those researchers faced was far greater than that in this
research. Much of the data used in their models had more than two categories. Thankfully, porkbarrel legislation is a simple binary classification problem with categorical independent variables
and a discrete binary dependent variable.
The most similar research on this topic emerged from a group called Data Science for
Social Good. Researchers working in a Carnegie Mellon fellowship were able to identify earmarks
using text analysis methods and data from the Office of Management and Budget.25 They then ran
analysis on the characteristics of the earmarks and were able to achieve some success in doing so.
Like others who have studied this topic, however, they viewed earmarks and pork as synonymous
or nearly synonymous. The current paper uses both different data and a different set of definitions
regarding “pork-barrel” and “earmark.”
The current state of knowledge regarding the automation of the identification of
specifically pork-barrel legislation is virtually nonexistent. While research has been done on the
pork-barrel as a political phenomenon, and while some analysis has been conducted on earmarks,
no research could be found that uses a machine learning model to separate pork from other
earmarks. A number of reasons are likely to blame for this lack of research, including the
specificity of the problem, the lack of clear standardized definitions for this issue, and the infancy
of the application of data science to the field of political science.
Quantitative Analysis
As noted above, the objective of this analysis is to use machine learning to construct a
classifier to identify pork from data describing a set of earmarks. More specifically, an earmark’s
state and specific appropriations bill were used in constructing a model that attempts to separate
earmarks from pork. The Classification and Regression Trees algorithm (CART) was chosen to
build the classifier model. It uses a measure called the Gini impurity to try to differentiate between
positive samples and negative samples.26 It was hypothesized that using an earmark’s state and
appropriations bill would be able to improve the CART algorithm’s classification accuracy.
Data
The earmark disclosure rules that were implemented in Congress from fiscal years 20082010 provided watchdogs and researchers with special conditions upon which much data on
earmarks could be collected. Members of Congress were required to disclose details regarding any
“Congressionally directed spending project” (earmarks) that they requested to be added to the
appropriations bills.27 As such, data from this time are excellent for the study of the history and
use of earmarks in American politics.
Two main sources were used in the collection of data to train and test a machine learning
algorithm. CAGW’s yearly Pig Book Summary details the earmarks–which they view as
synonymous with pork–that they find in each year's budget and spending bills.28 The book
summarizes what they view as the most blatant examples of pork and compares these data to
previous years. The projects explicitly mentioned in the Pig Book do not constitute all projects that
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members of Congress were required to disclose. Rather, the projects constitute a subsection of
earmarks that CAGW views as “the most egregious and blatant examples of pork.” The current
project derives its data from the 2008 Pig Book Summary and TCS’s comprehensive earmark
database for 2008.28, 29 That 2008 was the first year that comprehensive earmark data were made
available makes it a logical starting point for the analysis; furthermore, additional research will
examine the next few years.
Data Collection
Data from the 2008 Congressional Pig Book Summary were not available for automated
electronic entry. Consequently, a manual data coding process was used. Each item mentioned in
the 2008 Congressional Pig Book Summary was subsequently searched for in the 2008 TCS
dataset. If it was found, it was labeled as a positive pork sample. The criteria for identifying a
positive pork sample were as follows:
1. A project that matches the bill section, contains keywords in the description, and has one
earmark that matches the dollar amount (or is within 2% of the total cost)
or
2. A project that matches the bill section, contains keywords in the description, and has
multiple earmarks that when summed together match the dollar amount (or is within 2%
of the total cost)
Note: All earmarks associated with the project are added to the positive pork data, a
sample may pick out a specific earmark from that project
It is important to note that in the data collection process, a few notable observations and
exceptions were made. First, each project mentioned in the CAGW data did not always correspond
to exactly one data point in the TCS data, and some CAGW projects contained many TCS
earmarks. Furthermore, some groups of rows of earmarks in the TCS data corresponded to one
singular project, regardless of whether CAGW identified that project as positive pork. CAGW
claimed that 1,188 projects out of the 11,146 projects they identified as being disclosed were
included as blatant examples of pork. By manually counting the number of projects detailed in the
Pig Book’s paragraphs for each appropriation bill, a total of 1229 projects were found to have been
mentioned by CAWG as being blatant pork, contradicting the number they reported.
Projects were separated by each congressional member with approximately one paragraph
per member of Congress. CAGW only mentioned a select few of each member’s projects, further
complicating and reducing the number of positively labeled pork projects. CAGW did not provide
the original full data, which would have aided greatly in the collection of training data needed to
build the CART decision tree model.
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Example data that had to be manually copied from CAGW’s 2008 Pig Book Summary

In total, only 420 line items in the TCS dataset could be matched with all the projects
described in the 2008 Congressional Pig Book Summary. All other items in the TCS dataset were
regarded as not being positively labeled pork. It bears noting that inconsistencies in the data could
potentially weaken the model’s accuracy and ability to generalize.
Sampling
A stratified random sampling approach was used to find training data for the model, with
the strata being each type of appropriation bill. The number of projects CAGW claimed to find in
each bill was used in a ratio with the percent of total earmarks per bill found in the TCS data. A
sample size of n=30 was used, and bills that contained very small ratios of pork to earmarks were
rounded up so that at least one data point could be included in the model.
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Table 1: Pork-Barrel Projects Distribution Across 2008 Appropriations Bills

Bill

# of Pork-Barrel
Projects Found in
CAGW Data

% of Total Earmarked
Projects Found in TCS
Data

Number of
Samples for
n=30

Rounded Ip (to
include all
types of bills)

Ag-Rural Development-FDA

123

10.01

3.00

4

Commerce, Justice & Science

171

13.91

4.17

5

Defense

234

19.04

5.71

6

Energy & Water

147

11.96

3.59

4

Financial Services

7

0.57

0.17

1

Homeland Security

98

7.97

2.39

3

Interior

70

5.70

1.71

2

Labor-HHS-Education

260

21.16

6.35

7

Legislative Branch

2

0.16

0.049

1

Military Construction

10

0.81

0.24

1

State-Foreign Ops

3

0.24

0.07

1

Transportation and Housing &
Urban Development

104

8.46

2.54

3

Note: Numbers rounded to 2 decimals places.

Data Cleaning
Many challenges were also faced in cleaning the data to prepare it for the training of a
machine learning model. Due to a breakdown in the pipeline that cleaned the data and then sampled
it randomly for the machine learning model to be trained, the positive pork data and TCS earmark
data had to be manually merged. After the complete dataset was merged, the categorical data had
to be encoded such that CART could run on it. To do so, each possible value for each column was
broken out into a separate column and coded as 0 or 1 depending on whether a row contained that
value. This also had to be done somewhat manually, as the data pipeline for cleaning and sampling
data was not fully functional.
Operationalization of Variables and Creation of the First Model
Had there not been a breakdown of the original data pipeline, more than two independent
variables (state and appropriations bill) would have been used in the creation of a preliminary
model. They were the state that the earmark was from and the specific appropriations bill to which
it belonged. The dependent variable used in the model was whether or not CAGW classified the
earmark and its data as pork (1 = yes).
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The first decision tree produced by the CART algorithm
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While the selected independent variables were hypothesized to improve classification
accuracy, as data was collected it was also hypothesized that the specific appropriation bill would
be the largest indicator used by the model to classify an earmark as pork. This is because the ratios
of pork to earmark projects for bills such as Financial Services, Legislative Branch, Military
Construction and State-Foreign-ops were much smaller compared to the other types of bills.
Results and Discussion
The model itself surprisingly used Mississippi as its primary classifier of pork. This is
likely due to the large amount of pork from Senator Thad Cochran identified by CAGW.30 Testing
of the model on unclassified earmark data proved to be a difficult task. Like the creation of training
data, testing data had to also be manually sampled and created. Using a stratified random sample
of 30 rows that were not used for training, the model was able to predict 26 of the 30 samples
given. If the model were to predict every sample given as not being pork, it would have predicted
24 out of 30 samples correctly. Because the sample was stratified, only three of the data points
were positive pork, and the model correctly identified two of them. A much larger testing size is
needed in order to get an accurate estimate of the model’s accuracy. A baseline can also show that
high accuracy may not always result in a model that is effective. The results of the model’s ability
to classify pork suggest that states and appropriations bills may be useful in classifying earmarks,
but the model is otherwise inconclusive. Further work on the model is needed before any
conclusions can be drawn. It is of the utmost importance to obtain far larger amounts of training
data before the hypothesis can be definitively accepted or rejected.
Conclusions
With an inconclusive model being generated, the original hypothesis was not proven
correct. That being said, the process of undertaking this research produced other notable findings.
Notably, data regarding pork-barrel legislation remains scant and hard to analyze. More efforts in
analysis of the original legislation would aid greatly, as the data from CAGW was not easy to
analyze or use. Also of note was a lack of data available from multiple previous administrations’
Office of Management and Budget. The archived sites of the former Presidents did not have
downloadable data, which could’ve aided greatly in this research. A cause for concern would be
the lack of preservation of that important public policy data in a centralized source. The limited
research done in the past regarding automating the process of earmark analysis uses said data.
Future work on the model will focus on restoring a reliable and automated data pipeline to clean
and create large amounts of training and testing data. Without the full automation of this
component, the model is limited to analysis on only a few variables, and testing on only a small
dataset. This provided a model that was not a truly effective identifier of pork-barrel
appropriations.
Future research on the issue should also think carefully about the difference between the
terms pork-barrel and earmark and the different uses of those terms. Standardization of the
terminology in the field of political science would greatly benefit future scholars attempting to
study the budgeting processes, especially with the return of earmarks in the most recent Congress.
What makes pork-barrel legislation objectively bad is not clearly defined. Critiques levied on the
entire earmarking process itself by groups like CAGW are broad, and specific research on the
varying levels of how bad pork-barrel legislation is and its relation to the degree of effectiveness
for politicians should be considered. CAGW may also not be the best source to identify pork-barrel
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projects. They are one of only a few groups who study the issue in-depth, and they take a stance
that labels all government projects created through the earmarking process as pork. As such they
are inherently biased against all earmarks, which may not necessarily be “bad” pork. It should also
be noted that they are incredibly biased against government spending in general. Much of the work
in their “Pig Book'' focuses on name-calling politicians and critiquing all spending.
Future planned technical work on the project includes (upon restoration of the data
pipeline) the inclusion of more data sets. Should the OMB earmarking data be found, its inclusion
into either testing or training data will be considered. The OMB, as a component of the executive
branch, took a cynical stance on earmarks and their data may be valuable in identifying other porkbarrel projects (especially ones which they especially took issue with). Other years of TCS data
will likely be taken into consideration as well, especially if a classifying model for earmarks in the
current Congress is to be built. There are many ways in which data from other years may be used,
including but not limited to the use of a random forest algorithm, which would effectively be a
combination of decision trees.
For any researcher interested in this project, for which work is ongoing, the code base for
the project can be found is online.31 It is in the interest of the field of political science for technical
and non-technical scholars alike to collaborate on open source projects. Assistance could be used
in the identification of pork-barrel projects from FY 2009 and 2010, as well as in programming
the actual code itself. Collaboration is encouraged and the code will remain open source.

https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

142

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

Endnotes
1

Gordon, S. C., & Simpson, H. K. (2018). The birth of pork: Local appropriations in America’s first century.
American Political Science Review, 112(3), 564–579. https://doi.org/10.1017/s000305541800014x
2
Hauk, W. (2007). Small states, big pork. Quarterly Journal of Political Science, 2(1), 95–106.
https://doi.org/10.1561/100.00005048
3
Maxey, C. C. (1919). A little history of pork. National Municipal Review, 8(10), 691–705.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ncr.4110081006
4
Stowe, L. (2021, November 11). Earmark and pork barrel spending & why you should care. FiscalNote. Retrieved
February 16, 2022, from https://fiscalnote.com/blog/earmark-vs-pork-barrel-spending
5
Kennedy, S. (2021). (rep.). (T. A. Schatz, Ed.) 2021 Congressional Pig Book Summary. Citizens Against
Government Waste. Retrieved August 23, 2021, from https://www.cagw.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2021PigBook.pdf
6
See Note 4
7
See Note 4
8
Taxpayers for Common Sense. (2010, March 10). Earmarks and earmarking: Frequently asked questions.
Taxpayers for Common Sense. Retrieved January 22, 2022, from https://www.taxpayer.net/budget-appropriationstax/earmarks-and-earmarking-frequently-asked-questions/
9
Kennedy, S. (2015). (rep.). All About Pork: The History, Abuse, and Future of Earmarks. Citizens Against
Government Waste. Retrieved February 19, 2019, from
https://www.cagw.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2021PigBook.pdf
10
See note 2
11
See note 9
12
See note 4
13
See note 1
14
See note 9
15
Stratmann, T. (2013). The effects of earmarks on the likelihood of reelection. European Journal of Political
Economy, 32, 341–355. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2013.08.001
16
Heston, M., Khabsa, M., Vora, V., Wulczyn, E., & Walsh, J. (2014). Using Data For A More Transparent
Government. Data Science For Social Good. Retrieved February 14, 2022, from
https://www.dssgfellowship.org/2014/12/04/using-data-for-a-more-transparent-government/
17
Weingast, B. R. (1979). A Rational Choice Perspective on Congressional Norms. American Journal of Political
Science, 23(2), 245–262. https://doi.org/10.2307/2111001
18
See note 1
19
See note 2
20
See note 1
21
See note 15
22
See note 15
23
Lin, F, Hao, D., & Liao, D. (2016). Automatic content analysis of media framing by text mining techniques. 2016
49th Hawaii International Conference on System Sciences (HICSS). https://doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2016.348
24
Lin, F.., Chou, S.-Y., Liao, D., & Hao, D. (2015). Automatic content analysis of legislative documents by text
mining techniques. 48th Hawaii International Conference on System https://doi.org/10.1109/hicss.2015.263
25
See note 16
26
Singh, S., & Gupta, P. (2014). COMPARATIVE STUDY ID3, CART AND C4.5 DECISION TREE
ALGORITHM: A SURVEY. International Journal of Advanced Information Science and Technology, 27(27).
Retrieved February 22, 2022, from
https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.685.4929&rep=rep1&type=pdf.
27
See note 9
28
Williams, D. E., & Kennedy, S. (2008). (rep.). (T. A. Schatz, Ed.) 2008 Congressional Pig Book Summary.
Citizens Against Government Waste. Retrieved August 23, 2021, from
https://www.cagw.org/sites/default/files/pdf/2008_Pig_Book.pdf
29
Taxpayers for Common Sense. (2012). Earmark database. Taxpayers for Common Sense. Retrieved January 22,
2022, from https://www.taxpayer.net/budget-appropriations-tax/earmark-data/
30
See note 28
31
https://github.com/sunilgreen/pork

Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

143

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

The Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics, and World Affairs
Volume. I, Issue. IV, 144-160, July 2022

Econometric Analysis of the Relationship Between Domestic
Economic Growth and Levels of Inflow of Remittances in
Developing Countries
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ABSTRACT: The international global migration has produced an exponential growth of
remittances, which can be defined as the transfer of funds from one country to another. This study
will inspect the macroeconomic impact of remittance inflow on economic growth using panel
regression, covering the period from 1981 to 2020 and focusing on a sample of 152 countries, then
filtered by 4 geographical regions for additional analysis. Like many studies before, a consensus
about an overall effect of the flows on global level could not be reached from his study following
the analysis of the general sample. However, on a more specific regional analysis like this study
intended to provide, the results have given slightly clearer answers. Finding a positive significant
coefficient in the sample regression of the African nations pushes forward the claim of remittances
playing an important role for increasing the cap of savings and thus investment options in
developing nations. On the other hand, a negative significant coefficient for the Caribbean, Central,
and South American countries’ sample suggests support for the claim that higher remittance
inflows are probable reaction to, not an actual reason for, decreasing domestic output i.e., provides
support for their counter-cyclical nature.
Introduction
International economic development has been often specified as the global challenge to
alleviate massive poverty in the developing world and reduce disparities between the Global North
and Global South in terms of standards of living. Macroeconomic processes suggested to national
economies for this mission have often included establishment of foreign direct investments, private
capital inflows, trade liberalization, or receiving foreign aid packages. However, a globalization
of the national economies into a more connected international market is pointing to a newer, more
robust trend of realizing an intertwined economic development. This trend is based on the multidecade expansion of the freedom of movement for migrant and capital across the globe.
Defining the exact concept of remittance inflow among scholars has been a consequence
of using the only well-established method of generating macroeconomic data on the topic:
a
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analyzing data from international data aggregators such as the World Bank and International
Monetary Fund, which work depends on aggregating the often complex and diverse categories of
capital flows from the national balances of payments. As pointed out by Chami et al. (2008)1, the
usual balance of payments includes three categories that seem very similar to one another:
employee compensation, migrant transfers, and workers’ remittances. Employee compensation is
defined as funds that have come to the country recipient from seasonal labor only, an example
being seasonal agricultural workers. Migrant transfers, on the other hand, are reallocation of entire
funds of a current first, second, or third generation migrant to the country of origin due to change
of residency status. This is not necessarily associated with a willingness to send this capital to, for
example, family members, but more so to establish a residential life in their country of origin.
Finally, worker remittances are funds that are specifically sent to the county of origin by a migrant
that currently lives and works permanently in the host country. Many studies that have analyzed
the impact of the remittances have used either the sum of all three categories, or just a specific
combination of them. Chami et al.2 and Barajas (2009)3 point to a diversity in the data sets used
by every researcher. With the inclusion of every other category except the workers’ remittance,
the chance for ending up with different interpretations of the data is highly likely.
It should be also noted that the values for remittance inflows differ in transparency from
country to country. Informal channels of remittances are estimated to present a significant
proportion of unreported inflows, which reach families and probably influence the aggregate
demand in a society without a visible effect and acknowledgement of the transferred funds from
abroad. In these instances, macroeconomic studies lack an advantage over microeconomic surveys
that focus on interacting with families who are recipients of remittances4 (Clemens and McKenzie,
2018).
The international global migration has produced an exponential growth of remittances,
which can be defined as the transfer of funds from one country to another. Remittances have grown
due to the increasing labor migrant population’s ability to send surplus of funds from their current
country of residence and work to their homeland, often referred to as country receiver. The notable
fact in this global wave is that majority of these funds have been reallocated from high-income
countries to low-income ones, which practically could be defined as a reallocation of funds from
wealthier to poorer states. According to the World Bank Remittance Data, the total remittances
flow of 2019 reached an all-time high value of $689 billion5 (Financial Times, 2019), as $558
billion of these transactions ended up in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs)6 (The World
Bank, 2021). These inflows remained consistent even during 2020, a year of a global pandemic,
with $550 billion towards the low- and middle-income economies7 (The World Bank, 2021). The
last two annual values surpassed the total amount of foreign direct investment, private capital flow,
or foreign aid, all of which are still more popularized as the main methods of reducing global
disparities and promoting economic growth in the developing world. In relation to economic
development, numerous studies have found that remittances serve as a robust tool for boosting
domestic spending on essential needs such as nutrition, education, and other necessary life
standards, reducing poverty vulnerability, and acting much faster than any other capital flow due
to the agents’ own decision-making.
With the increasing levels of remittances across the globe, the new trend begs the questions:
could a continual massive increase of money transfers from the Global North to the Global South
be the development success that the globalized economy has aimed to achieve? Founded on
understanding the current academic consensus and disagreement on the topic of remittances, this
study will inspect the macroeconomic impact of remittance inflow on economic growth using
2
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panel regression, covering the period from 1981 to 2020 and focusing on a sample of 152 countries,
then filtered by 4 geographical regions for additional analysis.
First, this paper provides an overview on the definition of remittance inflows to narrow
down the available data, further analyzing proposed theoretical frameworks that include the impact
of remittances on Gross Domestic Product growth. The goal of establishing a relevant econometric
model continues with highlighting the adoption of control-variables needed for specifying the
effect of the inflows, as well as recognition of the endogenous nature of remittances and other
econometric challenges from the available data sets. The paper then proceeds in defining the
methodology and data used for the econometric analysis, followed by the model results.
Conclusion and further research suggestions are provided by the end of the paper.
Literature Review
Theoretical Frameworks Incorporating Macroeconomic Impact of Remittances
The impact of remittances on growth in a domestic economy has been hypothesized via
changes in multiple macroeconomic indicators. The idea to include remittances in the
macroeconomic model is built on the claim that remittances act as an additional savings inflow
account to households in the recipient countries. Families transition their savings account in
investment activities and thus accumulate capital that was not possible to be financed from the
household’s other income sources8 (Eggoh, Bangake, and Semedo, 2019). Furthermore, in the role
of savings accounts, remittance inflows could directly support the removal of numerous obstacles
for financing activities in the given country9 (Barajas, 2009). Remittances can also prevent output
volatility10 (Chami, Hakura, and Montiel, 2009) as they act as safety net for many consumers,
maintaining positive expectations in aggregate demand that would on its own condition indirectly
prevent fear of financial instability on macroeconomic level. Still, there has been an opposition
that this argument is an all-round assessment of impact of remittances on investment. Scholars
have argued that remittances indeed alleviate poverty and reduce the lack of consumption levels.
However, these effects have been argued to not have any direct links to increase of investment and
capital accumulation boost11 12 (Barajas, 2009; Sutradhar, 2020) as the ratio of marginal propensity
to consume is very high in the developing world.
On the impact on growth through labor force dynamics, remittances have again been seen
as polarizing factor of economic growth. On one hand, remittances have been hypothesized as a
substitute to earning labor income for some household members. If a recipient obtains funds that
are enough to satisfy their basic necessities for life or even more, some economists argue that these
individuals accept to trade their ability to gain more wealth to spending more time on leisure
activities13 (Barajas, 2009). On the other hand, using the previous argument centered around
lowering the opportunity cost for foregoing active participation in the labor force, many
economists indicate that remittance inflows support family youth in focusing longer time on
schooling14 15 16(Yang, 2008; Hanson and Woodruff, 2003; Cox and Ureta, 2003). The tendency
described could give rise to perhaps shorter lifespan of labor participation, but of a much more
highly skilled, highly productive labor force overall.
Another theoretically established concern for remittance inflows relates to their impact on
the trade dynamics established in a domestic economy. According to Clemens and McKenzie
(2018), there is a significant claim that the transactions occurring with the transfer of funds can
appreciate the value of the currency of the recipient country17. Eggoh, Bangake, and Semedo
further point out to reduction of the optimized total factor productivity and technological
3
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innovation that the country has invested for specialization in certain trade sectors18 (2019).
Finally, aside the different impacts explained, it must be noted that the flows and effects of
remittances have a very endogenous nature in the macroeconomic model of determining the
domestic output. The most apparent connection is perhaps the one relating the inflows to its source:
the migrant labor population of a country recipient. Funds arrive in the domestic economy from
abroad, from a portion of the domestic population that has decided willingly or forcefully to not
participate directly in the domestic economy by remaining in the country recipient. Therefore, the
same emigration that makes remitting possible for the households back home is in a way an
opportunity cost for the country recipient as the country cannot rely on that part of its total labor
force19 20 (Sutradhar, 2020; Clemens and McKenzie, 2018). The claim has been supported by
empirical evidence from panel data that suggest strong significant negative value for the
relationship between logs of GDP per capita and a certain annual level of remittances-to-GDP
ratio21 (Dujava and Kálovec, 2020). With this theoretical framework, one can easily conclude how
remittances magnitude of flow can be already easily defined and assumed to exist in the economic
model by referring to the net export of human capital that an economy undergoes, or in the way of
representing the mentioned opportunity cost of emigration of the labor force.
Overview of Past Econometric Study Results
A significant amount of the research done on the impact of remittances have used different
econometric techniques. Although rarer, cross-sectional data sets have been used by Abdih,
Chami, Dagher, and Montiel (2010) on a macroeconomic scale22, and more often on
microeconomic scale23 24 such as studies by Hanson and Woodruff (2003) and Cox and Ureta
(2003). Macroeconomic analyses have included even a time-series for a single case country25 like
the study by Javid et al. (2012). Still, a big portion of research has been completed by establishing
a cross-sectional panel data of numerous countries from different regions26 27 28 29 (Dujava and
Kálovec, 2020; Zghidi, Sghaier, and Abida, 2018; Williams 2018; Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz,
2009) or data sets from specific regions such as Latin American countries30 (Ekanayake and
Moslares, 2020), Sub-Saharan African countries31 (Olayungbo and Quadri, 2019), or Western
Balkans32 (Bajra, 2021).
Overview of Used Control Variables in Econometric Models
Consumption, savings, and investment levels throughout time periods have served as
insightful control variables of the econometric model in numerous studies. In economic theory,
these variables are regarded as one of the main potential channels of remittance’s exogenous
growth effect33 (Barajas, Chami, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel, 2009). Many scholars have
also established the development level of the financial system in a developing economy as an
essential variable for the inflows’ effect on output growth34 35 36 (Giuliano and Ruiz-Arranz, 2009;
Olayungbo and Quadri, 2019; Aggarwal, Demirgüç-Kunt, and Martínez Pería, 2011).
Another significant control variable to keep the remittances’ endogenous nature out of the
objective analysis is setting up the trade openness of the studied cases. Lueth and Ruiz-Arranz
(2006), Barajas, Chami, Fullenkamp, Gapen, and Montiel (2009), have argued that development
of bilateral remittance flows often follow the development of trade flows37 38. Often used variables
for this goal include the trade-to-GDP ratio39 40 41 (Olayungbo and Quadri 2019; Eggoh, Bangake,
and Semedo, 2019; Javid, Arif, and Qayyum, 2009), which represents the total exported and
imported goods and services as a share of GDP. Indicators such as Foreign Direct Investment and
Foreign Aid have been also added to econometric models in numerous studies as control variables,
4
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although many studies have confirmed their lack of correlation with remittances due to their higher
volatility and pro-cyclical nature compared to the flow of remittances42 43 44 (Dujava and Kálovec,
2020; Gammeltoft, 2002; Ratha, 2003).
Essential control variables in eliminating the bias in the regression for economic growth
are also the size of country’s economy, population, and migrant stock. A study needs to control
the values of one country’s specific geographic and demographic characteristics to level out the
field between economies with larger absolute numbers of work force, and consequently absolute
number of migrant stock abroad. Finally, remittance effect has been studied not only with control
variables that limit the remittances’ endogenous nature, but also with an addition of an interaction
effect. An example is the interaction between remittances’ impact and quality of institutions in a
country recipient 45 46 47 48 49 (Abdih et al., 2010; Tyburski, 2014; Zghidi, Sghaier, and Abida,
2018; Ebeke, 2013; Williams, 2018).
Data and Methodology
Analyzing the effects of remittances on economic growth should involve observing the
latest data trends, being inclusive to the questions of endogeneity, as well as differentiating the
specific impacts of remittances in different regions in the global economy. With these principal
objectives in mind, this study would inspect the macroeconomic impact of remittance inflow on
economic growth using panel regression, covering the period from 1981 to 2020 and focusing on
a sample of 152 countries, then filtered by 4 geographical regions for additional analysis. The
sample covering all 152 cases is referred as the general sample, while each regional sample is
noted under the names of the areas covered. Table 1 provides a sum description of the variables
used and their data sources.
Upon the collection of the complementary data, a robust merging process of the indicators
for each country followed in the software R. Combining existing data for all indicators meant also
organizing them in the specific longitudinal format to prepare the sample for direct panel data
recognition in software like STATA. Once imported in STATA, the dataset was declared as a
panel one, with the variable “ISO” (Country Code) being the identification component for the
countries i.e., defining every country as a unique group of observations, while the variable “year”
being recognized as the time period. Numerous nations have not provided specific data for the
variables for every year. The lack of the dependent variable !"#_!%&'(ℎ!" in some cases therefore
caused the general panel of the whole sample to be recognized as unbalanced, where those cases
for certain years were excluded.
Specification of Model, Variable Description, and Data Wrangling
With the specified research question, the following model establishes a function of
economic growth:
!"#_!%&'(ℎ!" = +0 + +1 %*+,((-./*_%-(,&!" + +2 (%-"*_012_%-(,&!" + +3 ,.3*4(+*.(_%-(*!"
+ +4 4-3,.!4_%-(*!" + +5 5",_%-(,&!" + +6 5,.-./,-6_"*3*6&#+*.(!"
+ +7 */&._5%**"&+!" + +8 -"+,.,4(%-(,&.!" + +9 +,!%-.(_4(&/8!" + .- + /-.
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Table 1: Variable Description and Data Sources
Dependent Variable

Description

Source

Annual percentage change rate of GDP (measured by PPP standards) by
country receiver, expressed as a percentage.

International Monetary Fund - World
Economic Outlook Database
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/w
eo-database/2021/April

Description

Source

%*+,((-./*_%-(,&!"

Annual Amount of Remittance Inflow to each country, expressed as a
percentage of annual GDP.

The World Bank - Migration and
Remittances Data
https://www.worldbank.org/en/topic/migratio
nremittancesdiasporaissues/brief/migrationremittances-data

(%-"*_012_%-(,&!"

Annual aggregate value of imports and exports divided by the gross domestic
product. Measure for trade openness of a country. Expressed as a percentage of
annual GDP.

International Monetary Fund - Direction of
Trade Statistics (DOTS)
https://data.imf.org/regular.aspx?key=610137
12

,.3*4(+*.(_%-(*!"

Annual ratio of total investment (the total value of the gross fixed capital
formation and changes in inventories and acquisitions less disposals of
valuables for a unit or sector) in current local currency to GDP in current local
currency, expressed as a percentage of annual GDP.
Annual ratio of gross national savings (gross disposable income less final
consumption expenditure and adjustment for pension funds) in current local
currency to GDP in current local currency, expressed as a percentage of annual
GDP.
Annual ratio of foreign direct investment net flows (change in assets minus the
change in liabilities in each country’s balance of payments, where net FDI
outflows are assets and net FDI inflows are liabilities) to GDP in current US
dollars. Expressed as a percentage of annual GDP. Positive values signify
greater quantities of inflows, while negative values signify greater quantities of
outflows.

International Monetary Fund - World
Economic Outlook Database
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/w
eo-database/2021/April

!"#_!%&'(ℎ!"

Explanatory
Variables

4-3,.!4_%-(*!"

5",_%-(,&!"

International Monetary Fund - World
Economic Outlook Database
https://www.imf.org/en/Publications/WEO/w
eo-database/2021/April
The World Bank Database
https://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BN.KLT
.DINV.CD
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!"#$#%"$&_()*)&+,-)#.!" Financial Development Index is defined by the IMF as “a combination of depth

)%+#_!/))(+-!"

$(-"#"0./$."+#!"

+,!%-.(_4(&/6!"

(size and liquidity of markets), access (ability of individuals and companies to
access financial services), and efficiency (ability of institutions to provide
financial services at low cost and with sustainable revenues, and the level of
activity of capital markets)” (IMF, 2016). Annually measured from 0 to 1, with
0 representing no financial development to 1 being highest financially
developed environment in country.
Economic Freedom Summary Index by Fraser Institute measures economic
freedom, ranking countries based on five areas—size of government, legal
structure and property rights, access to sound money, freedom to trade
internationally, regulation of credit, labor, and business. Measured from 1 to
10, value of 1 being least amount of freedom, while value of 10 signaling most
amount of freedom. Data between 1980 and 2000 is available only as
estimators of 5-year periods (data for 1980, 1985, 1990, 1995), while most
countries have annual data from 2000 onwards.
The Impartial Administration Index is part of IDEA’s Global State of
Democracy Indices, measuring absence of corruption fair public administration.
Annually measured from 0 to 1, with 0 representing no performance to 1 being
highest performance of democratic and responsible institutional frameworks in
a country.
Number (“stock”) of international emigrants by country, expressed in millions.
The data is presented only as estimates of 5-year periods, therefor only value
for 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005, 2010, 2015, and 2020.

7!

time-invariant error term

8!"

time-varying error term

i

International Monetary Fund – Financial
Development Index Database
https://data.imf.org/?sk=F8032E80-B36C43B1-AC26-493C5B1CD33B

Fraser Institute Database
https://www.fraserinstitute.org/economicfreedom/dataset?geozone=world&year=2019
&page=dataset&min-year=2&maxyear=0&filter=0

IDEA, Global State of Democracy Indices
https://www.idea.int/gsodindices/#/indices/world-maptable?attr=%5B%22A_04%22%5D

United Nations Population Division
https://www.un.org/development/desa/pd/con
tent/international-migrant-stock

country observed (1 - 153)
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Optimizing Robustness of Estimators
Initial panel regressions pointed to a significant decrease of observations included in the
results, namely due to the absence of data for many cases, specifically for the variables
!"#$_&'!!(#)!" and )*+',$-_.-#"/#$ . Although this first regression model would have been the
most comprehensive one, regressing for only handful of years of entire data due to the limit of the
above-mentioned variables does not provide the best insight for a panel data. Thus, the initial
model needed to be further edited by excluding the two challenging variables and thus creating the
following function:
+(0_+'#1-ℎ!" = "0 + "1 '!)*--,$"!_',-*#!" + "2 -',(!_345_',-*#!" + "3 *$6!.-)!$-_',-!!"
+ "4 .,6*$+._',-!!" + "5 &(*_',-*#!" + "6 &*$,$"*,7_(!6!7#0)!$-!"
+ "7 ,()*$*.-',-*#$!" + %) + &)*

After the model was reiterated, the Hausman Test - determining the best estimation technique was used on the general sample as well as on all 4 regional subsets. The Hausman test helped
establish whether a preferred regression model is a fixed effects model or a random effects model,
based on the presence or absence of a correlation between the errors and the regressors in the
model. The null hypothesis states that the preferred model is random effects where there is no
correlation between the errors and the regressors. The alternative hypothesis claims the opposite,
where the preferred model is a fixed effects one, in order to adjust to the present correlation. The
test results suggested that the general sample, as well as the sample covering the African countries,
South/South-East Asia, and Europe should proceed being regressed with the fixed-effects
approach, while the subset for countries in the Americas should proceed being regressed with a
random-effects approach. Thus, with the adoption of fixed-effects estimation for majority of the
samples, the Hausman Test showcased that there is significant statistical evidence to reject the null
hypothesis that the unobserved time-invariant component is unrelated to the regressors. On the
contrary, for the sample covering the Americas, the assumption that the unobserved time-invariant
component is unrelated to the regressors was supported by the test, leaving the random-effects
estimation as the better technique.
To further eliminate the possible unequal variance of the residuals, an occurrence referred
to as heteroskedasticity, the regression techniques also include cluster robust standard errors for
controlling the unevenness of residuals. Serial correlation can also pose a problem in panel data,
as the error terms in our model could be correlated either along a time period for each individual
group observation or across numerous groups of observation. With the use of robust standard errors
in the estimation, autocorrelation is aimed to be eliminated as well.
Model Results
Summary Statistics
The summary statistics unveil the challenges of merging complementary data for numerous
cases. As seen from Table 1, which describes the general sample, the presence of data
(“Observations”) for each variable is very diverse. While the more established variables have more
total observations (N) and more unique groups of observations (n) for a longer average time period
(T-bar) overall, other complimentary variables lack the same presence and frequency. For
example, the total observations for the dependent variable '()_'+,-.ℎ+, is 5395, with every
country being present (n = 152), while the average amount of years of present data -T-bar - standing
8
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at 35.4934 years. The essential independent variable +012..3450_+3.2,+, is accounted less, but
with still significant presence, with every country being accounted (n = 152) in total of 4489
observations (N = 4489) and significant average amount of years being recorded (29.5329) for the
general sample. On the other hand, variables 05,4_6+00(,1+, and 12'+34._7.,58+, have a
significantly lower presence, with 05,4_6+00(,1+, being observed only in 2298 cases and
average amount of years for every case being 18.5323, while 12'+34._7.,58+, having only 981
observations with average of 6.49669 years. These variables have lacked data as both include
multiple or only 5-year estimators instead of an annual data, leaving the model to be optimized
further below in the next section.
Regarding the dispersion of data, insight from the overall, between, and within variations
for the general sample need to be noted. The overall approach includes all datapoints for a variable
for every case. The estimation of between variation focuses on calculating the variation among the
means of every unique group of observations. By focusing on plotting the means of each of these
unique groups, between variation controls the potential significance of time and inspects only the
variation coming from the uniqueness of the cases themselves. On the contrary, the within
variation of the sample controls for the differences between every group of observations and
focuses on explaining the variation of the data regarding the passing of the time period.
Table 2: Summary Statistics for Variables' Value of General Sample

Variable
gdp_growth
remittance_ratio
trade_GDP_ratio
investment_rate
savings_rate
fdi_ratio
financial_development
econ_freedom
administration
migrant_stock

Mean overall
5.809728
2.246202
38.0772
23.83878
18.71393
1.619819
0.202232
6.440283
0.426453
1.078889

Std. Dev
6.27037
4.24623
198.088
10.6233
11.7941
3.89698
0.13877
1.00701
0.14104
1.90377

Min
-55.78
0
0
-8.629
-93.872
-56.66
0
2.52
0
0.0012

Max
85.16
69.49
7726.02
116.063
120.552
92.7
0.8
9.02
0.84272
17.8695

Although the sample mean of response variable '()_'+,-.ℎ+, is approximately 5.8 %
change of domestic output, a significant variability exists among the 152 countries for the 40-year
period. This is evident by the overall standard deviation value, which simply puts 68 % of the data
between approximately -0.5 % and 12.1 % change, a large space for interpreting between economic
stagnation and growth for the developing world for large time period. The within estimation
showcases similar results with 68 % of the data located between -0.20 % and 11.8 % change of
output. On the other hand, plotting each country’s mean of growth rates across the time period and
thus holding time constant, the between deviation indicates a lesser spread. Its value puts 68 % of
the data approximately between 3.7 % and 7.91 % change. By comparing the three deviations, the
variation of data for economic growth is higher across time rather than across the countries

9
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observed. The standard deviation of all cases along the time period is also higher compared to the
between deviation for the variables 24907.104._+3.0+, , 6(2_+3.2,+, , and 73924'7_+3.0+, .
The opposite trend is present for the remaining variables. The statistics for the main
exploratory variable +012..3450_+3.2,+, show that the average percentage of remittance inflows
to GDP is approximately 2.25 %, while the overall deviation approach calculates that 68 % of the
data is located approximately between 0 % and 6.5 %. However, the between estimation is higher
in comparison to the within one, with the values of the standard deviation being 3.71 % and 2.26
% respectively. Thus, remittance data variability across countries has been greater than the one
organized along the time period covered. Although very general, this finding can be explained by
the steady change of remittances over time in many countries, while the inflows not becoming a
significant portion of domestic output in all cases due to different developments of economies.
Furthermore, the data on the variable +012..3450_+3.2,+, was able to be analyzed when
extracting 4 specific regions out of the general sample: a. South/South-East Asia, b. Caribbeans,
Central, and South America c. Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe and d. majority of
African countries. It is firmly noticeable that the variability in the newly created data subsets is
often significantly lower than the one in the general sample across all types. The finding
strengthens the idea to proceed investigating the remittance effect individually for each region.
The only exception is the data of majority of African countries, where the deviation is higher than
the general sample. This result confirms that although many African countries may share similar
economic conditions for remittances to appear significant, there is still a large variability among
states in terms of remittance’s portion of domestic output. A run of the Hausmann test in
optimization of the model would continue this claim similarly by basing some of the samples on
random-effects regression, while the others on fixed-effects estimation.
Table 3: Summary Statistics for Variable :;<=>>?@A;_:?>=B-. Across Samples
Region
Variable
Mean overall
Std. Dev. Min Max
General Sample
remittance_ratio
2.246202
4.246228 0
69.49
South/South-East Asia
remittance_ratio
1.229389
1.436916 0
8.31
Caribbeans, Central, and
South America
remittance_ratio
1.807569
2.472924 0
10.87
Central, Eastern, and
South-Eastern Europe
remittance_ratio
1.978725
2.076645 0
12.09
Africa
remittance_ratio
2.074159
5.822346 0
69.49
Regression Results
Regression results came in with great variability in size of observation, coefficients’ values,
and significance levels, depending on the sample discussed. Namely, the fixed-effects regression
of the general sample included ultimately only 3080 observations from 109 countries that consisted
of the entire data analyzed. Overall R-squared value is significantly low, with a value of 0.0413.
Regarding the coefficient for the essential independent variable +012..3450_+3.2,+, , value of
0.0054628 is positive yet very small. This would suggest that with a 1% increase of remittance’s
ratio in the domestic output, there might be an approximately 0.006 % increase in GDP. Aside the
minimal value, the coefficient of this regressor is not suggested to be significant, as the p-value is
far greater than even the 10% level of significance with 0.867. On the other hand, significant
coefficients
were
suggested
for
24907.104._+3.0+, ,
73924'7_+3.0+, ,
and
62434523C_(090C,)104.+, , all of which p-values were below the 1% level of significance. While
10
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results for 24907.104._+3.0+, and 73924'7_+3.0+, suggested positive coefficient values, the
value for the variable 62434523C_(090C,)104.+, implied a strongly negative impact on GDP
growth when this variable increases.
Significant values for the main explanatory variable +012..3450_+3.2,+, were suggested
in the fixed-effects regression on the sample of the chosen African countries, as well as in the
random-effects regression on the sample with Caribbean, Central, South American countries. In
the case of former, number of total observations was 1109 with 41 countries included, though with
once again small R-squared value of just 0.0162. The coefficient value for the +012..3450_+3.2,+,
was 0.0680714 and had a p-value of 0.014, thus significant at 5% level of significance. The result
suggests that with an increase of 1% of remittance’s ratio to domestic product, a country’s GDP
would grow by approximately 0.07 %. Positive significant coefficient on 1% level was also present
for 73924'7_+3.0+, , while a negative significant coefficient on 1% level was again suggested for
62434523C_(090C,)104.+, .
The random-effects regression of the sample with Caribbean, Central, South American
countries included 721 observations from 21 countries. Overall R-squared value is higher than
other regressions but still low with value of 0.1172. The coefficient for the variable
+012..3450_+3.2,+, , value is -0.23383, which would suggest that with a 1% increase of
remittance’s ratio in the domestic output, the country of the sample might be met with an
approximately 0.23% decrease in GDP. On the other hand, significant positive coefficients were
suggested for .+3(0_EFG_+3.2,+, and 24907.104._+3.0+, , while a negative significant sign was
provided once again for the variable 62434523C_(090C,)104.+, . All three significant coefficients’
p-values were taken on a 1% level of significance.
Regarding the fixed-effects estimations for both the samples covering Asian and European
countries, there was no sign of significance for the coefficients for the main explanatory variable
presenting remittance inflows. The regressions continued the trend of results with low R-squared
values, with 0.0707 for the estimation of the sample with the South/South-East Asian countries,
while 0.1666 for Central, Eastern, and South-Eastern Europe. Aside the big p-values for the most
important regressor, the former estimation suggested a positive coefficient of 0.329909 while the
latter yielded a negative sign and a value of -0.51954. Other significant coefficients for the first
sample were present for 24907.104._+3.0+, (positive, 5% level), 73924'7_+3.0+, (negative, 10%
level), 6(2_+3.2,+, (negative, 5% level), and 62434523C_(090C,)104.+, (negative, 1% level). As
for the second estimation, significance was suggested for .+3(0_EFG_+3.2,+, (positive, 5% level),
24907.104._+3.0+, (positive, 1% level), 73924'7_+3.0+, (positive, 5% level), 6(2_+3.2,+,
(positive, 1% level), and 62434523C_(090C,)104.+, (negative, 1% level).
Conclusion and Further Research Suggestions
The regression results point to a continuation of the current status quo in the debate about
remittance inflows. With the basic econometric models analyzed in this study, their impact seems
to shape a diverse range of outcomes with different set of conditions established. Like many studies
before, a consensus about an overall effect of the flows on global level could not be reached in this
study following the analysis of the general sample. However, on a more specific regional analysis
like this study intended to provide, the results have given slightly clearer answers. Finding a
positive significant coefficient in the sample regression of the African nations pushes forward the
claim of remittances playing important role for increasing the cap of savings and thus investment
options in developing nations. On the other hand, a negative significant coefficient for the
Caribbean, Central, and South American countries’ sample suggests support of the claim of higher
11
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remittance inflows being a probable reaction to, not an actual reason for decreasing domestic
output i.e., provides support for their counter-cyclical nature. Nevertheless, the other two regions
in Asia and Europe are leaving the conclusion without significance in their estimation of
remittances, thus opening space for understanding the ways how the regional studies can be
improved.
Despite an inclusion of the most recent time period and unique analysis for different
regional economies, it has to be pointed out that the investigation ran into challenges for providing
significant amount of observations for two potentially important variables: 05,4_6+00(,1+, and
12'+34._7.,58+, . The two variables could have assessed further the engine of international flows
by providing an additional interacting microeconomic understanding of a remittance receiver by
the former variable, and a macroeconomic labor flow in the domestic economy by the latter. Still,
the variables’ estimates of 5-year cycles turned out to reduce the sample observations significantly,
nullifying the potential analysis of longer time period and more cases for the remaining variables.
A strategy to include these two conditions more successfully in future studies should thus be one
priority.
Finally, the current use of only the basic panel-data regression estimation techniques leaves
space for conducting an even better econometric model with even the same status of observations
and variables. An application of specific dynamic models providing differences and lags of the
dependent and independent variables could possibly suggest results whether one year’s remittances
are indeed impacting the growth rate of a domestic output in subsequent years. Estimation
techniques such as the Arellano–Bond dynamic panel-data model could not only provide
intertemporal aspects of effects of remittances but also strengthen the instruments used to control
for external factors on economic growth and thus specify the remittance impact on domestic output
increase. A detailed process of creating this kind of a dynamic model with the goal of resolving
potential endogeneity and crystalizing further the correlations between the variables studied should
be a follow-up to this research.
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Appendix
Table A1: Summary Statistics for Variables' Value of General Sample
Variable
gdp_growth

remittance_ratio

Mean
overall

N

5395

between

-8.63333

11.63075

n

152

within

-56.9766

81.40382

T-bar

0

69.49

2.246202

savings_rate

26.94075

n

44.79545

T-bar

0

7726.02

N

5373

between

2.331154

2060.687

n

152

within

-1932.16

5703.41

T-bar

-8.629

116.063

N

4504

between

9.830075

46.05158

n

132

within

-12.2458

94.30711

T-bar

-93.872

120.552

N

4625

-3.39608

48.47083

n

134

-99.7948

117.9687

T-bar

-56.66

92.7

N

4418

-1.663

15.1025

n

148

-53.3772

85.30597

T-bar

0

0.8

N

5076

between

0.033846

0.635385

n

143

within

-0.20469

0.44454

T-bar

2.52

9.02

N

2298

4.239545

8.853636

n

124

2.12801

8.380737

T-bar

overall

overall

overall

38.0772

23.83878

18.71393

within
overall

1.619819

between
within
financial_development

econ_freedom

overall

overall

0.202232

6.440283

between
within
administration

migrant_stock

4489

0.01

between
fdi_ratio

N

35.4934

-18.9046

within

investment_rate

Obs.

85.16

between
trade_GDP_ratio

Max

-55.78

overall

5.809728

Min

overall

35.3487

34.1212

34.5149

29.8514

35.4965

18.5323

0

0.842724

N

4386

between

0.147012

0.765463

n

124

within

0.149963

0.634249

T-bar

0.0012

17.8695

N

0.002586
-4.13278

11.18094
7.767446

n
T-bar

overall
between
within

0.426453

152
29.5329

1.078889

35.371
981
151
6.49669

13
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

156

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

Table A2: Summary Statistics for remittance_ratio in General and Regional Samples
Region

Variable

General
Sample

remittance_ratio

South/SouthEast Asia
Caribbeans,
Central, and
South America
Central,
Eastern, and
South-Eastern
Europe

overall

remittance_ratio

Obs.

0.0000

69.4900

N

4489

0.0100

26.9408

n

152

within

2.2557

-18.9046

44.7955

T-bar

30

1.4369

0.0000

8.3100

N

475

between

1.0974

0.1565

3.8757

n

15

within

1.0068

-2.4663

5.6637

T-bar

32

2.4729

0.0000

10.8700

N

835

between

1.8691

0.0104

6.1150

n

23

within

1.6414

-3.6174

7.8386

T-bar

36

2.0766

0.0000

12.0900

N

408

between

2.1075

0.4752

6.6062

n

17

within

0.8594

-0.7978

7.6222

T-bar

24

5.8223

0.0000

69.4900

N

1284

between

4.4614

0.0100

26.9408

n

44

within

3.3779

-19.0766

44.6234

T-bar

29

overall
Africa

Max

3.7049

overall
remittance_ratio

2.2462

Min

4.2462

overall
remittance_ratio

Std. Dev.

between
overall

remittance_ratio

Mean

1.2294

1.8076

1.9787

2.0742

Table A3: Hausman Test on General and Regional Samples
b = consistent under Ho and Ha; obtained from xtreg
B = inconsistent under Ha, efficient under Ho; obtained from xtreg
Test: Ho: difference in coefficients not systematic
General Sample

chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 48.17
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

Africa

chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 16.72
Prob>chi2 = 0.0193

Caribbeans, Central, and
South America

chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 10.17
Prob>chi2 = 0.1794

Central, Eastern, and
South-Eastern Europe

chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 135.84
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000

South/South-East Asia

chi2(7) = (b-B)'[(V_b-V_B)^(-1)](b-B) = 55.41
Prob>chi2 = 0.0000
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Table A4: Estimated Coefficients From Linear Regressions on General and Regional
Samples
Dependent variable: !"#_!%&'(ℎ!"
Central, Eastern,
and South-Eastern
Europe

South/SouthEast Asia

Fixedeffects

Caribbeans,
Central, and
South America
Randomeffects

Fixed-effects

Fixed-effects

0.005
(0.17)
0.021
(2.59) **
0.105
(3.24) ***
0.091
(4.09) ***
0.050
(1.29)
-12.241
(-6.16) ***
-0.490
(-0.19)
4.377
(3.1) ***

0.068
(2.58) **
0.018
(1.3)
0.012
(0.29)
0.073
(2.75) ***
0.002
(0.12)
-16.347
(-2.82) ***
7.496
(1.52)
3.536
(1.72) *

-0.234
(-2.37) **
0.020
(2.78) ***
0.168
(3.3) ***
0.061
(1.33)
0.100
(0.44)
-5.608
(-2.71) ***
0.589
(0.27)
1.715
(1.16)

-0.520
(-0.85)
0.050
(2.84) **
0.414
(4.54) ***
0.177
(2.63) **
0.447
(3.03) **
-20.919
(-5.92) ***
-5.004
(-1.03)
-1.205
(-0.44)

0.330
(1.44)
0.035
(1.32)
0.242
(2.53) **
-0.108
(-1.89) *
-0.945
(-2.81) **
-13.391
(-3.31) ***
-7.039
(-0.79)
10.157
(1.85) *

Observations

3080

1109

721

342

383

Countries

109

41

21

14

12

R^2

0.0413

0.0162

0.1172

0.1666

0.0707

Explanatory Variable
rem_ratio_percent
trade_gdp_ratio_percent
investment_rate_percent
savings_rate_percent
fdi_ratio_percent
financial_development
administration
_cons

General
Sample

Africa

Fixedeffects

Note: The table presents the panel data regressions’ results, reporting their t-statistics in parentheses and respective
significance levels (if any) of α = 0.01 (denoted as ‘***’), α = 0.05 (denoted as ‘**’), or α = 0.1 (denoted as ‘*’)
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in Republican Political Narratives During the 2016 and 2020
Presidential Elections
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ABSTRACT: National identity, as a broadly constituted social identity category, has been shown
to hold power both as a source of political mobilization and as an enforcer of democratic stability.
In recent years, Republican voters have reported stronger national attachments than Democrats,
perhaps due to national identity’s longstanding implicit associations with white racial identity –
and the rising prominence of multiculturalist and globalist ideologies in recent decades.1 In light
of such findings, I propose that the rhetoric of Republican political elites may function to further
exacerbate a stronger sense of national identity among their base by appealing to conjoined
national and racial identities. This project investigates if and how Republican presidential
candidates in the 2016 and 2020 elections employ national narratives in ways which have the
potential to activate both sources of social identity when compared to the narrative elements
employed by their Democrats counterparts. Through both “thin” and “thick” social narrative
analysis, I found that Republican politicians were indeed more likely than Democrats to employ
narratological techniques that implicitly affirm the notion of an ancestrally continuous and racially
homogenous (white) nation. Such techniques may further raise the salience of both national and
white racial identities among receptive audiences, and thus – given the associations between racial
and partisan identities – may both reflect and exacerbate the growing association of national
identity with Republican partisan identity and the growing power of Republican “identity politics”
writ large.2 This social identity alignment may benefit the GOP’s political mobilization efforts
while also perpetuating political polarization, threatening to distort the democratic function that
national identity has been shown to perform.
Introduction
The idea of the “nation,” and the power it holds, has long been a source of confusion and
fascination for scholars. Why do people unquestioningly, even enthusiastically, display the
national flag, celebrate national holidays, and voluntarily enlist in their country’s military – in
short, why are we willing to declare solidarity with millions of people we have never met? While
political thinkers have long struggled to make sense of nationalism, its potential as a collective
mobilizing force has been appreciated across time and cultures. That “nation-building” has long
been understood as a crucial part of the state formation process, that political actors of all
persuasions have weaponized nationalism for their objectives, and that we bitterly debate which
values “the nation” stands for, demonstrates its unequivocal power. Particularly when compared
to other potential forms of political community (such as religious or ideological coalitions), the
national unit is notable for how it “can attract so much support with so little by way of organization,
1
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doctrine and continuous mobilization.”3 As both a driver of political mobilization and a necessary
bulwark of democratic function and state stability, nationalism is commonly understood as a
crucial, yet often invisible, political force.4
Recent political science research has empirically affirmed the importance of national
cohesion to the function and capacities of the state – especially in the realm of public goods
provisions. Across a diverse array of countries, scholars have demonstrated a correlation between
strong national unity and more progressive tax policies (Lieberman, 2003), greater civic
participation and interest in government (Reeskens and Wright, 2012), and greater public funding
for education and infrastructure (Miguel, 2004).5 In the United States specifically, a stronger sense
of national identity has been shown to boost voting rates and other forms of civic involvement;6
other research has demonstrated that in some cases, appeals to national identity can even supersede
internal racial divisions, increasing white Americans’ support for enhanced educational
opportunity for minorities.7 Such cases demonstrate that even outside of policy areas where
appeals to nationalism would seem directly applicable (such as immigration or foreign policy), its
salience – and just as critically, how it is conceptualized by both elites and the public – is an
important influence on policy outcomes.
Clearly then, the nation, as collectively imagined, is not just significant in abstract, but acts
as a critical mediating force in the function of democracy, facilitating the recognition of common
interests among citizens, and the reciprocal obligations between the citizenry and their country.
Understanding the nature and strength of these bonds is then essential to making sense of the limits
and capacities of the state – in its ability to provide public goods as well as in its long-term
stability.
Nationalism in a Social Identity Frame
Research in social identity theory provides critical insight into the nature of national
attachment. As classical studies have demonstrated, individuals can quickly develop an affinity to
any social group that they feel a subjective attachment towards (even those formed on the basis of
extremely minimal differentiation), favoring in-group over out-group members past any rational
assessment of intergroup conflict.8 According to social identity theory, individuals strive to make
their in-group “positively distinct” (in comparison with others), because one’s individual selfesteem can be increased by a positive evaluation of one’s in-group.9 Such research in social identity
coheres neatly with the consensus in classical nationalism scholarship that the origins of the nation
as a political unit coincided with the demise of the dynastic realm and widespread religious
uniformity – perhaps rising in prominence to provide a new source of group-based identity as
another fell apart.10
When group-based social identities become salient, they can be potent enough to
overpower self-interest, prompting individuals to act altruistically or make drastic sacrifices to
increase the welfare or status of their in-group, especially when it is perceived to be under threat.11
As Kramer and Brewer write, “inclusion within a common social boundary acts to reduce social
distance among group members, making it less likely that they will make sharp distinctions
between their own and others’ welfare.”12 In other words, individual and group identities can
become fused together to the point where the well-being of the group becomes indistinguishable
from the well-being of the individual – insights which go far in explaining why, for example,
citizens will willingly risk their lives in wartime to defend their country. Such instances of extreme
identity fusion are most likely when one perceives their in-group to be under threat from an outgroup, but even the mere presence of an out-group is enough to prompt in-group favoritism.13
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These patterns of behavior highlight another notable feature of group identity, which is its
inherently exclusive nature. While the nature of in-group bias can certainly be expansive (in the
case of the nation, conceptually flexible enough to include millions of unknown fellow in-group
members) and is not necessarily accompanied by hostility towards out-group members, positive
affect with the in-group does require some subjective comparison with some relevant out-group.
That is, the altruism associated with social identities cannot be universally extended, but rather is
predicated on an (either real or imagined) shared characteristic as the basis of in-group favoritism.
This form of in-group bias can be so potent that even when distinct groups share superordinate
goals, they may develop rivalries based on the mere fact of their differentiation.14 In the context of
national identity for example, individuals would likely be much more supportive of policy actions
that would directly benefit U.S. citizens rather than foreigners – even if those foreigners come
from allied countries or are perceived as sharing common values. In other words, the goodwill
associated with in-group favoritism will always be limited, predicated as it is on the recognition
of a comparable outgroup.
Such findings go far in explaining the often-ugly nature of nationalism. As a potent form
of in-group bias, extreme nationalism has historically manifested in horrific and violent acts of
nativist, anti-immigrant hostility, on both interpersonal and structural levels (e.g., anti-Catholic
and anti-Semitic driven hate crimes against European immigrants in the late 19th century, the
Chinese Exclusion Act of 1882, and the 2018 zero tolerance immigration policies resulting in
immigrant family separations). Particularly when the nation is conceptualized from a socially
essentialist perspective – as categorically impermeable, with membership predicated on certain
ascribed characteristics – nationals are much more likely to partake in extreme acts to eradicate
perceived out-group threats.15 The political implications of national identity must then be taken
quite seriously.
Still, despite nationalism’s potential as a source of hostility or violence, it is also worth
emphasizing that national identity can function as an important stabilizing mechanism for
democratic function by fostering a sense of unity and interdependency. When considered through
frameworks like Gaertner and Dovidio’s Common In-Group Identity Model (CIIM), one of the
possible strengths of broad and abstract group identities like the nation is its potential to supersede
other arbitrary intergroup distinctions and expand the sphere of in-group bias to include the welfare
of former outgroup members.16 Salient national identity could potentially be capable of mitigating
inter-societal prejudice and conflict by prompting individuals to recategorize themselves as part of
a larger, overarching group.17 In other words, CIIM suggests that when national identity is salient
as an identity category, individuals will reconceptualize their in-group to include Americans at
large and extend their capacity for altruistic behavior to a much larger, demographically diverse
group of people – a process which has at least some external validity in the U.S.18
Frameworks like CIIM also illuminate the fact that, despite the frequency with which
national attachment is deployed in manipulative or exclusive ways, it can also be used to foster a
sense of societal responsibility and solidarity and deployed for progressive projects as well –
especially those aimed at improving collective welfare through provisional and redistributive
policies. That is, when individuals understand their national community as socially meaningful, it
intensifies their concern for the wellbeing of their fellow national in-group members and can
prompt collectively oriented, rather than self-interested, political behavior. As Canovan writes,
“If...justice is to be achieved by relatively consensual means, social justice will be feasible only in
a polity with a high degree of communal solidarity.”19 Put differently, our potential for collectively

3
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

163

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

oriented actions increases when we perceive ourselves as members of a collective. Clearly, then,
national identity is a nuanced and multifaceted social category which escapes easy definition.
The Growing Partisan Split on National Attachment
Such questions are especially important in the current political climate, where the strategic
deployment of national identity, once used widely by political actors regardless of party, has fallen
into a partisan alignment. Although national identity has formerly been shown to be independent
of ideology, it has become increasingly associated with the Republican Party in recent years.20 A
2019 poll found that approximately 80 percent of Republicans described patriotism as a “very
important” American value while only about 40 percent of Democrats said the same – about a 10
point drop overall from two decades ago.21 Particularly in the context of the heightened political
protest of the past several years, national identity has been evoked in strikingly conflicting ways;
while a Black Lives Matter chapter recently declared the American Flag “a symbol of hatred,” farright activists stormed the U.S. capital adorned in American flag garb and echoing President
Trump’s marching orders to “stand strong for our country.”22 While protesters may represent two
extreme ends of the U.S. ideological poll, the intonations of such associations resonate with the
broader public; 66% of Republicans associate the American flag with their party, while only 34%
of Democrats feel the same.23 Such trends appear to demonstrate a growing partisan conflict in not
merely what American national identity represents, but whether such an identity is valuable at all.
But although recent polls demonstrate an increasingly extreme split, Republicans have long
been advantaged in their ability to effectively appeal to national identity. By examining how
Americans conceive of their imagined political community through the lens of social identity
theory and related research, we can begin to understand why the political pressures of the past 15
years have pushed the forces of national identity far into the Republican corner. And although
ideology and other factors have certainly played an important part, the racial implications of
American national identity are central to understanding its contemporary partisan undertones.
American Identity and Racial Identity
The Republican coalition today is striking in its racial homogeneity. The partisan
realignment that began in the New Deal era and accelerated during the Civil Rights era (and
accelerated yet again following the election of President Obama) has resulted in a Democratic
Party defined by its multiracial coalition, and a Republican Party defined by its whiteness.24 In
2020, 57% of white voters cast their ballots for President Trump (up from 54% in 2016) – the only
racial group that (twice) supported him by a majority.25 Compared to Biden, whose winning
coalition was comprised of nearly 40% voters of color, only 15% of Trump’s voter base was nonwhite.
At first glance, the demographic make-up of each party’s coalitions would seem to have
no bearing on their respective relationships with national identity, which is almost always
explicitly discussed in non-racial terms. When asked outright what criteria is most important for
national belonging, most Americans overwhelmingly favor value and civic-based nationhood
rather than nativist or ethnocentric criteria. Adaptive traits like “feeling American,” having U.S.
citizenship, and valuing egalitarianism and tolerance are considered significantly more important
to being an American than ascribed characteristics such as being born in the U.S. or being
Christian.26 Such civically determined conceptions of national belonging also seem to have
reached a broader consensus in recent years. Since 2016, Americans have come to consider criteria
like Christianity and being born in the United States as less important for national belonging – and
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although the shift has been more concentrated among liberals (whose views shifted by 28 points
compared to 13 among conservatives), the embrace of an increasingly inclusive American identity
is notable in its bipartisanship.27 The implication from such findings would be that entry into the
U.S. political community is simple – all that is needed is the embrace of certain values (mostly
based in liberalism) and willingness to participate in U.S. civic society.28
However, even as egalitarian values have been explicitly embraced as foundational to
American political membership in recent history, majorities of both white and non-white
Americans demonstrate an implicit association of the “American” label with whiteness. That is,
research has shown that Americans (of all races) are more likely to instinctively categorize generic
white faces as “American” – and are also more likely to associate generic black and brown faces
with foreignness.29 To put this in terms of the CIIM model, the superordinate group identity of
“American” does not seem capable of transcending racial intergroup distinctions in the U.S.
because the superordinate category of group identity is already implicitly associated with a
subgroup. As Dach-Gruschow and Hong propose in their research, the possibility of
reconceptualizing an expansive, multiracial “American” category is limited by how firmly
entrenched racial divisions are in the U.S.30*
*
Centuries of structural exclusion and segregation has created what CIIM theorists label a
boundary condition in the minds of many Americans, leaving them incapable of imagining a
racially inclusive national community.31
Social dominance theory (SDT), developed by Sidanius and Pratto, also provides a helpful
framework for making sense of the limited accessibility of the superordinate “American”
identity.32 This framework is especially compelling because it accounts for the larger sociohistorical patterns of racially predicated exclusion and subordination that have traditionally
defined American belonging. Echoing a long lineage of Critical Race theorists, Sidanius and Pratto
argue that although the basis for formal citizenship is more racially inclusive today than ever before
in history (and that the American political community is explicitly predicated on universalist,
liberal principles, rather than ascribed ethnic traits), the most stable and long-lasting markers of
national belonging are founded in racial hierarchy. Even as racial minorities have been
successively granted the formal rights of citizenship, institutional and cultural systems remain
designed to hinder the civic and cultural participation of racial minorities in the American national
community.33 At its core, the United States remains “a white nation, a Protestant nation, a nation
in which true Americans were native-born men with Anglo-Saxon ancestors,” demanding
assimilation and subordination from those who do not fit the criteria for inclusion.34
Because of these historical patterns of dominance and subordination, SDT suggests that
white Americans will have a much simpler relationship to national identity because of their
hegemonic position in American society; that is, white Americans will feel greater ownership over
conceptions of the “nation,” because such conceptions have long been synonymous with white
belonging. For racial minorities, on the other hand, national belonging is less straightforward,
because national identity (in a nation which has long invalidated the political and human worth of
people of color) is inherently incongruent with other forms of group-based identity they hold.
These theorized relationships between competing identities are largely born out in the data. While
there is a positive correlation between a strong sense of racial and national identity for white
Americans, the inverse is true for non-white Americans – the more strongly one identifies with
*

But, see also: Transue, J. E. (2007). Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American
National Identity as a Uniting Force. American Journal of Political Science, 51: 78-91.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2007.00238.x.
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their racial minority group, the weaker their national identity.35 National belonging has thus long
been a quietly racially coded project, with evocations of national identity speaking not just to white
Americans’ sense of national belonging, but their racial identity as well.
Nationalism in the Age of Globalism
This relationship between national and racial identity, long apparent, has become
particularly pertinent in this political moment, where both sources of identity have grown
increasingly salient through the ascendance of globalist and multiculturalist ideologies. Over the
past decade and a half, the credibility and purpose of once commonly respected American values
and institutions have increasingly been called into mainstream debate, destabilizing the political
and moral bedrock of U.S. society. Much of this is non-specific to the United States; as Western
societies have grown more prosperous and politically stable, liberal democratic values – which
deny the validity of particularistic attachments of exclusive group identities – have become almost
universally accepted in mainstream political discourse, while values once taken for granted – like
the special status of the national community – have increasingly been derided.36 For some white
Americans, many of the events which have defined this period (the election of Barack Obama, the
increased cultural visibility of people of color, the Black Lives Movement, ongoing national
conversations about structural racism, police violence, and xenophobia) have registered as a
fundamental attack on the intricately linked racial and national groups with which they identify.
As the joint identities of whiteness and American-ness rise in saliency together in response to the
perceived threat of political change, they have grown increasingly associated with one another
under cyclical patterns of rising globalism and reactionary populism – creating what is essentially
a feedback loop. That is, as right-wing leaders have conflated national pride with white supremacy
in increasingly flagrant ways, many on the left have written off patriotism altogether as a dangerous
form of racism, coming to deny particularistic national attachments ever more vehemently.37 And
as the left increasingly avoids evoking national identity, the more closely it becomes associated
with ethnocentric rhetoric of the right.38 In other words, the political conditions created by
ascendant globalist and multicultural values have brought racial and national identity into an
especially close alignment over the past decade and a half.
Such a dynamic has noteworthy implications for the potency of social identity appeals on
either side of the aisle, particularly for voter mobilization. Republican elites can use nationalist
rhetoric to simultaneously raise the saliency of both national and racial identity for their
predominantly white base, motivating them to act on the basis of multiple in-group loyalties.
Instead of appealing to one form of group identity that is cross-pressured with another,
Republicans’ use of national rhetoric can potentially appeal to two coherent sources of identity
simultaneously. And since racial identities have become conflated with partisan identities in recent
years, as Sides Tesler and Vavreck have demonstrated, the conflation of white racial and national
identities could also cause national identity to become increasingly associated with the Republican
Party.39 This layering of social identities may then provide a stronger foundation for political
mobilization of the GOP base.
On the other side of the aisle, national identity is less likely to be considered an effective
social identity appeal for Democratic elites. Not only might national identity appeals be cross
pressured with non-white racial identities as they have become increasingly associated with
whiteness under contemporary political pressures, but its racialization may have also increased its
associations with Republican partisan identity as well. Because of the various identity crosspressures associated with national identity for the Democratic base, appeals to national identity
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may not function as a tool for mobilization as effectively for Democrats as they do for Republicans.
This could be potentially problematic for Democrats. While voters can of course be motivated by
a number of elite tactics (and not merely rhetorical social identity appeals), the fact that
Republicans are able to rely on such layered identity appeals and leverage the power of in-group
behavior (group-motivated behavior which is likely more extreme due to the lack of identity crosspressures) undoubtedly presents a political advantage.40
Such a development might also pose a challenge on the linguistic level. Especially in
national-level politics, the language of nationalism has long been a default; politicians align
themselves with their audience and evoke a sense of unity and shared purpose by calling on shared
national identity (i.e., when politicians in national contexts talk about “us” (“our” interests, “our”
values) they are almost always talking about “us” as Americans). Even as it has become
increasingly associated with white identity, “the nation” continues to be the most common and
familiar basis for collective identity in the United States; it is not at all obvious that there exists
another linguistic framework for capturing the collective interests of American society in a
political setting. As such, the partisan and racial associations of national identity matter immensely
to a Democratic politician’s ability to deliver any sort of effective or appealing political narrative.
With this in mind, I intend to investigate if Republican elites are indeed using national
narratives which have the potential to speak to national and racial sources of identity, when
compared to their Democratic counterparts. To do this, I analyze the narratological techniques
undertaken by presidential candidates during the 2016 and 2020 election cycles. The electoral
context is particularly well-suited to the aims of this investigation, since the candidates address a
broad national audience in these contexts (transcending the more particularistic constituent
communities, such as state or congressional districts, or specific demographic appeals to racial
voting blocs) and are thus more likely to make appeals to a unifying national identity. At the same
time, they are also largely operating within the expectations and ideological norms of their
respective parties and largely appealing to their parties’ respective base coalitions. While the
partisan relationships to national identity likely shifted even in the four-year period between 2016
and 2020, both election cycles took place in a deeply polarized political climate where race was a
salient and contentious factor.41 It is also important to note that the parties’ base coalitions shifted
in only marginal ways between 2016 and 2020; while the share of different racial voting blocs
shifted by a few points in either partisan direction (most notably in the form of an eight-point shift
towards the GOP among Latinos), the Republican base was still overwhelmingly white (and the
Democratic coalition significantly multi-racial) for both elections.42
A Note on Research Design: Assessing National Identity through Narrative
There has been considerable contention among nationalism scholars over how, and indeed
if, it can be satisfactorily measured. As Huddy and Khatib write, “research on patriotism has been
marred by a confusing array of terms, definitions, and expected consequences in which patriotism
is variously defined as a sense of national loyalty, a love of national symbols, specific beliefs about
a country’s superiority, and as a crucial ingredient in the development of civic ties to a mature
nation.”43 Even as I take their definition of national identity (derived from social identity theory)
as the “subjective or internalized sense of belonging to the nation” as my starting point, it remains
difficult to evaluate how it becomes externally activated by political actors (within the confines of
their already limited power to influence their audience’s individual identity construction). 44
Because the nation, as a site of social identity, is an imagined entity, it is constantly being
reconceived in ever-changing historical conditions. The ways that individuals are likely to relate
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to their national identities are thus not stagnant, but rather highly layered and contextually
contingent. In other words, to the extent that politicians can raise the salience of national identity
in their speech, they do so not through a simple “cause-and-effect'' mechanism (for example,
simply evoking a national symbol, like the flag, does not on its own automatically raise the saliency
of national identity), but through more complex rhetorical means.
Social narrative analysis provides one promising framework with which to examine the
more nuanced means by which national identity is constructed. This methodology is predicated on
psychological findings that human beings are natural storytellers; because we are predisposed to
conceive of the world in narrative form, “stories have a vital a priori role as cognitive constructs,
or even as cognitive scripts.”45 Psychological research on transportation theory provides some
insight into this phenomenon; when individuals are “transported” into a particular “story world,”
they may become less able to “counter argue assertions or events in the story because [their]
cognitive capacity is committed to imagining story events.”46 In other words, compelling national
narratives can “move” us, increasing our identification with the nation, in ways which other
rhetorical techniques (reciting the Pledge of Allegiance, for example) may not. In absence of any
concrete interaction within such a widespread community, national stories can provide a common
sense of who we are and how we came to be, linking our own lives to those from distant places
and times, “creating a sense of familiarity, and probably emotional attachments between
people…who have probably never met and never will.”47 National narratives are then a key site
for the construction of national identity – and as such, a crucial tool for politicians as they attempt
to wield its power in political speech.
To examine partisan uses of national narrative, I will be adopting Prince’s minimalist
structural definition of a narrative, as “the representation of at least two real or fictive events in a
time sequence, neither of which presupposes the other”; this definition helps to account for the
inherent, multiplicitous nature of national narrative as something that is communicated not in a
singular telling, but which exists in relation to a larger body of narrative “versions.” 48 This is
particularly important when considering the narrative elements found in political speech, which is
almost always sparse and non-adherent to a progressive time-sequence. The limits of political
narrative, however, ensure that the narrative elements which are incorporated are necessarily
meaningful, because they have been chosen by the speaker as worthy of inclusion.49 In other words,
the way in which politicians choose to rhetorically map the historical trajectory of the nation, or
characterize its population or values, matters immensely for who or who is not included within it.
For this investigation, I will be looking primarily at two narratological elements: the use of
temporality in narrative and the characterization of the nation as racially diverse. I predict that the
Republican presidential candidates will be more likely to use temporally richer narratives and less
likely to reference diversity in their political speech than Democrats, both of which would seem
(in drawing from past findings in social narrative analysis and social psychology) to exacerbate or
confirm linkages between national and white racial identities for reasons discussed below. To
gauge partisan patterns in narratological construction both broadly and in depth, I employ both a
“thin” level analysis of generalized partisan patterns, and a more detailed, “thick” level
comparative study of two partisan speeches.
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Part One: Thin Narrative Analysis of Closing Remarks in Primary Debates
Data Sample
To gain understanding into how Democrats and Republicans as partisan blocs employ
national narratives, I will first be conducting a broad analysis of closing statements in the 2016
and 2020 primary debates. Closing statements are often rich with narratological elements;
politicians are compelled to make a generalized, compelling appeal to their electorate, usually
laying out their vision for the country, drawing on personal and historical anecdotes, resonant
symbols, and values to communicate what their candidacy represents.50 Rather than advocating for
specific policies, closing statements are often emotionally-based attempts to mobilize supporters
and can be powerfully leveraged by candidates; as Shenhav has shown, there is a positive
correlation between the relative narratological strength of presidential contenders’ closing
statements and their ultimate electoral success.51
The contexts of these speeches (nationally broadcast electoral primary debates) already
share some degree of similarity, but to control for potential differences further, I also
predominantly selected closing statements from the beginning of the election for analysis (those
from the first, second, third or fourth debates), though there were some exceptions (i.e., the samples
from 2020 Democratic candidates Tom Steyer and Micheal Bloomberg, who joined the race later).
The wide field of candidates in both parties (particularly the Democratic field in 2020 and
the Republican field in 2016) also provides a solid foundation for an analysis of generalized
partisan behavior by accounting for the diverse range of ideology within each party. For the
purposes of this investigation, I will consider “major” candidates as those who qualified for at least
one debate. To that end, the set of closing statements analyzed for this investigation includes those
from the 15 GOP candidates in 2016; and the five Democratic candidates in 2016 and the 22
Democratic candidates in 2020 (including Bernie Sanders, who was a primary contender both
years). In total, I analyzed 94 closing statements (43 from Republicans and 51 from Democrats),
examining the following narratological elements.
1. Temporality
Temporality, in its basic narratological definition, is a measurement of the time-sequence over
which a narrative takes place.52 As Prince’s definition suggests, it is an integral aspect of narrative;
speech without any temporal variation (i.e., a speech that takes place entirely in the present,
without any references to past or future events) cannot be defined as a narrative.53 Past research
has shown not only how national narratives with denser time-sequences are more likely to deepen
the audience’s feelings of resonance with a historically continuous community, but also that the
belief in historical continuity is itself correlated to socially-essentialist formulations of the nation.54
Thus, if politicians present “the nation” as a historically continuous entity (for example, framing
the contemporary U.S. as continuous with the U.S. of the Revolutionary era and the U.S. of the
future), they may be implicitly lending credence to the belief of ancestral continuity in the nationstate, strengthening the linkages between national and racial identities – even if they themselves
do not use socially essentialist narrative constructions.55 Another way to understand the racial
implications of a historically continuous narrative is in its assumption of a uniformly shared
history. American history is thoroughly racialized; certain historical events carry conflicting
emotional associations for different racial groups in America, which can make the work of
navigating its meanings difficult for politicians who are addressing a multiracial audience. Using
American history to affirm both national and racial sources of identity may then be a more
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accessible – and thus more common – project for political elites addressing an audience who can
resonate with the empowered white perspective from which dominant understandings of American
history have always derived.56 In other words, because Republican elites largely need not confront
the complex racial connotations of certain historical events or figures (i.e., the Civil War, Thomas
Jefferson), they may be able to navigate American history in their narratives more freely – and
thus more frequently.
To measure temporality, I adopted Shenhav’s “relative narrativity” metric, adapting it
slightly to control for variation in speech length:57
1. The total number of temporal references in each speech were counted and sorted
into four temporal categories: distant past (before the birth of the speaker), past
experiences (within the lifetime of the speaker), near future (within the next 10
years), or distant future (beyond the next 10 years). Temporal references were
counted by clause within each sentence (to account for the fact that sentences
oftentimes contain multiple and different temporal ranges).
2. Time periods furthest from the present (distant past and distant future) were
doubled and counted as two references to improve the representation of relative
temporal range.
3. The total sum of temporal references for one candidate were divided by total
word count.
a. Hypothesis 1a: The closing statements of Republicans will have a higher relative
narrativity (i.e., they will be more temporally rich) than those of Democrats,
because Republicans, in addressing their predominantly white base, have more
reason to evoke the themes of historical and ancestral continuity which speak to
both national and racial identities (and both parties will likely reference past
experiences and the future at relatively equal rates) (H1a).
2. Racial References
Here, I attempt to measure how much politicians allude to racial diversity as a positive or
neutral characteristic of the national in-group, compared to how often racial difference is treated
as an out-group threat. To understand the significance of racialized references, I draw on
Shenhav’s definition of narrative “characters,” and his rationale for inherent importance in political
narrative. Shenhav argues that “characters” (which he defines as anything which can be
rhetorically personified, including “the nation, firms, institutions, organizations, political parties,
the government, our world, or our planet”) are intrinsically significant within the constraints of
public political speech. 58 That is, references to certain figures or populations are strategically
selected by the speaker, and thus are inherently meaningful in the values and communities they
are symbolically representative of.59 I can thus assume that racial references in contexts like
primary debates are not random (particularly in this age of the increased racial salience), but a
purposive attempt to communicate one’s values, rhetorically broadening the American
community. Because of the longstanding conflation of whiteness and American identity, racial
references can be understood as an attempt to challenge dominant American narratives,
incorporating historically excluded populations in a new American story.60 In other words, because
American identity is often equated with white identity, the mere reference to racial diversity can
cognitively disrupt the implicit conclusion that the United States is a “white” nation.61
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For the purposes of this investigation, I examine how often presidential candidates use the
following racialized terms in positive or neutral ways (measured with Linguistic Inquiry and Word
Count analysis [LIWC]):
i.
Racial references (neutral): “African-American(s),” “Asian(s)” “Asian
American(s)”, “black(s),” “brown,” “Caucasian(s),”, “color(s)”,
“country(ies) of origin,” “creed,” “diverse,” “diversity,” “ethnic,” “from all
walks of life,” “Hispanic(s)” “Hispanic-American(s),” “immigrant(s),”
“Indigenous,” “inner city(ies),” “Islam(ic),” “Jew(s)”, “Judaism,”
“Latino/a/x(s),” “Mexico(an/ans),” “Native-American(s), “race(s),”
“racial,” “refugee(s),” “religion we practice,” “religion you practice,”
“white(s).”
As a means of comparison, I also examined how often politicians referenced racial dogwhistles in an apparent attempt to “other” minorities, distinguishing them from “normal” (i.e.,
white) Americans. That is, since evoking racial identity can be a subtle way to reinforce the implicit
whiteness of the American label, and exclude racial minorities from that identity, I also measure
the frequency with which politicians use terms that clearly frame racial minorities as national
outsiders – most of which are well-established as racial dog-whistles.62
ii.
Racial references (negative): “criminal alien(s),” “criminal(s),” “drug
dealer(s)”, “extreme Islam(ic),” “gang(s),” “ghetto(s),” “illegal alien(s)”,
“illegal immigrant”(s), “inner city(ies),” “jihad(ist/s),” “law and order,”
“looter(s),” “moocher(s),” “radical Islam(ic),” “religious extremist(s),”
“rioter(s)”, “sharia,” “states’ rights,” “terrorist(s),” “thug(s).”
b. Hypothesis 1b: Republican candidates will be less likely to reference race overall
but will be more likely to use negative racial terms than Democrats (H1b). As
opposed to Democrats, who may be more likely to reference racial diversity to
recognize or affirm the demographic make-up of their coalition, Republicans may
instead use narratological framing which does not challenge the implicit
associations between American identity and white identity. The Republican
candidates also may be more likely to use language that frames racial minorities as
malignant outsiders to the American community, in ways that could raise the
saliency of both national and white racial identities to their base by evoking an outgroup threat.63 In contrast, these terms with such negative racial connotations are
very unlikely to be used by Democrats as they address their multiracial base.
3. Nationalist Language
As a final supplementary metric, I measure how often Republicans and Democrats reference
national symbols. Although merely referencing national symbols (appealing to symbolic
patriotism) is itself not synonymous with fostering a sense of national identity (the subjective sense
of belonging one feels with the nation), prior research has shown the two to be closely correlated
– and thus they may be capable of evoking social identity sentiments or behaviors.64 While national
symbols can thus serve as seemingly race-neutral indications of national identity appeals, it is still
worth noting that their evocation of traditional markers of national glory and pride adhere to
dominant (white) constructions of national identity.65 As such, how politicians use them – and in
particular, how their usage of nationally symbolic language compares to their usage of racialized
language – remains worthy of interrogation.
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I examine how often presidential candidates use the following nationalist symbolic terms
(measured with Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count analysis [LIWC]):
i. nationalism dictionary: ”all men are created equal,” “American dream,”
“American people,” “Bill of Rights,” “Constitution,” “Declaration of
Independence,” “e pluribus unum,” “eagle,” “flag,” “Founding
Document(s),” “Founding Father(s),” “God Bless America,” “greatest
country”, “In God we Trust,” “Lady Justice”, “Lady Liberty,” “Liberty
Bell,” “life liberty and the pursuit of happiness,” “most powerful nation in
the world,” “national anthem,” “one nation under God,” “patriot(s),”
“Pledge of Allegiance,” “protect our troops,” “sea to shining sea,” “stars
and stripes,” “Statue of Liberty,” “this great nation,” “White House.”
c. Hypothesis 1c: Republican candidates will more frequently reference national
symbols then Democratic candidates (H1c). Because national symbols are
associated with a particularly traditional, dominant national narrative, they may
covertly resonate with more racially exclusive forms of nationalism.
Findings and Analysis
As stated above, I expected that Republican closing statements would be more likely to
contain narratological elements which could activate both national and racial identities by
rhetorically constructing the nation as a historically continuous, racially homogenous entity. More
specifically, I expected that Republican closing statements (when compared to those of Democrats)
would have a higher average relative narrativity score (H1a); would contain fewer racialized
references in general but would be more likely to contain negative racial references (H1b); and
that they would be more likely to employ symbolic national language (H1c). The average scores
for each dimension of the party’s closing statements adhered to each hypothesis; however, only
the differentiation in racial neutral references reached statistical significance.
While Republican statements did have a slightly higher relative narrativity score of 0.0627,
as opposed to the average for Democratic statements of 0.0574, the difference was not statistically
significant. While Republicans in general may have been slightly more likely to evoke temporally
richer narratives and more frequently reference the “distant past,” this is not captured by the
relative narrativity metric, which equally weighs references to both the distant past and distant
future. It also seems likely that differences in narrative temporality were more so due to differences
in individual rhetorical style, rather than generalized partisan modes of communication; a large set
of both Democrat and Republican candidates evoked the distant past and distant future in
compelling ways to situate their candidacy in the broader American story, but not all (especially
Democrats) did so in ways that aligned with dominant American examples. For example, in the
second debate, Julián Castro provided a compelling historical narrative which includes
traditionally marginalized populations; “...we stand on the shoulders of folks who have made beds
and made sacrifices, people that fought in wars and fought discrimination, folks that picked crops
and stood in picket lines, and they helped build the wonderful nation that we live in today.”
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Chart 1a: Narrative Elements in Democratic and Republican Closing Statements
Temporality

Racial

References

Relative Narrativity: Racial Neutral Racial Negative

Nationalist References
National Symbols:

DEM AVG:

0.0574

0.332

0.025

0.165

GOP AVG:

0.0627

0.046

0.077

0.239

Figure 1a: Narrative Elements in Democratic and Republican Closing Statements

The difference between partisan use of racially neutral references was the only variable
which met statistical significance, with Democrats making racialized references 0.332% per word
count, compared to Republicans, who on average referenced them only 0.046% per word count.
The use of these racial references often were utilized in calls for unity or justice (“For the last three
years, we’ve watched Donald Trump pit working people against each other, black versus white,
citizen versus immigrant” [De Blasio, second debate]; “They’ve tried to divide us, who's white,
who's black…” [Ryan, first debate]; “We can tell our kids that…[we] deliver[ed] a society where
race has no bearing on your health or your wealth or your relationship with law enforcement”
[Buttigieg, second debate]).
In comparison (and in keeping with my hypothesis), Republicans made racialized
references quite minimally, although they were slightly more likely to use racial negative language
that framed non-white populations as national outsiders (0.077% of racial negative references per
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word count, compared to 0.046% of racial neutral references per word count) than to use racial
neutral language associated with celebrating America’s diversity. Notably, Republicans almost
exclusively used negative racial language in reference to foreign policy threats, rather than
American citizens; the more frequent phrases used were “terrorists” (Christie [first debate], Cruz
[second debate]) and “radical Islam” (Cruz [second debate], Graham [second debate]). While this
sort of language is then not directly applicable to the ostracization of racial minorities within the
U.S., it is worth noting that this sort of Islamophobic language has been shown to generate
animosity and increase hate crimes towards Muslim citizens, and thus, cannot be completely
disentangled from the broader project of racialization of American identity (Lichtblau, 2016). It is
also worth noting that some of the words in my dictionary, coded either as “racial neutral” or
“racial negative” may have been evoked by candidates in ways that did not carry the connotations
I expected and could have distorted the results.
Finally, as hypothesized, Republicans evoked national symbols slightly more frequently
than Democrats, with an average of 0.239% of references per word count, compared to 0.165%
references per word count, though again, this differentiation failed to reach statistical significance
–perhaps not surprising, given the general nationalist atmosphere of federal elections. While again,
the use of symbolic nationalist language has not been shown to have a direct bearing on the strength
of national identity, it is still notable that Republicans were slightly more likely to employ it in
their rhetoric, especially when compared to the frequency with which they employed racialized
rhetoric.
There are also interesting insights to be found in comparing rhetorical trends within each
party; Democrats were significantly more likely to use racially neutral language than either racially
negative language or nationally symbolic language. In contrast, Republicans were more likely to
use nationally symbolic language than racially neutral language, and significantly more likely to
use nationally symbolic language than racially negative language. These narratological patterns in
Republican closing statements (frequently employing symbols of national glory or pride, while
infrequently and non-explicitly referencing race) could very well function to further promote the
notion of the U.S. as a white nation – or at the very least, accommodate pre-existing associations
of whiteness with national identity.
The overall inconsistency of narrative deployment within the partisan blocs could be in
part due to the inconsistency in the data set itself; while many candidates’ closing statements were
rich with narrative elements, relating their candidacy or personal history to the broader sweep of
American history and describing the U.S. and its values in vivid ways, others used their closing
statements to advocate for a single policy or state why they were more viable candidates than their
competitors. As such, the temporal range of narrative as well as quantity of racialized or nationally
symbolic references may be more largely contingent on the candidate’s specific rhetorical strategy
in that moment (to alleviate voters’ doubts about a potential weakness they may have as a candidate
or to re-emphasize a point they made earlier in the debate), one which may not involve raising the
saliency of national identity.
That being said, in examining the potential cumulative effect of each partisan grouping of
closing statements, the degree to which the Democratic narratives place racial diversity as a key
American characteristic is significant when compared to that of Republicans, which notably does
not challenge the links between American identity and whiteness – and thus perhaps implicitly
affirms it, given the pre-existing relationship between the two. Because Republican narratives
evoke themes of historical continuity and racial homogeneity (with higher measures of relative
narrativity, fewer allusions to race, and the frequent use of dominant and recognizable national
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symbols), it appears that they could in fact function to appeal to white racial identities in addition
to national identities.
Part Two: Thick-level Narrative Analysis of Trump and Biden’s 2020 Convention Speeches
To complement the relatively surface-level analysis of how national narratives are broadly
structured as a function of partisanship, I also performed a more detailed narrative analysis of two
political speeches – at full length – to gain deeper insight into relative narrative strength and
impact. I chose to do a comparative study of Joe Biden’s speech at the closing of the 2020
Democratic National Convention and Donald Trump’s speech at the closing of the 2020
Republican National Convention, in which each candidate accepted their party’s nomination for
President. The full transcripts of Biden’s speech and Trump’s speech can be found in Appendix 4
and Appendix 5 respectively. I chose these speeches because they are symmetrical; each takes
place in the same political moment at the beginning of the 2020 general election (Biden spoke on
August 20th, and Trump spoke on August 24th), with both candidates formally assuming the
responsibility of representing their party in the coming months. It is worth noting that the timing
of these speeches (immediately following the national racial reckonings of the summer of 2020)
could offer further insight into how each partisan interacts with national identity’s relationship to
race, not captured from the Part One dataset, which analyzed GOP statements only from 2016.
Biden and Trump’s addresses are also tailored for their respective audiences in similar
ways; while the conventions are themselves partisan events, these final speeches represent a pivot
towards the general election, where each candidate must begin to make a broader appeal to the
country and speak to potentially undecided voters, as well as members of their own party. Beyond
this symmetry in context, these speeches are a particularly appropriate venue for assessing and
comparing the use of national narrative. Like closing statements, closing convention speeches are
often heavily symbolic, drawing on certain conceptions of American history and values to ground
each candidate’s campaign in a larger national story and mobilize voters on its behalf. There are
also meaningful similarities between the narrators themselves; both Donald Trump and Joe Biden
are white men in their 70s and well-established political actors. The shared characteristics of the
narrators and the context of their speech lends credence using solely the narratives’ story elements
as the basis for comparing their ultimate strength and effectiveness towards raising the salience of
national identity.
Because Trump’s speech (which ran for 1 hour and 1 minute) was much longer than
Biden’s (running for 25 minutes), I controlled for length in some contexts. However, doing so did
not always feel appropriate for every metric of assessment, as discussed below. Particularly given
the fact that the speeches took place in a symmetrical context, and that both candidates presumably
had equal freedom to speak for as long as they wanted, there is certainly value on evaluating both
on their own terms, especially as I consider the relative richness of each candidate’s narrative
construction.
My framework for assessing these narratives was three-fold:
1. Temporality
First, as in Part One, I assessed each narrative’s relative temporal density and racial references, to
capture how thoroughly each narrative respectively appeals to themes of historical continuity and
racial homogeneity. My analysis is predicated on the same definitions of temporality and
characters elaborated above.66
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To assess each narrative’s appeals to historical continuity, I again used the relative
narrativity metric.67 But to get a deeper sense of how exactly each narrative’s time sequence is
populated, I also counted and coded each character according to predefined temporal categories
and calculated the total number of references of all characters in each time period. Characters
referenced in multiple time periods were counted for all relevant time categories. For the
organizational purposes, I coded the temporal locations of characters in the following categories:
Ahistorical, Pre-Founding, American Founding, First half of 1800s, Second half of 1800s, First
half of 1900s, Second half of 1900s, Unspecified Past Experience (if the time frame was not
identifiable in the narrative), and Present Day (2000-2020).
ii.
Hypothesis 2a: Trump’s speech will contain a more temporally rich national
narrative, with a higher relative narrativity and references to more historical
periods than Biden’s, in accordance with the same rationale that led to my
predictions for H1a in Part One (H2a).
1. Racial References
I also further interrogated to what extent each narrative appealed to racial diversity, assessing how
each character is racialized, and how prominently they appear in the narrative – or how many times
they were referenced in proportion to the total number of references to characters, with references
counted by sentence. As explicated before, references to racial diversity are intrinsically notable
within political narrative, as they have been strategically included by the speaker. Specifically, I
asked; Which speaker more frequently mentioned characters who were overtly racialized as nonwhite, implicitly racialized as non-white, overtly racialized as white, implicitly racialized as nonwhite, or not racialized?
iii.
Hypothesis 2b: Biden will more frequently reference overtly non-white
characters (and a greater number of distinct racial or ethnic groups) and Trump
will more frequently reference non-racialized characters, implicitly racialized
characters, and overtly white characters, this in accordance with the same
rationale that led to my predictions for H1b in Part One (H2b).
2. Discussion of Narratological Themes
To complement this, I will also discuss each of the candidate’s respective narrative styles,
rhetorical motifs, and general characterizations of America, assessing how each elucidates the
interplay of national and racial identities.
Findings
For the purposes of analysis, I did not count the speaker’s references to himself, as to better
understand the significance of the frequency with which other characters were mentioned. Not
including self-references, Biden referenced 54 characters (363 character references total), and
Trump referenced 96 characters (629 references total). They mentioned 24 of the same characters,
with Trump making a greater number of references to almost every character, except for “women''
and Franklin Roosevelt. Because the personal, political, and historical cannot easily be separated
within political narrative, all characters (regardless of if they are evoked in the context of personal
relationship, historical reference, or as a contemporarily salient political actor) were counted
indiscriminately.68
1. Temporality and Historical Dispersion of Characters
As hypothesized (H2a), Biden’s speech takes place within a much narrower narrative
realm, with a relative narrativity score of 0.048 as opposed to Trump’s relative narrativity 0.079.
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It is particularly notable how much more of Trump’s speech takes place in the distant past (78
references compared to 10 in Biden’s speech) evoking past American history more than four times
as frequently as Biden when controlling for word count (see Chart 8.2).
Chart 2a. Temporal Dispersion of Characters (percentage and raw reference count)
Time
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The differentiation between the two speakers' character lists and their distribution over time
again reinforces Biden’s relatively limited temporality. Although most of each speaker’s narratives
are situated in the present (here, defined as including recent political history of the 21st century),
there is significant variation in how often each speaker references historical events. As opposed to
Biden, who makes only one reference to American history before the early 20th century (the
writing of the Constitution), Trump makes at least one reference to every temporal category,
including most epochs (the Pilgrims’ arrival, the American Revolution, Westward expansion, the
Civil War, and abolition of slavery, both World Wars, the Civil Rights era) that are traditionally
thought of as foundational in U.S. history. Trump also speaks in ahistorical terms (in reference to
God, America, and a generalized “we”), more frequently than Biden does.
2. Character Racialization
Apart from differences in time sequence, Biden and Trump’s speeches also differed
significantly in the extent to which they incorporated themes of racial diversity. Looking at the
relative racialization of each speech (see Chart 8.4), Biden made significantly more overt nonwhite racialized character references (11.29%) than Trump (4.29%), although both made roughly
the same proportion of references to explicitly white characters (individuals and groups of people),
with 12.21% and 12.56% respectively. Notably, Trump made a significant number of implicitly
racialized references (racial dog whistles) to characters such as “criminals” (speaking of the racial
uprisings of that earlier summer), “immigrants,” “the China virus” and “extreme jihadists”, as well
as groups acting in opposition to those groups such as “immigration enforcement,” and “law
enforcement.” 69
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Figure 2a: Racial References (individuals and groups of people only)

Although Trump did not then reference race overall as frequently as Biden (14.3% as
compared to 23.5% of total character references), he did do so in covert terms significantly more,
echoing the pattern found in Part One. Biden also referenced a greater number of overtly racialized
characters (see Chart 8.5), referencing Black characters at almost three times as often as Trump,
and referred to Hispanic Americans, Native Americans, and Asian Americans once each. In
comparison, Trump referenced only Hispanic Americans once and Arabs (from outside the United
States) twice.
When looking only at individuals and groups of people referenced (that is, discounting
references to racial demographics like “African Americans”), Biden continued to reference nonwhite characters more frequently; 39% of individuals and groups of people named were non-white,
as opposed to 15.46% of Trump’s references (see Chart 8.10, and also Figure 2a above). These
findings mostly cohere with my predictions (H2b), except for the fact that both speakers reference
overtly white characters roughly the same amount. For findings on how each frequently each
speaker references diversity pertaining to nationality, gender, and ideology refer to Chart 8.6, Chart
8.7 and Chart 8.8 respectively. To see how the rationale for inclusion of each of the speaker’s
characters, see Chart 8.9.
Overall, Trump’s speech does seem to contain stronger themes of historical continuity and
racial homogeneity when compared to that of Biden’s. His narrative is temporally thicker, and
more densely saturated with American history, which would seem to evoke the sense of historical
continuity correlated with socially essentialist themes.70 And with only 4.29% of references as
overt allusions of non-whiteness, it is also evident that Trump’s narrative adheres to historically
dominant American self-conception and traditional markers of national belonging – evoking white
racial hegemony while largely ignoring racial diversity.71 In comparison, Biden’s narrative was
much more situated in the present, harkening back to American history relatively little. His more
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frequent references to racial minorities (11.01% of total references) point to his efforts to structure
a more modern, inclusive American narrative. As will be expanded on below, the historical and
racial themes found in Trump’s speech are quite effective at pairing national and white racial
identity when compared to Biden’s.
3. Discussion of Narratological Themes
Biden
Biden’s DNC address is founded in urgency. Throughout the speech, he consistently
situates the 2020 election as a political crossroads which will have far-reaching consequences for
the country’s long-term stability and prosperity. Describing America at a historic “inflection
point,” simultaneously engaged in four moral-political crises (the coronavirus, the resulting
economic fallout, climate change, and a racial reckoning) that are challenging America on an
unprecedented scale, he nonetheless is optimistic in his message; “in this dark moment, I believe
we are poised to make great progress again. That we can find the light once more.”
This rhetorical motif of lightness and darkness is recurrent throughout Biden’s entire
speech; he speaks of the country as being in a “season of darkness,” with Trump being its
perpetrator, the one who “has cloaked America in darkness for far too long.” For the most part, the
motif of darkness is vague, and (besides specifically framing Trump as the cause of the darkness),
he discusses it mostly in terms of non-quantifiable, moral descriptors like “anger,” “fear,”
“division” and “unfairness.” Which events and phenomena this darkness specifically constitutes,
and what other actors may be perpetuating it, is left largely unanswered. Throughout the entirety
of Biden’s address, only Trump, Russia (for its foreign interference in U.S. elections), and the
white supremacists who protested in Charlottesville are framed as malignant actors. Biden thus
draws a delineation between Trump, the irredeemable creator of America’s darkness, and the
majority of his supporters who have only been “cloaked” in darkness (although he frames the white
supremacists of Charlottesville as similarly irredeemable). The “anger,” “fear,” and “division” that
have defined this season of darkness is only a temporary infection of the American public, who, at
their core, are “a good and decent people,” capable of returning to a “path of light.” In this way,
he frames the American public as a mostly passive entity, not creating political or moral outcomes
but enduring them.
This motif also carries a strong religious undercurrent, one that is cohesive with some of
the other language Biden uses in his speech, as well as a broader rhetorical tradition of evoking an
“American civic religion” a device that likely makes his speech more compelling to some listeners
by drawing on familiar national narrative elements.72 Particularly in Biden’s frequently recurring
call to “win the heart and soul of America,” America is personified as a sinful but redeemable
entity (particularly in regard to its racial history, as will be discussed below), challenged by dark
forces of evil but ultimately capable of being “reborn.” Biden thus implicitly frames himself as the
deliverer of redemption, capable of restoring “hope over fear, facts over fiction, fairness over
privilege.” He evokes the Christian belief in the power of “love and light” to ultimately prevail
over “darkness and evil,” optimistic that he and his campaign (an “ally of the light”) will overcome
the darkness of the Trump era. As he says, “May history be able to say that the end of this chapter
of American darkness began here tonight as love and hope and light joined in the battle for the
soul of the nation. And this is a battle that we, together, will win.” Biden also raises the stakes of
this moral battle by calling on America’s responsibilities as a global leader; part of our “great
purpose as a nation” is to “be a light to the world once again.”
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Though Biden predominantly uses ahistorical, moralistic terms to describe his campaign’s
vision, he also grounds his message through appeals to American history and iconographic
language. Most directly, he links himself to Franklin Roosevelt, another Democrat who met a dark
era of economic and public health crises with progressive reform. Using the historical era of the
1930s as an example, Biden suggests that contemporary problems must be met in the same fashion;
not only with similarly bold, progressive policies but also through the reunification of the
American people. He utilizes iconic, Constitutional language to sacralize the importance of unity,
calling for “We the People to come together…. I believe there is only one way forward. As a united
America. United in our pursuit of a more perfect Union.” In this way, he does not explicitly
acknowledge the divisive nature of progressive, New Deal-scale policies which he is advocating
for, but instead treats them as part of a larger existential project that transcends party lines;
“America isn't just a collection of clashing interests of Red States or Blue States....We're so much
better than that.” By deriding the “clashing interests” of each party, Biden then seems to bestow
his campaign with a higher moral purpose that rises above partisan battles and seeks to return
America to an era of light, the return of fundamental moral values; “Character is on the ballot.
Compassion is on the ballot. Decency, science, democracy are on the ballot.” Biden further signals
the moral gravity of his campaign by quoting Civil Rights activists Ella Baker and John Lewis,
covertly aligning his campaign with a larger historical battle for social justice in the United States.
However, Biden's message of moral redemption is complicated by a rhetorical confusion
in his argument about how morally worthy the United States in fact is. In some parts of his speech,
he suggests that America has historically been a site of moral good. The “darkness” of the Trump
era is just a temporary “season,” inhibiting America’s potential to be a “generous and strong,
selfless and humble” society; the next president’s job will be to “restore the promise of America
to everyone” [italics added]. Yet, in other moments, Biden frames the “promise of America” as
something which has yet to be achieved, suggesting that America has never been a truly moral
society. He speaks of the historical quest “to finally live up to and make real the words written in
the sacred documents that founded this nation that all men and women are created equal.” This
discrepancy is particularly glaring when Biden discusses racism; using language suggestive of
religious absolution, he asks “will we be the generation that finally wipes the stain of racism from
our national character?” In this characterization, the sin of racism has been an enduring attribute
of America’s national character, inseparable from it since its founding. He similarly frames the
lived American experience as one of exclusion and oppression in reference to his running mate
Kamala Harris; “Her story is the American story. She knows about all the obstacles thrown in the
way of so many in our country. Women, Black women, Black Americans, South Asian Americans,
immigrants, the left-out and left-behind.”
In this way, then, Biden contradictorily characterizes America both as a fundamentally
“good and decent” nation, but also as a site of racism, economic and social obstacles, where full
equality has never been realized; the lived American experience has not yet caught up with
American values. Biden extols the “idea” of America, something that has yet to be historically
achieved. And while he is optimistic about the potential of finally uniting them, of “mak[ing]
history and hope rhyme,” this characterization of America makes for a much more confusing
conception of what the nation is, and as an extension of this, what constitutes membership into it–
something which becomes problematic from a social identity theory perspective.
Biden’s speech contains zero explicit discussion of what makes someone an American; this
is significant in itself, but the vagueness of his conception of the nation becomes particularly clear
when following the implicit logic of the rhetorical constructions he does employ. If the legitimacy
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of being an American is definitively not predicated on historical inclusion (if the “American story”
is one of the “left-out and left-behind”), Biden seems to be suggesting that the basis for being an
American is respect for certain values, to be “generous and strong, selfless and humble.” And yet,
this characterization is weak, not only because he himself discusses how these values have not yet
been incorporated into American life (they are theoretical), but also because such so-called
American values are not characterized as distinctly American; using a globalist framework, he
pledges to “stand always for our values of human rights and dignity...work[ing] in common
purpose” with U.S. allies. The confusion is furthered because the refusal to adhere to certain
“American’ values isn’t grounds for exclusion from the American in-group; Biden is extremely
reticent to ostracize any subpopulation in the U.S. except for Trump and Neo-Nazis, likely because
of his broader rhetorical mission to “unite'' America again. For example, even in his discussion of
inequity, he speaks of the wealthy (a common villain in liberal political speech) in fairly neutral
terms; “I'm not looking to punish anyone. Far from it. But it's long past time the wealthiest people
and the biggest corporations in this country paid their fair share.” From a social identity theory
perspective, then, Biden’s in-group construction is fairly weak, with nebulously determined
boundaries and unclear norms of group membership.73
Trump
Most notable in Trump’s RNC speech is his discussion of threat. Whereas Biden’s central
motif of “darkness” is vague and non-personified, Trump’s speech is defined by his much more
concrete descriptions of the dominant threats facing the American people -- all of which are
tenuously linked or aligned in some way -- and his own role in “defend[ing] America against all
threats and protect[ing] America against all dangers.” This is particularly notable in comparison
to Biden, who specifies only Trump, Russia, white supremacy, and the pandemic as explicit threats
to the nation.
The entities which Trump most often references in terms of threat are the pandemic (36),
criminals (15), socialists (13), China (13) immigrants (11) and the political establishment (9). In
almost every case, he presents the threat as existentially urgent, and like Biden, frames the 2020
election as determinative of the United States’ long-term stability and prosperity; “... everything
we have achieved is now endangered. This is the most important election in the history of our
country.” The threats Trump describes play out on a multitude of dimensions, but all ultimately
pose a threat to the American way of life, often in converging ways. For example, China poses
both an economic threat (“stealing our jobs [and] ripping our country blind”) and a public health
one (for the “pandemic [they] allowed to spread around the globe”). Immigrants (often referred to
as “criminal aliens”) also pose both economic and national security threats (by “stealing YOUR
healthcare dollars” and violating U.S. borders) but are also heavily criminalized, labeled as “gang
members” and “human traffickers” and conflated with the larger criminal population of
“anarchists, agitators, rioters, looters, and flag-burners.” From his discussion of criminals more
broadly, with repeated references to the June racial uprisings of that year, it is clear Trump’s
conception of criminality is heavily racialized; he frames the “rioters and criminals” as unleashing
a state of violence into American streets and neighborhoods, dehumanizing them as “monsters”
and dismissing their aims as destructive and chaotic. The far left (often not clearly differentiated
from Democrats in general, nor with the “political establishment”) has not only enabled and
supported this chaos and threat, but also are aiding its destructive mission in the ideological and
religious spheres. Whether by their critique of Christian institutions or perpetuation of cancel
culture (“The far-left wants to coerce you into saying what you know to be FALSE, and scare you
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out of saying what you know to be TRUE”), Trump argues that “in every case, the attacks on
American institutions are being waged by the radical left.” Trump also makes frequent references
to the specific dangers facing women and children (such as foreign “human traffickers who prey
on women and children” and pro-choice liberals “who have no problem with stopping a baby's
beating heart in the ninth month of pregnancy”), raising the stakes of his threat construction by
evoking populations commonly seen as vulnerable and in need of protection.
At the nexus of all these sources of threat is Biden, who is a central figure in Trump’s
speech (referenced most frequently after “America” and Trump himself). Trump frames Biden not
only as a “weak” and incompetent leader, but one aligned with all the forces which are
fundamentally threatening American life. He is an ally of China (“Joe Biden's agenda is Made in
China”), immigrants (“He also supports deadly Sanctuary Cities that protect criminal aliens”),
criminals (“During their convention, Joe Biden and his supporters remained completely silent
about the rioters and criminals spreading mayhem...”), and the far left (“Biden is a Trojan horse
for socialism”). The time Trump spends speaking about and construing Biden as a threat is
particularly notable when compared to Biden’s speech, which references Trump about half as
much (not controlling for length) and never mentions him by name. Trump also provides a much
more detailed account of the threat that Biden represents (linking him to specific and preestablished forms of danger), as opposed to the vague “darkness” that Trump represents in Biden’s
speech. Biden then poses the most direct threat to the American people, representing the potential
unleashing of a multitude of malignant forces, which, until this point, Trump has deterred. By
framing the 2020 election as the final stand against these looming dangers, Trump raises the
saliency of out-group threat and provides a clear action (supporting Trump) to protect one’s ingroup.74
In this way, as Trump rhetorically constructs this plethora of threats, he simultaneously
works to present himself as a guardian of the “law-abiding” and “decent” American citizens, who
value the United States as it currently exists and are content to abide by its law and social practices.
Implicitly, he seems to suggest that these “real” Americans are Christian (“during the Democrat
Convention, the words ‘Under God’ were removed from the Pledge of Allegiance...The fact is,
this is where they are coming from”), and, by casting the heavily racialized criminal and immigrant
subpopulations as oppositional to America, also implicitly suggests they are white. This
racialization project remains implicit though (although tenuously so) because Trump does evoke
minority populations (African Americans and Hispanic- Americans) more favorably, primarily as
groups in need of his protection from a dangerous Democratic agenda (“Thousands more AfricanAmericans are victims of violent crime in these communities Joe Biden and the left ignore…”).
He also references two Black law enforcement officials (Miosotis Familia and David Dorn) who
were killed by anti-police protestors, muddling the liberal argument that law enforcement and the
Black community are fundamentally in conflict through anecdotal means. Here, Trump avoids
overt racism by differentiating “bad” minorities (the “rioters” and “criminals”) and “good”
minorities (those that unquestionably accept the current American order, especially law
enforcement, and by extension, are aligned with Trump himself), and in doing so, again construes
the left’s racial justice demands as illegitimate.
This rhetorical use of “good” African Americans is just one example of how Trump
politicizes what it means to be a “true” American as one who is loyal to current American
institutions. Simply put, to be a “good” American, in Trump's rhetorical framework, is to love
America. Trump frames patriotism as the key to building national unity (“We will rekindle... a
new spirit of unity that can ONLY be realized through love for our country”), but also as an
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enduring source of strength for Americans across history when faced with adversity; “What united
generations past was an unshakable confidence in America's destiny, and an unbreakable faith in
the American People...It is that conviction that inspired the formation of our union, our westward
expansion, the abolition of slavery, the passage of civil rights, the space program, and the
overthrow of fascism, tyranny and communism.” Under this construction of American identity,
the out-group status of Democrats is again reinforced, because they do not love their nation; “How
can the Democrat Party ask to lead our country when it spends so much time tearing down our
country?... they do not see America as the most free, just, and exceptional nation on earth. Instead,
they see a wicked nation that must be punished for its sins.” The premium Trump places on
American patriotism also fits clearly into historically dominant practices of American
exceptionalism and raises the moral status of Americans above all other foreign entities – as
opposed to Biden, who unfavorably compares the United States to the countries which have
surpassed it in their COVID-19 response (“It's not this bad...almost anywhere else in the world”
[Biden, 2020]).75
Trump is also responding directly in the above quote to Biden’s rhetorical use of religion
in his DNC speech, and rhetorically reverses his religious metaphor. While Biden frames the nation
as a historical being seeking salvation for its past sins (a redemption that he as a leader can
provide), Trump frames America as itself an immortal, quasi-divine source of moral strength,
providing guidance for various mythical American figures (Trump names Presidents Jefferson,
Lincoln, and Franklin D. Roosevelt, among several others) as they met the challenges of history.
The abstract “America” is then not in need of redemption from mortal actors but is itself a quasireligious guiding light. Biden’s rhetorical positioning of himself as a redemptive figure then
becomes almost sacrilegious; “in this country, we don't look to career politicians for salvation....
Joe Biden is not the savior of America's soul.” In Trump’s rhetorical project, America is not in
need of moral redemption, but of moral protection from a variety of evil forces. From a social
identity theory perspective, this construction of America is useful in bolstering in-group solidarity;
we are more likely to identify highly with our in-group if we perceive them as morally good.76
Throughout his entire speech, then, Trump constructs a heavily partisan framework of what
it means to be American. He builds an extensive and multidimensional dichotomy of who is
American (law-abiding, patriotic, implicitly Christian, implicitly white citizens) and who is not
(implicitly non-white, immigrants, amoral “criminals and anarchists,” and non-patriotic liberals)
– framing himself as an exemplar and protectorate of the former, and all his dissenters (and Biden
in particular) as proponents of their demise. As opposed to Biden who frames national identity as
above partisan division, Trump’s notion of who is “American” and who is a threat to it is thus
drawn directly along party lines, constructing the national boundary around “law-abiding,”
“decent,” and “obedient” Republican voters and situating liberals as an external threat. Even his
calls for national unity are predicated on the assimilation of Democrats and Independents into a
more ideologically correct form of patriotism; “The Republican Party...goes forward united,
determined, and ready to welcome millions of Democrats, Independents, and anyone who believes
in the GREATNESS of America.” In other words, Trump rhetorically brings national identity into
alignment with a set of other identities (racial, religious, and partisan), which have already become
increasingly associated with one another in this age of extreme polarization through a “social
sorting” process.77 Groups which many of Trump’s viewers may already feel at odds with
(dissident minorities, immigrants, liberals in general) are thus presented as a threat across multiple
dimensions of group identity (not only as a partisan threat but as a national one as well), which is
likely to tighten in-group solidarity and heighten out-group hostility even further.78
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This rhetorically powerful reduction of the national in-group and out-group is further
intensified by Trump’s more straightforward account of America’s moral worth. While Biden
speaks of America’s potential to become morally worthy once its practices and institutions come
into alignment with its proclaimed values (drawing nuanced distinctions between American
values, American history and American contemporary values), Trump provides a cohesive,
historically continuous narrative of America’s moral worth as an eternal “torch that enlightens the
world,” connecting the historical figures who have exemplified its values to the “decent”
contemporary American public–and himself. Like Biden, Trump also relates himself to past
American leaders, but instead of referencing a specific political moment (Franklin Roosevelt’s
leadership in the Great Depression), Trump frames himself as the inheritor of a much more
generalized and longer history of Americans (Teddy Roosevelt, Andrew Jackson, Thomas
Jefferson, Abraham Lincoln, Ulysses Grant, Dwight Eisenhower, and Franklin Roosevelt) who
persevered and protected the sanctity of the country in the face of adversity; “Like those brave
Americans before us, we are meeting this challenge.” The common link between them, in Trump’s
words, is again, an enduring love of country, the “towering American spirit [which] has prevailed
over every challenge.” In facing contemporary political threats, then, Trump presents a strong case
for optimism in America’s eventual victory over forces of evil, one which rests in a rich historical
legacy (as opposed to Biden, whose optimistic vision for America’s eventual redemption takes
place in an uncharted future).
This evocation of the enduring role of American perseverance is intensified by Trump’s
outright appeals to essentialist visions of America as an ancestral descendancy – a form of
nationalism linked to increased identity fusion and out-group hostility.79 Trump repeatedly uses
familial language to describe the national community, speaking of “our nation and its children,”
“our American ancestors,” and describing the U.S. as “one national family.” The history of
“American Ancestors” that Trump most strongly evokes is one of settler-colonialism, referencing
the age of “pioneers” more frequently than any other historical epoch (8 times). America is then,
at its core, a “nation of pilgrims, pioneers, adventurers, explorers and trailblazers who refused to
be tied down, held back, or reined in.” In glorifying America’s colonialist past, Trump evokes
long-standing Manifest Destiny narratives, which have historically grounded the American
exceptionalist self-conception.80 This obviously has potent racial implications; the history that
Trump extols is one of indigenous genocide, religious conversion and slavery, a history only white
Americans could see themselves descended from or draw pride from.81
In considering how each speech may be received through a social identity theory lens,
Trump’s narrative construction of America would then seem to speak to compounded sources of
social identity (national, racial, and partisan) when compared to Biden’s. Trump’s narrative style
also seems particularly likely to mobilize supporters through its frequent evocations of out-group
threats, conflating racial, national, and partisan outsiders into a single source of danger – and
framing Trump’s reelection as paramount to the in-group’s protection. In other words, Trump
frames support for his candidacy as a normative American in-group behavior; and, because his
construction of the American in-group is so clearly delineated and cohesive with other salient
forms of social identity (especially race and partisanship), he quite effectively utilizes national
identity constructions for his political benefit.
Conclusion
In this investigation, I set out to examine how Republican political elites rhetorically appeal
to national identity in the current political moment, where both the meaning and the value of “being
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American” has become increasingly polarized and contentious.82 Because of longstanding
associations between whiteness and American identity – an association that has become
increasingly overt in this era of heightened globalism and racial reckoning – and the racial
homogeneity of the Republican party, I predicted that Republican presidential candidates would
be more likely to evoke national narratives which appeal to both national and white racial
identities.83 I employed both “thin” and “thick” narrative analysis techniques to assess the nature
and strength of each party’s appeals to national identity and found that the Republican candidates
were indeed more likely to evoke themes of ancestral and historical continuity and racial
homogeneity in their political narratives than Democratic candidates. More specifically,
Republicans were significantly more likely than Democrats to reference traditional national
symbols more frequently than racial diversity; more likely to frame non-white populations as outgroup threats; and (at least in the case study of 2020 presidential convention speeches), were more
likely to use temporally rich and socially essentialist narratives of American history. Overall, it
appears that the rhetoric of Republican politicians in this sample both reflects and could in fact
work to exacerbate national identity’s contemporary associations with whiteness, as well as its
increasingly partisan connotations.84
To say with certainty how much the alignment of national identity with Republican identity
matters is impossible from just the findings of this project – which itself could be considerably
expanded upon. To gain a more comprehensive sense of the partisan relationship to national
identity on a “thin” level, the sample size could have been increased and the scale of inquiry could
have been expanded beyond the 2016 and 2020, to account for discrepancies in the sample sizes
(which accounted for two electoral cycles for Democrats, but only one for Republicans) -- as well
as to better gauge exactly how much partisan discrepancies in national narratives have shifted
between the elections. More controls also could have been added to account for the race and gender
(factors that have been shown to alter public perception of politicians) of the speakers in question.85
Perhaps most crucially, to understand exactly how these social identity appeals from political elites
are received by the public, future investigations that directly examine voter responses are needed;
such investigations would also help capture the effect of non-quantifiable elements (like the
rhetorical gravitas of the speaker) that are central to narrative analysis and cannot be adequately
captured by this analysis of written transcripts.86 Findings from this investigation would also be
well complemented by research on the relative saliency of national identity when compared to
other social identity categories and by updated research on the extent to which the public now
associates national identity with racial identities (i.e., updating studies such as those from DachGrushow and Hong [2006] and Devos and Banaji [2005] for the post-Trump era).
That being said -- to the extent that the alignment of national identity with white racial and
– by extension – Republican identities found in this investigation of political elite speech points to
a larger change, there are several important implications to consider. First, as findings in social
identity theory would suggest, the growing alignment of multiple social identities on the right lends
a powerful advantage to the Republican elite’s capacity to mobilize their base. As Mason and
Wronski write, “the convergence of social identities along partisan lines makes in-party preference
[ever] more powerful.”87 That is, the layering of multiple social identities (especially in this era in
which partisan, racial, and national identities are all extremely salient) leads to more extreme
adherence to the norms of one’s in-group.88As such, it may be significantly easier for Republican
elites to mobilize their base (to vote or to participate in other political projects) through social
identity appeals than it is for Democrats – whose comparatively diverse base prevents them from
capitalizing on multi-layered social identity appeals to the same degree.
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This phenomenon may also have important implications for broader trends of polarization
and democratic stability. Along with increasing adherence in-group norms and behaviors, the
increasingly overt alignment of national identity with partisan and racial identities could likewise
function to increase out-group hostility, taking current processes of polarization to new extremes.
Republicans may come to perceive Democrats as an even more serious “out-group” threat, one
external to the borders of even the broadest common in-group, provoking even greater political
hostility than is currently being seen today. The legitimacy of left-wing politicians may be
increasingly undermined by right-wing perceptions of Democrats as foreign -- perhaps generating
greater skepticism about the integrity of democratic institutions, as was seen following the 2020
presidential election. Taken to its far extremes, if national identity is no longer perceived as a nonpartisan basis for shared interests and solidarity, democratic function could become infeasible
altogether.89
Such a possibility is predicated on the globalist-nationalist feedback loop discussed above.
The more national identity is conflated with partisan and white racial identity, the more
disenchanted the left is likely to feel with it; and the more the left avoids evoking national identity,
the more prominent ethnocentric conceptions of the nation become (Lepore, 2019). This not only
has serious implications for democratic function in a multicultural (and currently deeply polarized)
state, but for the interpersonal and systemic treatment of racial and religious minorities,
immigrants, and foreigners. If the distinction between civically based patriotism and white
nationalism becomes gradually obscured, normative in-group behaviors associated with American
national identity (formally non-partisan and civically determined, such as voting) may be replaced
by more partisan, nativistic and overtly racially hostile behaviors.90 In other words, racist intolerant
behavior may gain renewed legitimacy if white nationalist conceptions of what it means to be an
“American” gain dominance.
Democratic national narratives thus serve important purposes that should not be hastily
disregarded. While evoking a sense of national pride and narrativizing a common history will
always be a more complex project for Democrats -- and one that will always stand in some degree
of tension with globalist liberal values -- ignoring the psychological predisposition toward ingroup favoritism will not make it go away.91 For better and worse, as long as the “nation” exists,
at least some portion of the American electorate will feel drawn to it as a source of group belonging
and purpose; but whether there exists an alternative to ethnocentric and outwardly hostile forms of
national identity is not necessarily a given.92 Democratic national narratives can then serve an
important democratic function, holding the potential to decouple white and national identity and
challenge the rising legitimacy of white nationalist rhetoric.
Democrats also may have a political interest in continuing to produce compelling, inclusive
national narratives. Collectively oriented, redistributive political projects (especially the largescale, progressive proposals which have been centered in the Biden era) become much more
politically feasible where national solidarity exists, where people feel the obligations and altruism
associated with in-group identification.93 And although Democrats may have a more complex
relationship with national identity (because of the greater identity cross-pressures intrinsic to their
coalition), they are not necessarily inhibited from producing compelling national narratives (such
as Barack Obama’s compelling narratives which center the quest for social justice and racial unity
in the American story), given the ever-fluctuating nature of national identity-construction. 94 While
Republicans have been advantaged in large part from adhering to a historically dominant national
narrative that centers whiteness and ancestral continuity, such a narrative is not predestined to
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remain dominant forever. National identity is malleable and arises historically and national
narrative remains a particularly promising site for reshaping its meaning.95
If anything, now — in this moment of contention over American history and values, with
rapid demographic change and racial upheaval — there may be an unprecedented opportunity to
center a new national narrative, to recalibrate civically derived national norms and standards of
belonging. As debates over Critical Race Theory in public schools have illustrated, dominant
national-historical narratives, which adhere to Manifest Destiny rhetorical traditions and smooth
over America’s troubled racial history, are becoming existentially challenged as they begin to ring
false for growing segments of the American public.96 With the proper utilization of narrative, the
American self-conception could be fundamentally transformed, deriving ulterior forms of pride
and purpose by incorporating new perspectives and characters into the national story – finding
coherency in our multiracial national identity by confronting racial trauma, rather than smoothing
it over.97 The key to ultimately overcoming white nationalism may not lie in renouncing the idea
of the nation altogether, but rather in the process of reimagining it.
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Appendices
The appendices for this paper can be found in the individual page for this paper.

28
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

188

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

Endnotes
1

Ballard, J. (2021, March 31). What Americans Think of the US Flag in 2021. YouGovAmerica.
https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/03/31/what-americans-think-american-flag-poll-data;
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005, March). American = White? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol
88(3), 447-466. https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2005-01818-003; Haidt, J. (2016). When and why nationalism beats
globalism. American Interest. 12 (1). https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-whynationalism-beats-globalism/.
2
Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018, February). One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments
Strengthen Partisanship. Political Psychology 3: 257–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12485.
3
Canovan, M. (1996). Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham, 3.
4
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. Yale University Press; Rustow, A. (1970). Transitions to
democracy. towards a dynamic model. Comparative Politics. 2(3):337–63.
5
Lieberman, E. S. (2003). Race and Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa. Cambridge
Studies in Comparative Politics; Wright, M., & Reeskens, T. (2013). “Of What Cloth Are the Ties That Bind?
National Identity and Support for the Welfare State across 29 European Countries.” Journal of European Public
Policy. 20 (10): 1443–63. https://doi.org/10.1080/13501763.2013.800796; Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or Nation?
Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. World Politics. 56, no. 3: 327-62.
http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054263
6
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American
Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 63–77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.
7
Transue, J. E. (2007). Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National
Identity as a Uniting Force. American Journal of Political Science, 51: 78-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15405907.2007.00238.x.
8
Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest ingroup
favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.
9
Ibid.
10
Gellner, E. (1983). Nations and Nationalism. Blackwell; Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities:
Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso.
11
Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest ingroup
favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.;
Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984, May). Effects of Group Identity on Resource Use in a Simulated Commons
Dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol 46(5), 1044-1057.
12
Kramer, R. M., & Brewer, M. B. (1984, May). Effects of Group Identity on Resource Use in a Simulated
Commons Dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol 46(5), 1045.
13
Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest ingroup
favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.;
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The Common Ingroup Identity Model:
Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias. European Review of Social Psychology. 4:1, 1-26.
https://doi/10.1080/1479277934300000.
14
Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest ingroup
favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.
15
Siromahov, M., Buhrmester, M., & McKay, R. (2020). Beliefs in national continuity are related to essentialist
thinking and to perceptions of the nation as a family. Nations and Nationalism. 26: 845– 863. https://doiorg/10.1111/nana.12640.
16
Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., & Rust, M. C. (1993). The Common Ingroup Identity Model:
Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias. European Review of Social Psychology. 4:1, 1-26.
https://doi/10.1080/1479277934300000.
17
Ibid.
18
Transue, J. E. (2007). Identity Salience, Identity Acceptance, and Racial Policy Attitudes: American National
Identity as a Uniting Force. American Journal of Political Science, 51: 78-91. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.15405907.2007.00238.x.
19
Canovan, M. (1996). Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham, 28.
20
Citrin, J., Wong C., & Duff, B. (2001). The meaning of American national identity: Patterns of ethnic conflict and
consensus. Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction. 71-100.; Huddy, L. & Khatib, N. (2007).

29
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

189

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American Journal of Political Science. 51 (1):
63–77. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.
21
Wall Street Journal/NBC News. (2019). NBC News/Wall Street Journal Poll, Public Opinion Strategies/Hart
Research Associates Dataset. Roper Center for Public Opinion Research.
https://doi.roper.center/?doi=10.25940/ROPER-31116709.
22
Black Lives Matter Utah Chapter. (2021). When we Black Americans See this Flag... Facebook.; Naylor, B.
(2021, February 10). Read Trump's Jan. 6 Speech, A Key Part of Impeachment Trial.
NPR. https://www.npr.org/2021/02/10/966396848/read-trumps-jan-6-speech-a-key-part-of-impeach.
23
Ballard, J. (2021, March 31). What Americans Think of the US Flag in 2021. YouGovAmerica.
https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/03/31/what-americans-think-american-flag-poll-data.
24
Zingher, J. N. (2014, September). An Analysis of the Changing Social Bases of America’s Political Parties: 1952–
2008. Electoral Studies. 35:272–82. https://doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014.02.003.; Sides, J., Tesler, M., &
Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for the Meaning of America.
Princeton University Press.
25
Edison Research. (2020). National Exit Polls: How Different Groups Voted.
https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2020/11/03/us/elections/exit-polls-president.html; Pew Research Center.
(2018). For Most Trump Voters, ‘Very Warm’ Feelings for Him Endured.
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validatedvoters/.
26
Citrin, J., Wong C., & Duff, B. (2001). The meaning of American national identity: Patterns of ethnic conflict and
consensus. Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction. 71-100; Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005,
March). American = White? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology. Vol 88(3), 447-466.
https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2005-01818-003.
27
Pew Research Center. (2018). For Most Trump Voters, ‘Very Warm’ Feelings for Him Endured.
https://www.pewresearch.org/politics/2018/08/09/an-examination-of-the-2016-electorate-based-on-validatedvoters/.
28
Citrin, J., Wong C., & Duff, B. (2001). The meaning of American national identity: Patterns of ethnic conflict and
consensus. Social identity, intergroup conflict, and conflict reduction. 71-100.; Smith, R. M. (1997). Civic Ideals:
Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. Yale University Press. 2-10.
29
Devos, T. & Banaji, M. R. (2005, March). American = White? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol
88(3), 447-466. https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2005-01818-003.
30
Dach-Gruschow, K., & Hong, Y-Y. (2006.) The Racial Divide in Response to the Aftermath of Katrina: A
Boundary Condition for Common Ingroup Identity Model. Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy. 6 (1): 125–41.
https:/doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2006.00110.x.
31
Dach-Gruschow, K., & Hong, Y-Y. (2006.) The Racial Divide in Response to the Aftermath of Katrina: A
Boundary Condition for Common Ingroup Identity Model. Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy. 6 (1): 125–41.
https:/doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2006.00110.x.; Gaertner, S. L., Dovidio, J. F., Anastasio, P. A., & Rust, M. C.
(1993). The Common Ingroup Identity Model: Recategorization and the Reduction of Intergroup Bias. European
Review of Social Psychology. 4:1, 1-26. https://doi/10.1080/1479277934300000.
32
Sidanius, J. & Pratto F. (2001). Social Dominance: An Intergroup Theory of Social Hierarchy and Oppression.
Cambridge University Press.
33
See also: Mills, C.W. (1997). The Racial Contract. Cornell University Press.; Coates, T-N. (2014). The Case for
Reparations. (Cover Story). The Atlantic 313 (5): 54–71.
https://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2014/06/the-case-for-reparations/361631/.; Omi, M., & Winant, H.
(2015). Racial Formation in the United States. Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group.
34
Smith, R. M. (1997). Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. Yale University Press. 3.
35
Sidanius, J., & Petrocik, J. R. (2001). Communal and national identity in a multiethnic state. Social identity,
intergroup conflict and conflict resolution. 3, 101-127.
36
Haidt, J. (2016). When and why nationalism beats globalism. American Interest. 12 (1). https://www.theamerican-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/
37
Ibid.
38
Lepore, J. (2019, March/April). A New Americanism: Why a Nation Needs a National Story.” Foreign Affairs 98
(2): 10–19. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-02-05/new-americanism-nationalism-jilllepore.
39
Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for
the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press.

30
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

190

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

40

Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018, February). One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments
Strengthen Partisanship. Political Psychology 3: 257–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12485.
41
Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for
the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press.
42
Prokop, A. (2021). A New Report Complicates Simplistic Narratives about Race and the 2020 Election. Vox.
https://www.vox.com/2021/5/10/22425178/catalist-report-2020-election-biden-trump-demographics.
43
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American
Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.
44
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American
Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 65. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.
45
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge, 22. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
46
Green, M. C. (2008). Research Challenges: Research Challenges in Narrative Persuasion. Information Design
Journal. 16 (1): 47-52. https://doi.org/10.1075/idj.16.1.07gre.
47
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge, 2. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
48
Prince, G. (1982). Narrative Analysis and Narratology. New Literary History. 13, no. 2: 4.
https://doi.org/10.2307/468908.
49
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
50
Shenhav, S. R. (2009). We Have a Place in a Long Story: Empowered Narratives and the Construction of
Communities: The Case of US Presidential Debates. Narrative Inquiry 19 (2): 199–218.
https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.19.2.01she.
51
Ibid.
52
Shenhav, S. R. (2005). Thin and Thick Narrative Analysis: On the Question of Defining and Analyzing Political
Narratives. Narrative Inquiry. 15 (1): 75–99. https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.15.1.05she.
53
Prince, G. (1982). Narrative Analysis and Narratology. New Literary History. 13, no. 2: 4.
https://doi.org/10.2307/468908.
54
Shenhav, S.R., Sheafer, T., Zoizner, A., van Hoof, A., Kleinnijenhuis, J., Kaplan, Y.R., & Hopmann, D. N.
(2021). Story Incentive: the Effect of National Stories on Voter Turnout. European Political Science Review. 13, no.
2: 249–64. https://doi.org/10.1017/S1755773920000399.; Siromahov, M., Buhrmester, M., & McKay, R. (2020).
Beliefs in national continuity are related to essentialist thinking and to perceptions of the nation as a family. Nations
and Nationalism. 26: 845– 863. https://doi-org/10.1111/nana.12640.
55
Siromahov, M., Buhrmester, M., & McKay, R. (2020). Beliefs in national continuity are related to essentialist
thinking and to perceptions of the nation as a family. Nations and Nationalism. 26: 845– 863. https://doiorg/10.1111/nana.12640.
56
Smith, R. M. (1997). Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. Yale University Press. 2-10;
Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their
role in identity politics. British Journal of Social Psychology. 44: 537-556.
https://doi.org/10.1348/014466605X27162.
57
Shenhav, S. R. (2009). We Have a Place in a Long Story: Empowered Narratives and the Construction of
Communities: The Case of US Presidential Debates. Narrative Inquiry 19 (2): 208.
https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.19.2.01she.
58
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge, 2. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
59
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
60
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005, March). American = White? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol
88(3), 447-466. https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2005-01818-003.
61
Dach-Gruschow, K., & Hong, Y-Y. (2006.) The Racial Divide in Response to the Aftermath of Katrina: A
Boundary Condition for Common Ingroup Identity Model. Analyses of Social Issues & Public Policy. 6 (1): 125–41.
https:/doi:10.1111/j.1530-2415.2006.00110.x.
62
Lopez, G. (2016, February 1). The Sneaky Language Today's Politicians use to Get Away with Racism and
Sexism. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2016/2/1/10889138/coded-language-thug-bossy.
63
Ibid.
64
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American
Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.
65
Smith, R. M. (1997). Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. Yale University Press. 2-10.
66
Shenhav, S. R. (2005). Thin and Thick Narrative Analysis: On the Question of Defining and Analyzing Political
Narratives. Narrative Inquiry. 15 (1): 75–99. https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.15.1.05she; Shenhav, S. R. (2015).
Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.

31
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

191

Dartmouth Undergraduate Journal of Politics, Economics and World Affairs, Vol. 1 [2022], Iss. 4, Art. 10

67

Shenhav, S. R. (2009). We Have a Place in a Long Story: Empowered Narratives and the Construction of
Communities: The Case of US Presidential Debates. Narrative Inquiry 19 (2): 199–218.
https://doi.org/10.1075/ni.19.2.01she.
68
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
69
Lopez, G. (2016, February 1). The Sneaky Language Today's Politicians use to Get Away with Racism and
Sexism. Vox. https://www.vox.com/2016/2/1/10889138/coded-language-thug-bossy.
70
Siromahov, M., Buhrmester, M., & McKay, R. (2020). Beliefs in national continuity are related to essentialist
thinking and to perceptions of the nation as a family. Nations and Nationalism. 26: 845– 863. https://doiorg/10.1111/nana.12640.
71
Smith, R. M. (1997). Civic Ideals: Conflicting Visions of Citizenship in U.S. History. Yale University Press. 2-10.
72
Onuf, P. S. (2012). American Exceptionalism and National Identity. American Political Thought. 1, no. 1: 77–
100. https://doi.org/10.1086/664594.; Hammer, S. (2010). The role of narrative in political campaigning: An
analysis of speeches by Barack Obama. National Identities. 12:3, 269-290,
https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2010.503439; Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge.
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.
73
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American
Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.
74
Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest ingroup
favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.
75
Onuf, P. S. (2012). American Exceptionalism and National Identity. American Political Thought. 1, no. 1: 77–
100. https://doi.org/10.1086/664594.
76
Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their
role in identity politics. British Journal of Social Psychology. 44: 537-556.
https://doi.org/10.1348/014466605X27162.; Doosje, B., Branscombe, N.R., Spears, R., & Manstead A.S.R. (1998).
Guilty by association: When one's group has a negative history. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology,
75(4): 872–886. https://doi.org/10.1037/0022-3514.75.4.872.
77
Mason, L., & Wronski, J. (2018, February). One Tribe to Bind Them All: How Our Social Group Attachments
Strengthen Partisanship. Political Psychology 3: 257–77. https://doi.org/10.1111/pops.12485.
78
Ibid.
79
Siromahov, M., Buhrmester, M., & McKay, R. (2020). Beliefs in national continuity are related to essentialist
thinking and to perceptions of the nation as a family. Nations and Nationalism. 26: 845– 863. https://doiorg/10.1111/nana.12640.
80
Onuf, P. S. (2012). American Exceptionalism and National Identity. American Political Thought. 1, no. 1: 77–
100. https://doi.org/10.1086/664594.; Tuveson, E. L. (1968). Redeemer Nation: The Idea of America's Millennial
Role. University of Chicago Press.
81
Liu, J. H., & Hilton, D. J. (2005). How the past weighs on the present: Social representations of history and their
role in identity politics. British Journal of Social Psychology. 44: 537-556.
https://doi.org/10.1348/014466605X27162.
82
Ballard, J. (2021, March 31). What Americans Think of the US Flag in 2021. YouGovAmerica.
https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/03/31/what-americans-think-american-flag-poll-data.
83
Devos, T., & Banaji, M. R. (2005, March). American = White? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, Vol
88(3), 447-466. https://psycnet.apa.org/buy/2005-01818-003; Haidt, J. (2016). When and why nationalism beats
globalism. American Interest. 12 (1). https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-whynationalism-beats-globalism/; Zingher, J. N. (2014, September). An Analysis of the Changing Social Bases of
America’s Political Parties: 1952–2008. Electoral Studies. 35:272–82. https://doi:10.1016/j.electstud.2014.02.003/.
84
Lepore, J. (2019, March/April). A New Americanism: Why a Nation Needs a National Story.” Foreign Affairs 98
(2): 10–19. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2019-02-05/new-americanism-nationalism-jilllepore; Ballard, J. (2021, March 31). What Americans Think of the US Flag in 2021. YouGovAmerica.
https://today.yougov.com/topics/politics/articles-reports/2021/03/31/what-americans-think-american-flag-poll-data.
85
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083;
Hutchings, V.L., Nichols, V.C., Gause, L., & Piston, S. (2021). Whitewashing: How Obama Used Implicit Racial
Cues as a Defense Against Political Rumors. Political Behavior. 43 (3): 1337–60. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11109020-09642-1; von der Malsburg, T., Poppels, T., & Levy, R. P. (2020). Implicit Gender Bias in Linguistic
Descriptions for Expected Events: The Cases of the 2016 United States and 2017 United Kingdom Elections.
Psychological Science. 31 (2): 115–28. https://doi.org/10.1177/0956797619890619.
86
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083.

32
https://digitalcommons.dartmouth.edu/dujpew/vol1/iss4/10

192

Editorial Board: Volume I | Issue IV | 2022

87

Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for
the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press, 274.
88
Sides, J., Tesler, M., & Vavreck, L. (2018). Identity Crisis: The 2016 Presidential Campaign and the Battle for
the Meaning of America. Princeton University Press; Haidt, J. (2016). When and why nationalism beats globalism.
American Interest. 12 (1). https://www.the-american-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beatsglobalism/.
89
Dahl, R. A. (1989). Democracy and Its Critics. Yale University Press; Rustow, A. (1970). Transitions to
democracy. towards a dynamic model. Comparative Politics. 2(3):337–63.
90
Huddy, L., & Khatib, N. (2007). American Patriotism, National Identity, and Political Involvement. American
Journal of Political Science. 51 (1): 63. http://www.jstor.org/stable/4122906.; Siromahov, M., Buhrmester, M., &
McKay, R. (2020). Beliefs in national continuity are related to essentialist thinking and to perceptions of the nation
as a family. Nations and Nationalism. 26: 845– 863. https://doi-org/10.1111/nana.12640.
91
Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social comparison and group interest ingroup
favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204. https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.
92
Haidt, J. (2016). When and why nationalism beats globalism. American Interest. 12 (1). https://www.theamerican-interest.com/2016/07/10/when-and-why-nationalism-beats-globalism/.
93
Canovan, M. (1996). Nationhood and Political Theory. Cheltenham; Lieberman, E. S. (2003). Race and
Regionalism in the Politics of Taxation in Brazil and South Africa. Cambridge Studies in Comparative Politics;
Miguel, E. (2004). Tribe or Nation? Nation Building and Public Goods in Kenya versus Tanzania. World Politics.
56, no. 3: 327-62. http://www.jstor.org/stable/25054263; Turner, J. C., Brown, R. J., & Tajfel, H. (1979). Social
comparison and group interest ingroup favoritism. European Journal of Social Psychology. 9(2), 187–204.
https://doi.org/10.1002/ejsp.2420090207.
94
Hammer, S. (2010). The role of narrative in political campaigning: An analysis of speeches by Barack Obama.
National Identities.12:3, 269-290, https://doi.org/10.1080/14608944.2010.503439.
95
Shenhav, S. R. (2015). Analyzing Social Narratives. Routledge. https://doi.org/10.4324/9780203109083;
Patterson, M., & Monroe, K. R. (1998). Narrative in Political Science. Annual Review of Political Science.1 (1):
315. https://doi.org/10.1146/annurev.polisci.1.1.315; Anderson, B. (1983). Imagined Communities: Reflections on
the Origin and Spread of Nationalism. Verso.
96
Fortin, J. (2021, July 27). Critical Race Theory: A Brief History. New York Times.
https://www.nytimes.com/article/what-is-critical-race-theory.html?searchResultPosition=2.
97
Grant, S-M. 2020. Toward a topography of national trauma: mapping the past onto the future of American
nationalism. Nations and Nationalism. 26, 366– 387. https://doiorg.coloradocollege.idm.oclc.org/10.1111/nana.12491.

33
Published by Dartmouth Digital Commons, 2022

193

